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In this thesis the author investigates the rationality of religious belief. In the first chapter he 
critically discusses the two main strands of classical epistemology (internalism and externalism), 
while focusing on the internalist view of foundationalism. Foundationalists maintain that certain 
propositions are basic in a rational belief system. These are rationally justified when apprehended, 
thus they serve as a foundation for knowledge. Formulating a criterion to determine what basic 
beliefs are has proven to be an insurmountable difficulty for foundationalism, however. The author 
argues that there is no rationale for strict criteria of basic beliefs. In the second chapter, he considers 
a group of philosophers (the reformed epistemologists) who recognize this problem of the criterion of 
foundational beliefs, yet still hold that it is correct to think that religious belief has foundations. They 
appeal to a descriptive sense of basicality, and not one that is supported by strict logical criteria. If 
one can see that a belief acts as a ground of his belief system in a moment when it is apprehended, 
the reformists argue, one can claim that it is de facto foundational. In the third chapter the author 
considers uncanny similarities in investigative style between the reformed epistemologist and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, though he eventually focuses upon two differentiating features. He argues 
that Wittgenstein is right to claim that basic beliefs ought not be a focus of rationality. Basic beliefs, 
like "God exists", are held in place by non-basic beliefs which determine what God's existence 
amounts to. Taken as it is, "God exists" expresses nothing. It is not a foundation for belief in God, 
but like an axis around which non-basic beliefs revolve. The second difficulty that the reformist 
faces, the author argues, is that if one need only describe how a belief acts as a foundation of 
knowledge in a particular circumstance, then it seems that nearly any belief could conceivably be a 
foundation of knowledge. One need only appeal to justifying circumstances in which a belief could 
be described as acting foundationally. Conversely, he shows that Wittgenstein can argue against 
this charge, but it stands in the way of fully accepting reformed epistemology as an epistemology of 
religious belief.
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to critically investigate the views about the 
rationality of religious belief from within the work of traditional epistemology to 
reformed epistemology, on to the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The reader 
will be guided through evaluative discussions concerning the common conceptions 
of knowledge that are held by traditional epistemologists. At the end of that 
journey the work of the reformed epistemologists1 will be isolated and considered. 
The reformists have their epistemological roots steeped in traditional soil, yet even 
though their method of inquiry stems from the tradition, their views about the 
rationality of theistic belief are foreign to it. The reformists consideration of 
epistemogical principles, and use of language are reflective of the tradition, but 
their rigorous inquisitive focus on religious belief is not. My reason to isolate their 
work is motivated by the thought that their views are reminiscent of the 
philosopher who I believe has the best position concerning reason and religious 
belief, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's thoughts on religious belief are 
considered non-canonical. I intend to segregate the few points that keep the 
reformists from indorsing Wittgenstein's view, and by implication, severing 
themselves completely from traditional epistemology.
Recent forms of critical philosophical projects ranging from the metaphysics 
of Alfred North Whitehead, to the linguistics of Paul de Man, to the "laissez-faire" 
pragmatism of Richard Rorty, partly surround the view that traditional 
epistemology has a conception of knowledge which is far too limiting. The 
tradition assumes that there must be necessary and sufficient conditions of 
knowledge. To argue for particular conditions of knowledge is necessarily a path 
which leads to isolating particular kinds of beliefs that conform to those conditions, 
and excluding the beliefs which do not. Many contemporary philosophers have 
argued that the beliefs which are excluded from the domain of propositions of 
knowledge have been unjustifiably dismissed. The search to find necessary and 
sufficient conditions of knowledge is possible for traditional philosophers because 
their conception of philosophy involves the assumption that we can discover what
’I will refer to the philosophers that affirm the project of reformed epistemology by using the terms 
reformed epistemologists, reformed philosophers, reformed thinkers, or reformists (this last term 
ought not be confused with those who are considered theologians of the reformation). The 
philosophers I principally have in mind are George I. Mavrodes, William P. Alston, George 
Marsden, D. Holwerda, Nicholas Wolterstorff and Alvin Plantinga.
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all knowledge must entail through one kind of investigation. This view suggests 
that we can discover the conditions of knowledge which govern all contexts in 
which a proposition of belief may be held. This is the post-enlightenment 
conception of philosophy.
In the first chapter a description will be given of the core of traditional 
epistemology as a debate between the internalists and the externalists. The 
internalists (which include the coherence and foundations theorists) maintain that 
all knowledge comes from our sensations of the empirical world. Propositions of 
knowledge are analyzed in terms of our mental processes about that sensory input. 
What this implies is that necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge are 
internal to the mental state of knowing. Therefore, knowledge is a state of mind.
By their style of investigation we can distinguish the mental state of believing from 
the mental state of knowing. With the aid of the Wittgensteinian Norman 
Malcolm, I will reject this view because knowledge is not a mental condition but a 
steadfast reaction to undeniable truths that are expressed in our activity. Knowing 
proposition S means that it cannot be doubted, and the concept of doubt has no 
weight, currency, or role in relation to proposition S. Knowing does not involve an 
analysis of our states of mind. We know proposition S if it cannot be doubted in 
the particular context in which proposition S is apprehended.
The externalists (which include the reliabilists and the probabilists) hold that 
we must investigate our mental processes along with aspects of the environmental 
conditions of our sensing which may not be mentally accessible to us, yet are 
relevant to making claims of knowledge. The reliabilists assert that knowing 
involves acquiring a belief by a trustworthy belief forming mechanism that 
consistently yields true beliefs. The probabilists hold that probabilities can 
determine what one can justifiably believe. If a belief is not at least probably true, 
then it is not justified. I will argue that reliabilism is much preferable than 
probabilism, but only in terms of justifying propositions of empirical belief.
Confusion arises if one applies the externalist theories to analyze religious 
propositions. The theories provide no place for the concept of certainty. If we 
examine the sense of religious propositions in the life of St. Paul or St. Peter (who 
suffered greatly for their beliefs, yet endured because of their conviction), we see 
that the proper characterization of their beliefs must be in terms of certainty. 
Externalist theory is too constrained to accommodate the natural sense that 
religious beliefs often have in the life of a devotee. The first chapter will be
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comprised of detailed discussions and critical analyses concerning the major issues 
which surround the internalist and externalist positions.
The internalist theory of foundationalism is most dominant in traditional 
epistemology and will receive the majority of attention in the first chapter. 
Foundationalists hold that there are two kinds of propositions. One kind are 
foundational propositions which are rationally justified the moment that a person 
attains one, and simultaneously, understands its truth. They are the foundations of 
our knowledge. Foundationalists normally assert that these propositions are ones 
of immediate sense impression. We will see that they have a very narrow  view of 
what are foundational propositions. The other kind of proposition is non- 
foundational. Propositions of this sort are not immediately known when they are 
apprehended. They need to be logically connected to foundational beliefs in order 
to attain any rational standing. W hat follows from this is that propositions of 
aesthetic and moral judgement, or religious belief are never considered to be 
foundational. They are in need of rational support. These propositions are (at 
most) reliant upon some logical connection to a foundational proposition, or they 
are (at least) mere expressions of sentiment or attitude.
The analysis of these propositions leave no room for objectivity or truth.
The tradition argues that one can never hold them as propositions which issue 
certainty. These propositions are judged as having a degree of certainty in as much 
as they are logically connected to a foundational proposition. Wittgenstein and the 
reformed philosophers recognize, however, that this philosophical project cannot 
be justified as the tribunal to which all propositions of belief come to be judged. 
They argue that what may be a foundational proposition in one context may not be 
in another. To put it another way, all beliefs cannot be reduced to a single kind; as 
if all propositions of knowledge, in some way, stem from sense perception.
In the second chapter I will consider the reformist's view of the rationality of 
religious belief and investigate their claim that religious propositions can issue 
knowledge. We will see that they come out of the internalist strand of 
foundationalism. Reformed philosophers also consider a rational belief system to 
be a kind of upward-reaching logical structure with self-justified beliefs in its 
foundation. Traditional foundationalists assert that propositions which are self- 
evident, incorrigible or evident to the senses are the only ones that qualify as self­
justified. If a subject has one of those three propositions in the foundation of her 
belief system, then she can build a rational belief structure. I will investigate the
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reformist's argument that traditional foundationalists cannot rationally support 
their claim of what kind of proposition m ust be a self-justified one. In seeing that it 
is rationally irredeemable to assert that there are particular criteria to determine 
w hat kind of proposition must be a self-justifying one, I will show that the 
reformed epistemologists affirm an immanently relented sense of basicality. A 
belief that can be described as basic for a person's belief system in the moment and 
circumstance in which it is apprehended, they argue, forces us to concede that the 
belief is de facto a basic one. It is by this argument that they feel justified in 
submitting certain kinds of basic religious propositions in the foundations of a 
belief system, and claim that religious belief is rational.
In the third chapter the later work of Wittgenstein will be discussed and the 
reformist's project will be reflected upon by its light. We will see that for 
Wittgenstein what counts as a proposition of knowledge is contingent upon a 
context of believing, thus all propositions of knowledge cannot be reduced to a 
single kind, e. g. aesthetic, moral, religious, or empirical. He comes to this 
conclusion by inquiring into the use of concepts in our language and showing how 
sense and nonsense is distinguished within a form of discourse. He does not enter a 
philosophical investigation in terms of what can and cannot be rationally justified 
before investigating a particular instance of believing. There is no Archimedean 
concept of rationality to discover, and then apply to all forms of propositions. This 
is because the very concept of what is rational, or what are propositions of 
knowledge, is determined from within a context and not from an abstract 
conception of reasonableness. Traditional epistemologists are bound to a 
generalized form of investigation because they seek necessary and sufficient 
conditions of knowledge. They inevitably lack an understanding about how 
different, and often incommensurable, conceptual uses can be. They cannot 
appreciate the different uses of the concept of knowledge. We cannot assert, 
Wittgenstein argues, that there is one form of rationality, nor one particular set of 
propositions which can be rationally justified.
Throughout my detailed discussion of Wittgenstein's general points about 
knowledge and belief, we will see that many of his views are in agreement with the 
work of the reformists. Towards the end of the third chapter I will focus upon two 
points of divergence, however. I take these two points to be that which leads an 
epistemologist of religion to fully appreciate the work of Wittgenstein, while 
recognizing the weaknesses of reformed epistemology. Firstly, the reformed
4
epistemologists understanding of what basic beliefs are, and how they function in 
our belief systems, is problematic and leads to serious consequences. For the 
reformists basic beliefs are what the philosopher m ust focus upon in order to 
evaluate the rationality of belief. They focus on moments of belief acquisition 
which involve the apprehension of an exclusively particular proposition that can be 
described as the basis of one's belief system. Their discussions revolve around 
circumstances of forming the belief that "God is to be thanked and praised" or 
"God disapproves of what I have done" for instance, while never considering the 
simple, and in my mind truly fundamental (basic) proposition, "God exists". I will 
argue that "God exists" m ust be fundamental because if one does not firstly believe 
in a God, then it is nonsensical for one to offer Him praise. The reason that the 
reformists do not discus "God exists" in terms of acquiring basic beliefs seems 
obvious. It is truly difficult to think of a particular contextual circumstance when 
one would apprehend that belief alone.
Wittgenstein teaches us to look at the logic which is embedded in our 
ordinary conceptual and linguistic use. When we take his advice we can see that 
truly basic religious beliefs (like "God exists") are never, or rarely if ever, 
considered on the level of consciousness. He asks us to describe the sense that 
concepts have in our language. The proposition "God exists", as a basic belief, says 
very little if anything at all. We cannot determine what the existence of God 
amounts to, or means. The sense and nonsense in our language is determined by 
the clarity or obscurity in our expressions of meaning. The role of the concept of 
the existence of God takes shape and is enmeshed within our beliefs about what it 
means to serve God, love God, treat others in God, to feel guilt before God, to 
know that God is to be praised, and so on. When we investigate our behavior in 
the world and see how it reveals w hat we believe and the logic of it, the truly basic 
proposition "God exists" is not secured in a belief system because it is self-evident, 
or for any other reason. It is not held in isolation from how a believer in God 
behaves. This basic proposition is held fast by non-basic beliefs. It is not the 
ground of a religious belief system, but like an axis or nexus of meaningfulness. If 
the proposition "God exists" says very little by itself, then there is very little that it 
can mean epistemologically. The foundationalist and Wittgenstein agree about 
what basic religious beliefs are, but they have opposing views about their 
epistemological significance . Basic beliefs are the origin of the rationality of a 
belief system for the foundationalist. For Wittgenstein they are implicit in our
belief systems, and reveal nothing about the rationality of our beliefs. I will argue 
that basic propositions ought not be the focus of an epistemological inquiry. We 
ought to focus on the clarity of the logic in our language. The reformist's view of 
basic beliefs is a mischaracterization of the role that our truly fundamental beliefs 
have.
The above reason to argue against reformed epistemology applies a fortiori to 
my second argument for rejecting their work in light of Wittgenstein. Because the 
sole focus of rationality is on how a belief can be described as the basis of a belief 
system in a particular kind of experience, they have great difficulty claiming that 
not just any belief can be held rationally. I will show that we can imagine many 
obscure and superstitious beliefs being held rationally from within their style of 
investigation. Conversely, it is Wittgenstein who successfully argues that not just 
any beliefs can be held rationally.
In focusing on the sense and nonsense of our conceptual use, Wittgenstein 
shows that many beliefs that we have about the empirical world or historical facts, 
for instance, dramatically clash with some religious beliefs. A very obscure, or 
muddled, understanding of the concepts being used in conjunction with each other 
is revealed in these cases. Wittgenstein shows that we can criticize such beliefs as 
the apocalyptic book of Revelation was written to predict a certain historical event 
that will take place exactly as it is said in the last book of the New Testament. If we 
investigate the research of eschatologists and the evidence that they have for their 
understanding of that book, we will see that it is one of many books of that kind 
which was written as devotional literature in support of communities who endured 
(or anticipated enduring) persecution. To believe that it is predictive, or an oracle 
depicting historical inevitability, is to ignore historical developments and the 
attitudes of the first Christians who wrote it. It is to ignore historical facticity. This 
historical fact, and believing the book of revelation predicts historical affairs, 
mutually exclude each other. This kind of observation cannot be sustained in the 
work of the reformists. We can imagine a person being struck by the belief that 
Revelation is literally true while he is reading it, and seeing that belief as 
descriptively basic for him. Wittgenstein shows that historical truths surrounding 
the purpose of the book inform us about what can be religiously believed about it. 
Not just any belief about the book can be rationally held.
Through this comparative philosophical journey I hope to show that 
Wittgenstein's work concerning the rationality of religious belief is much
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preferable than traditional epistemology. I will argue that it is better than the most 
discussed contemporary analytic philosophical view about reason and religious 
belief: reformed epistemology. The reformist faces grave and insurmountable 
problems, because his view of the rationality of religious belief paradoxically 
provides room for irrational beliefs.
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CHAPTER ONE
Traditional Epistemology and Foundationalism : 
a Preface for Reformed Epistemology
I. Introduction
The post-enlightenment conception of rationality is the over-arching, or 
enveloping attitude, of traditional epistemology. This conception suggests that we 
can make general declarations about what knowledge is by discovering what is 
justifiably believed through an investigation into rationality. This attitude 
embraces the assertion that there are necessary and sufficient conditions of 
knowledge. In this chapter I will describe the typical aspects and areas of traditional 
epistemology; the field of philosophy which produces such theories of knowledge.
I will limit my description to aspects of epistemology that are what I take to lie at 
its center, and leave unorthodox conceptions, fringe views, nuances, and aspects of 
the discipline aside. This will involve drawing a stark contrast between the main 
ways of viewing, and thus analyzing, knowledge. In proceeding this way, I will 
present the spirit and kind of thinking that this entire area of philosophy is imbued 
with. The intention of this rather long prelude to reformed epistemology is to 
provide the reader with some detail of what I take to be the central issues of 
traditional epistemology. Classical epistemology, generally conceived, will be the 
background of the object of my critique. It is by this traditional horizon of 
philosophical investigation into knowledge that we will see reformed 
epistemology most clearly and forcefully.
The particular focus of this chapter will be on foundationalism because of its 
overwhelming influence in epistemology. By direct association, the spirit of 
foundationalism is a major driving force behind the work of reformed 
epistemology. I will clarify and critically discuss foundationalism by seeing how it 
fits within the two most dominant conceptions of knowledge. The two most
dominant domains of investigation into knowledge are generally called internalist 
and externalist perspectives. Throughout my explication and argument against 
these two domains of inquiry, I will use the influential work of John L. Pollock as a 
focal point, because he, in my mind, has presented these views forcefully, thus 
paradigmatically.1
I must qualify my initial intention of drawing a stark contrast between 
internalism and externalism. I recognize that I am flirting with ambiguity in 
trying to draw a stark contrast between these two views. It is a distinction, 
nonetheless, that I (and many others) take to lie at the center of understanding 
contemporary epistemology. At least, it is a distinction that helps to understand 
the nuances concerning the dominant strands of investigative foci in epistemology. 
Most epistemologists seemingly promote kinds of hybrids between these two 
ideological poles. Any sort of detailed discussion about these hybrids is to my 
mind well beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter and thesis, however. 
Nevertheless, because of the difficulties in characterizing contemporary 
epistemology in terms of the internalists versus the externalists, Laurence Bonjour 
writes, "...epistemologists often use the distinction...without offering any very 
explicit explication."2 Also, Richard Fumerton writes, "...I am not certain that [the 
distinction] has been clearly defined." He continues, "...it is probably foolish to 
insist that there is only one 'correct' way to define the distinction."3 Understanding 
that my task at hand would indeed be a foolish one if I suggested that this chapter 
is definitive, I will nevertheless attempt to highlight these general attitudes toward 
the contemporary definitions of knowledge and justification even if they are rough 
characterizations.
The internalist holds that one finds beliefs justified by means of an analysis of 
one's "internal states". By " internal states" the internalist is understood as solely 
investigating immediate sense perception or acts of the mind, for instance. These 
are cognitive processes that we have "direct access" to. Furthermore, internalism 
only concerns itself with what the subject is mentally aware of, i.e. the beliefs one 
has about an object. Immediate sense perception as well as acts of the mind are said 
to be directly accessible because we are not required to have beliefs about them
'This exposition of internalism and externalism will primarily be guided by Pollock's book 
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New Jersey, 1986).
2Laurence Bonjour, "Externalism/Internalism", in Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (eds) A  
Companion to Epistemology (Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1992), p. 131.
3Richard Fumerton, "The Internalism/Externalism Controversy", in Ernest Sosa (ed) Knowledge and 
Justification, Vol. 1 of 2 Vols., (Dartmouth Publishing Company, Brookfield, VT, 1994), p. 584.
9
before we have knowledge of them. For instance, when we perceive a red ball there 
is no mistake that we perceive, regardless of the external fact of a red ball actually 
being in our field of vision. Perception is understood, then, as a mental act or event. 
Conservatively we can say that we perceive a red spheroid in our visual field. It is a 
pre-reflexive (meaning prior to reflection or reasoning) report of perception. But 
how can these reports of perception be deemed justified as knowledge?
The thrust of internalism is, as John Pollock writes, "...that the justifiedness of 
a belief is determined by whether it was arrived at or is currently sustained by
"correct cognitive processes"."4 It can be said generally that internalism affirms 
cognitive essentialism. This means that the justifiability of a belief is a function of 
one's internal states, or cognitive processes. Furthermore, anything other than the 
mental process can be altered, but that will not affect the conclusion of which beliefs 
are justified. Epistemic correctness is a part of a mental process and cannot be found 
wanting by the reliability of it outside the mind. By the "reliability of the process 
outside the mind" I mean to suggest the determination of causal relationships 
between objects in the world and our ideas about them. For the internalist all that 
can be considered in the analysis of knowledge is our stock of beliefs, which include 
correct and incorrect cognitive processes. The correctness of a cognitive process is 
not caused by events outside the mind. Mental processes, whether correct or 
incorrect, are embedded in, or internal to, our stock of beliefs. So, because the 
determination of epistemic correctness is the path to justifying beliefs, and that 
involves analyzing the correctness of mental processes which are part of the stock of 
beliefs that we already have about the world, justifying beliefs is an internal affair. 
Ultimately, knowledge for the internalist is a state of mind. In the section on 
internalism I will describe their position and critically discuss why they proceed in 
this way, how they understand "correct cognitive processes", and how the domain 
of justified beliefs is limited by this evaluative procedure.
I will argue against the internalist view of knowledge mainly because of its 
insistence on cognitive essentialism. For us to make a claim of knowledge of 
external objects there must be some manner in which we can justify their existence 
in the actual world, which is apprehended via perception. This general intuition 
suggests that to know an object at least involves a belief that one can trust that there 
is a reality of the object outside of the mind; that for knowledge, acts of the mind
4
John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New Jersey, 
1986), p. 22.
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involving belief of objects must connect logically with an actuality, facticity, of the 
existence of an object in the world. It is this place for the facticity of objects of 
knowledge that is indispensable when considering empirical propositions.
It is true that some internalists have made a distinction between an object and 
the properties of the object. They intuit that the beliefs stemming from the 
sensations of an object are distinct from knowing its facticity. The properties of an 
object (smell, taste, color and so on) need not be associated, in terms of 
representation, with the object itself. This was put forward by John Locke who drew 
a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. For Locke the facticity of an 
object is tied to its primary qualities, such as extension. He suggests that the 
secondary qualities of an object are somehow separate from its primary qualities.
To concretely distinguish between the two we could imagine, for example, the 
myriad of kinds of yogurt that exist. Given that there are many differences in kinds 
of yogurt, there seems to be something primary, or essential to them. The 
secondary qualities (flavor, color, and smell) are not integral for yogurt to be 
yogurt. If one changes its primary qualities, then one no longer has yogurt, but 
another object. One can change its flavor, color and smell however w ithout altering 
its essence. So, with this in mind, secondary qualities alone cannot issue knowledge 
of an object; to know an object involves apprehending the primary qualities. There 
is a crucial relation between primary and secondary qualities of course; in some 
sense one influences the other. Locke's intuition is that what an object is in some 
sense affects our sensations of the object. Conversely, the secondary qualities of an 
object stem from the primary ones. Nevertheless, given this qualification, the 
distinction between secondary and primary qualities in the yogurt example still 
stand. Therefore, for Locke, objectivity is linked to our sensibility. Knowing an 
object, at least in part, involves being aware of the distinction and relation between 
its primary and secondary qualities. This distinction is not satisfying because it is 
confusing to consider the knowledge of objects in the world as being, in some sense, 
a matter of duality.5 This duality is operative, in a way, when distinguishing 
between whatever is an object's primary qualities and the representation of the 
object (secondary qualities).
^his form of objection to Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is 
well known. George Berkeley's work is considered the locus classicus of these objections.
See his Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999).
When we speak of an object in the world we do so in its entirety, a distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities do not assist us, nor clarify the condition, 
of knowing. The representation of an object is the object as a whole. Within the 
representation of an object is the presupposition of its primary qualities also. The 
representation of an object is nothing like a fine sheen or veil that can conceal the 
ontological reality underneath. It is asserted that knowing the taste, smell, and 
color of an object is analytically distinct from the "object itself". My objection is not 
to say that that is logically negligent, but what could that "object-in-itself" be? We 
eat strawberry yogurt, throw red cricket balls, and smell the aroma of espresso. The 
identification of objects is intimately bound to what Locke calls the secondary 
qualities. We know the primary qualities of an object by virtue of its secondary 
qualities. Ultimately, when we make claims of knowledge such a distinction does 
not assist us, but confuses w hat it means to know objects in our ordinary 
experiences.
Having reached an understanding of internalism I will turn to externalism. 
Externalism can briefly be described as a rejection of internalism, because of the 
internalist insistence on the principle of cognitive essentialism. Quite simply the 
externalist holds that more than just the internal states of a believer m ust be 
involved in finding a belief to be justified. A major point of contention for the 
externalist is the idea that the conditions of knowledge are internal to cognitive 
processes; that there are correct cognitive processes regardless of circumstance or 
environment, e.g. external justifying factors. An externalist may hold that the 
justifiability of a belief is as the internalist claims it is; namely, that the epistemic 
worth of a belief is determined by the cognitive process from which it comes. 
However, they would claim that the correctness of a mental process is not 
exclusively internal or essential to the process, but verifiable by investigating the 
environmental conditions of an object of knowledge. Ultimately, externalism holds 
that more than internal states of mind can be included in justifying beliefs.
Cognitive processes become subject to circumstantial scrutiny. For example, color 
vision is thought to be a reliable hum an faculty. If color vision varied radically we 
would not have confidence in its reliability. We see that color vision does not vary 
radically by examining the outside world and recognize great consistency with 
respect to it. By this example, we can distinguish a correct report of color vision 
from an incorrect one by an evaluation of the environment. This evaluation would 
establish if an environment allowed for normal conditions of color representation.
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If I wore glasses with red colored lenses the correctness of my perception of objects 
in the world would be contingent on the external factor of my glasses. The 
externalist maintains that some cognitive processes are correct in some 
circumstances and not in others.
The internalist would probably respond by insisting that the externalist 
misunderstands the phenomenon of knowing and, thus, subordinates it by focusing 
on irrelevant circumstantial contingencies or external factors. He would claim that 
knowledge is not determined by an assessment of states of affairs, or environmental 
circumstances, because knowing is a state of mind. If knowledge is a state of mind, 
it is uniform in all circumstances of knowing. If knowledge is contingent upon 
states of affairs, the internalist insists, it loses its rationalist weight as a mental 
phenomenon and becomes, partly, an issue of fact finding in the world.
For the externalist, however, we m ust rely on those facts to tell us what 
mental processes are reliable and in w hat circumstances. At least to some degree in 
externalism, knowing is divorced from mental processes alone. The correctness of 
what affairs are like outside of the m ind is not a part of the mental phenomenon of 
knowing for the internalist. Generally, the externalist wants to say that the 
justifiability of beliefs is determined by a mental process and its connection with the 
outside world. The two externalist sub theories that I will discuss are reliabilism 
and probabilism.
I will argue against externalism even though the theory meets my objection 
with respect to internalism in terms of the justification of empirical knowledge. I 
agree that beliefs about an external object require an investigation into the 
environmental states of affairs or conditions in order for a judgement of rationality 
of the belief to be made. However, isn 't that a commonplace assumption? When we 
make reports about our vision we ordinarily register our environment in which we 
see the world. This is what I gather epistemologists mean when they talk about 
beliefs being justified by mental processes and their connection with the outside 
world.
I will not accept internalism or externalism in light of the questions raised by 
Norman Malcolm. For the most part6 , 1 will be referring to his treatment of some
of these issues in his essay Knowledge and Belief. There he asks, "Can I discover in
6I will apply Malcolm's critique to internalism. I will appeal to his general philosophical orientation 
to critique externalist theories.
7
Norman Malcolm. Knowledge and Certainty: Essays and Lectures (Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1965), pp. 58-72.
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myself whether I know something or merely believe it?" Internalists assume that 
we can distinguish between belief and knowledge by exclusively evaluating our 
mental activities or processes. This is an assumption that Malcolm convincingly 
shows to be problematic for the internalist.
Malcolm investigates the character of our ordinary conceptions of 
"knowledge" and "belief" as a starting point in order to be clear on how to 
understand what is m eant by their use. He distinguishes between knowledge and 
belief by saying that normally we say we believe P when our grounds for accepting 
it are Tar weaker than grounds which are characteristic of knowing P. For instance, I 
might say, "I believe that it rained yesterday". Here, "belief" is used 
interchangeably with "I think", or "probably...was the case". If I was shown that in 
fact it did not rain, I ought not expect great bewilderment and chaos to fill my 
existence, because my use of "believe" rested upon grounds that were only 
probably true. I had some confidence in my belief, but I could be easily persuaded 
that my belief was wrong. Perhaps I was inside my house when I heard what I 
thought sounded like falling rain, when in fact the sound was caused by leaves 
being rustled by the wind. If I did not see or feel the falling rain, but believed it 
because it sounded like it was raining from inside my house, we cannot say that I 
knew that it rained. These grounds could not support a claim of knowledge that it 
rained. Because I thought that I heard it rain, I formed the belief that it probably did 
rain, but I knew that I could easily be mistaken.
Knowledge on the other hand is used in two manners, both in a strong and 
weak sense. To distinguish weak and strong forms of knowledge we can say that it 
is measured by the strength of the grounds which support them. A weak 
knowledge claim may be abandoned if evidence is presented to discount it. This is 
to say that we may have good grounds to say that one knows P, but it is not strictly 
inconceivable to abandon it if one is forced to do so by discounting evidence. Strong 
knowledge claims, by contrast, are such that no evidence could possibly be 
conceived of which would discount them. Malcolm gives an example of a weak 
knowledge claim when he imagines going to the doctor who informs him, after 
thorough investigations, that he has no heart. But, he says to the doctor, "I know I 
have a heart! How can my blood circulate, and what accounts for the thumping in 
my chest?" That he has a heart is a certainty! But eventually, he concedes, he would
8
Ibid., p. 58. Malcolm's emphasis.
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have to be convinced by the testimony of the doctors, who thoroughly searched his 
chest cavity and did not find a heart. We can say that he thought he knew that he 
had a heart, but this evidence would eventually force him to abandon that 
knowledge claim. This is a weak sense of knowledge, because evidence could 
conceivably be presented which would discount it.
If I say, "I know that 1+1=2", I use "know" in the strong sense. I have no idea 
of what evidence would count against it. I cannot think of 1+1 being anything other 
than 2. The usage of the strong sense of know does not only include some basic 
mathematical propositions. Malcolm has us consider the claim "I know that there is 
an ink-bottle here". Is it a weak or strong usage of "know"? Traditionally, I 
imagine, philosophers would answer that it is used in the weak sense. This is 
because we could discount it by evidence that it may vanish before one's eyes and 
be revealed as an illusion. Or that one would wake up in a garden and the ink- 
bottle would be discovered as existing within a dream. We think, says Malcolm, 
"...that the statement that here is an ink-bottle must have the same status as...I have a
heart... But this is a prejudice ."9 He clarifies the prejudice by writing, "In saying that 
I should regard nothing as evidence that there is no ink-bottle here now, I am not 
predicting what I should do if various astonishing things happened."10 He continues 
by saying:
But if it is not a prediction, what is the meaning of my assertion that I should regard nothing
as evidence that there is no ink-bottle here? The assertion describes my present attitude
towards that statement that here is an ink-bottle.
The logical role of the existence of objects concerning certain empirical 
propositions is presupposed and fundamental when making knowledge claims. 
Some internalists, for instance, may want to say that there is still the distinction to 
deal w ith between the representation of an object and the object itself. Malcolm 
says that that distinction would hold if "Here is an ink-bottle" is to be interpreted as 
"There appears to me to be an ink-bottle here". But, he curtly says , "It would be
utterly fantastic for me in my present circumstances to say, 'There appears to me to
12be an ink-bottle here.'" , as if "Here is an ink-bottle" involved some
Ibid., p. 68. Malcolm s emphases.
10
Ibid. Malcolm's emphasis.
^Ibid. Malcolm's emphases.
12Ibid.
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acknowledgement of doubt while another asked him if there were one on his desk 
for her to have. If that is to be the interpretation of this proposition, then the 
meaningfulness of it only refers to appearances, sense data, and sensations of the 
ink-bottle. "Here is an ink-bottle" is about the physical object!
Given this line of argumentation about knowledge claims the internalist 
sheds little light on the issue, because of his claim that we can discover in our minds 
if we know something or merely believe it. As Malcolm contends our epistemic 
relation to the world is expressed in the form of having an attitude of certainty, 
uncertainty, or degrees of certainty about a proposition. To have knowledge of X is 
partially characterized by how confident one is about the truth of X. One's degree of 
confidence in a proposition is marked by considering what could possibly count 
against that confidence in it. Of course it does not follow that one knows X solely 
because the belief is characterized by a strong confidence in it. There are many 
examples of one who professes particular beliefs with an unqualified confidence, yet 
later it was shown that that person was wrong. The point of the ink-bottle 
proposition is that one m ust say, if there is no ink-bottle before me now upon 
seeing it, I do not know what it means to know anything, regardless of any 
expression of confidence. Confidence, then, is a necessary, and not a sufficient, 
condition of knowledge.
It is important at the outset that I state what Malcolm's general philosophical 
point is. His point will carry a lot of weight throughout the theories that I will 
critique. He insists that some of the propositions that we would naturally classify as 
empirical (e.g. the ink-bottle proposition) have a logical status that is peculiar.
These types of propositions express something fundamental (even foundational) in 
our thinking. They are fundamental to our thinking because we recognize that if we 
were to doubt them, or question their truth, then we could not accept any 
proposition as true. Malcolm rightly states, in this connection, that:
If you could somehow undermine my confidence in [the ink-bottle proposition] you would not 
teach me [analytical] caution. You would fill my mind with chaos! I could not even make 
conjectures if you took away those fixed points of certainty; just as a man cannot try  to climb 
whose body has no support. A conjecture implies an understanding of what certainty would 
be. If it is not a certainty that 5x5=25 and that here is an ink-bottle, then I do not understand 
what it is."13
13 Ibid., pp. 69-70. Malcolm's emphases.
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As we will see in the second and third chapters, the position that Malcolm and 
Wittgenstein begin their philosophical investigations from can be dramatically 
distinguished from the view of classical foundationalism, because they argue that 
what may be foundational for us in one context may not be in another. This is to 
say that making claims of knowledge hinge upon a logic which is internal to a 
particular activity from which one deduces w hat is certain. Yet some kinds of 
propositions may be foundational in only very particular contexts, and another 
kind, in many. For instance, the ink-bottle proposition is known in the particular 
context of one asking if an ink-bottle is on another person's desk; the person looks 
at it and says, "here is an ink-bottle". However, imagine that a person looks for the 
ink-bottle in his room and doesn't bother to turn on the light, because he thought 
that he left it on his desk and could find it quickly by merely feeling around for it. 
Imagine that, while blindly searching for it, he mutters to the person who asked if 
he had one, "yes, yes, here is an ink-bottle". Suppose, then, that he does not find it, 
turns on the light, and sees that it is not there. In this context he did not know that 
"here is an ink-bottle". We can say that he believed it, but he did not know it.
Then we can consider cases which involve the use of mathematics, which have 
a great breadth of contexts in which those propositions are fundamental 
(propositions of knowledge) to our thinking. We can think of instances such as, 
counting out money for the cashier when buying tickets at the cinema, measuring 
flower when baking a cake, assuring oneself of the age of one's niece, determining if 
one has enough time to run an errand before a dinner party, or determining the 
density of a distant star in the cosmos. In fact, at present, I cannot think of a single 
context where mathematics is used and the truth that 1+1=2 (for instance) is not 
fundamental to that activity, a fixed point of certainty. Nevertheless, we are not 
committed to say that mathematical propositions embody necessary and sufficient 
conditions for all knowledge claims. When one makes calculations the values of 
numbers, and the relation of one number to another, is a certainty and unchanging 
regardless of the context in which calculating is employed. Malcolm convincingly 
shows how internalism is confused about how the concept of knowledge is used and 
contingent upon human practices.
I will argue against the two externalist theories for separate reasons. The 
externalist theory of reliabilism, which investigates the reliability of our belief 
apprehending mechanisms, like vision for instance, will be rejected as a conclusive 
theory for all knowledge claims. In terms of knowledge claims that are not
empirical, it seems odd to make use of the concept of reliability at all. I will 
illustrate this in my argument by considering ethical or religious truths that are 
inscribed by an assiduous conviction. The externalist theory of probability focuses 
on the likelihood of propositions being true, given environmental conditions and 
so on. In a sense, they intend to inform us about what beliefs we can "bet" on being 
true. This will be rejected also because it leaves no room for certainty, or what we 
could say is characteristic of knowing. In this way I think that it would make no 
sense at all for Malcolm to look at the ink-bottle on his desk and say "It is probable 
that there is an ink-bottle here." This general domain of criticism (and w hat is 
presupposed within it) is one that will be elaborated in chapter three. Even though I 
will not make those presuppositions and general concerns explicit and elaborate in 
this chapter, I believe that the sense of my criticisms draw n from them will be 
conspicuous nonetheless.
By this sketch of the traditional epistemological landscape we will be in a 
position to examine foundationalism in detail and see what is critically at stake in 
its relation to the internalist and externalist domains of inquiry. We will see that 
foundations theories claim that knowledge comes to us by our perception, and 
therefore posits the existence of logically basic propositions that report that 
perception. This is a belief that is at the foundations of our knowledge and does not 
rest on other beliefs. A typical example of a foundational belief is "there is a red 
circular blob in the center of my visual field." We see by this example that the 
belief involves basic concepts like color and form that are irreducible. That is what 
is basic about that belief and not the proposition "There is a red basket-ball on the 
coffee table" which includes complex conditions and many propositions that rest 
upon others. This means, justifying that proposition requires other non-basic 
beliefs to be justified also. We will see how it is clearly an internalist theory and 
how an externalist may argue against it. Given what I have just said about 
Malcolm's arguments against cognitive essentialism I think that it is obvious that I 
cannot accept any foundations theory, traditionally conceived. My main interest in 
explicating foundationalism is to be clear on their view of a rational structure of 
knowledge, and then to see how religious belief is considered by them.
I will end this chapter with a brief general description of the problem of the 
criterion of basic propositions. The ability to set down such criteria is what 
constitutes the very possibility for the foundationalist project. The reformed 
challenge to foundationalism surrounds this very issue. Foundationalism has
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always maintained a very narrow view of what can be basic beliefs which hinge on 
their empirical focus. The reformed epistemologists are unique in the sense that 
they are dedicated to the foundationalist picture of knowledge, but challenge it 
because of their exclusion of religious propositions from those that can be said to be 
foundational or basic. Because the details of this challenge will be discussed in the 
following chapter, I must, in this last section, provide the groundwork which is 
essential to fully comprehend reformed epistemology.
II. The Presuppositions of Traditional Epistemology
A. Philosophical intentions
As to lead into the main issues concerning internalism and externalism, a few 
general comments about the intentions of these traditional philosophies may be 
helpful. All traditional epistemology seeks to show what knowledge is and what 
knowledge is not. Roderick Chisholm explains it like this:
Theory of knowledge, when considered as a part of philosophy, is concerned with such 
questions as, 'What can I know?' 'How can I distinguish those things I am justified in believing 
from those things that I am not justified in believing?' 'And how can I decide whether I am more
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justified in believing one thing than in believing another?'
What exactly is the epistemologist hoping to accomplish with an analysis of 
what knowledge is and what knowledge is not? It is generally held that one thing 
he hopes to give is a justification for our beliefs, and thus provide an answer to what 
it is we can justifiably claim that we know. Essentially, epistemology amounts to 
investigating what can be claimed as knowledge. The result of epistemology is to 
improve the logical status of our claims of knowledge by the corrections it leads us 
to make in accordance to w hat knowledge is. Chisholm offers this description of 
the purpose of traditional epistemology as it, in this sense, relates to non- 
foundational propositions:
...we want to do our best to improve our set of beliefs - to replace those that are unjustified by 
others that are justified and to replace those that have a lesser degree of justification with others 
that have a greater degree of justification.15
4 Roderick Chisholm, Theory O f Knowledge (Printice Hall Int., Englewood Cliffs, 1989), p. 1.
15 Ibid.
What lies at the root of epistemology, then, is a natural or intuitive concern 
for truth. With this concern the epistemologist generally focuses upon the 
justification of knowledge claims, and the dominant conception of knowledge is 
that it is justified true belief. In so doing, the epistemologist will provide us with a 
better rational stance with respect to our beliefs. Therefore, the most important 
work of traditional epistemology is to discern how justification of true belief is to 
be understood and attained.
B. Epistemology as belief guidance
Epistemic justification is concerned with declaring what ought, and ought not,
be believed. This can be called the "belief-guiding" sense of justification.
Epistemology guides one away from holding false beliefs which ought not be held,
to true beliefs which ought to be held. However, there is another sense of
justification. For some contemporary epistemologists, justification is all that is
required for knowledge: the concept of knowledge can be defined as justified belief.
But, as Pollock notes, "That, of course, is not very clear, because knowledge requires
16more than justification." It is not certain what is meant by "justification". We are 
left with a vague rule which states that knowledge must be accompanied by 
justification. This is not satisfactory because we must be clear on what justification 
is. If we leave this definition of knowledge as it is, then we have a philosophical 
perspective that can lead to a view akin to sophistry.
We may hold any proposition as long as we can give some reasons for doing 
so. We must acknowledge that the concepts of truth and falsity never enter into this 
form of determining what knowledge is. This is because what reasons we may offer 
for holding a belief are not grounded in, nor stem from, that which is true. We must 
clarify what justification focuses on, which would introduce the missing piece to this 
definition of knowledge: truth. The reason why Pollock and many other 
epistemologists insist so tenaciously on the concept of truth to be included in the 
definition of knowledge, is that truth emanates from objectivity. To have an 
objective account of a belief provides certainty of its truth. It is truth which ought to 
be required for knowledge also. For a belief to be justified, a direct link ought to 
enjoin our beliefs and the reality which issue those beliefs. Justification alone does 
not do this. There is some debate as to whether there is a form of justification that is
16John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories o f  Knowledge (Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, N ew  Jersey,
1986), p. 10.
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required for knowledge, and yet is distinct from a "belief-guiding" form of 
justification. I take the most commonly accepted concept of justification to be of the 
belief-guiding sort. Thus, the most common refrain sounded by the traditional
17epistemologist is that knowledge is justified true belief.
C. Presupposing knowledge
A common concern about the project of epistemology is that if one is seeking 
justified true belief, then one must be presupposing something about it. Chisholm 
offers a response about this issue of the justification of the presuppositions of 
epistemology. He says:
I have an idea of what it is for a belief to be justified and have an idea of what it is for a belief
not to be justified; I have an idea of what it is to know something; and I have an idea of what it
18
is for one thing to be more justified for me than another.
Furthermore, he claims in light of the above, that he can rank his beliefs from 
those that are more justified to those that are less justified. And this presupposes 
knowledge about the status of justification of one's beliefs. For example, if a person 
believed both that there are nine planets in our solar system, and bulls in a rodeo 
are joyfully playing w hen they try to get the rider off of their back, we can 
intuitively rank which is more justifiable than the other. That there are nine planets 
in our solar system is a commonly learned and observable fact, thus it would rank 
ahead of the bull in the rodeo proposition in terms of being more justified to 
believe. The bull in the rodeo proposition is certainly of a lesser degree of 
justification given that all of the action to upset the bull before the rodeo seems to 
point in the direction of making the bull unhappy rather than in a playful mood. 
Thus, the bull in the rodeo proposition seems to be counterintuitive, where the truth
17
It is true that this conception of knowledge as justified true belief was agreed upon by nearly all 
epistemologists up until 1963. It is rare indeed that seemingly all philosophers would agree on such 
a substantive issue. In that year, to the astonishment of the philosophical world, Edmund Gettier 
published his seminal paper, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" (Analysis 23:121-123), which 
showed that this conception is inaccurate. In that paper he gave counter-examples which indicate 
that more conditions are needed in the analysis of knowing. Following the publication of Gettier's 
essay, epistemology has been confronted with more and more intricate, complicated, and highly 
nuanced views of the conditions of knowledge in order to measure up to his counter-examples. At 
any rate, I will not recount Gettier's arguments and examples here, but refer the interested reader to 
his paper to be read in its entirety. Even though this traditional conception has been justifiably 
questioned, it is standard - in general reviews of epistemology - to present knowledge as justified 
true belief while attaching a footnote (such as this one) specifying some dissent about how
exhaustive it may be as a definition of knowledge.
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Roderick Chisholm, Theory O f Knowledge (Printice Hall Int., Englewood Cliffs, 1989), p. 5. 
Chisholm's emphases.
of the actual number of planets in our solar system can be observed. Chisholm, 
therefore, makes the claim that the epistemologist is justified in presupposing that 
he can correct his system of beliefs, and add those beliefs that are justified, and 
discard those that are not justified. W hat is fundamental about the examples above, 
pertaining to what they say about justification, is that justification is concomitant 
w ith objectivity. This is the reason why the proposition about the num ber of 
planets has a higher degree of justifiability than the bull in the rodeo proposition.
D. Criteria of knowledge
How exactly epistemologists determine justified belief from unjustified belief 
differs greatly as a result of which criteria of justification are used. Some think that 
justifiedness lies in the reliability of the manner in which beliefs are derived. This 
is to ask the simple question: is a given mode of procuring a belief to be trusted as 
yielding truth? For instance, wishful thinking, "guesswork", "hunches", or reliance 
on emotional attachment, are not reliable in yielding true belief. Imagine a state 
investigator who investigates a series of m urders and has only one suspect: an 
eighty year old grandmother. Imagine that the investigator does not believe that 
this woman committed the crime because he wished it were not true. Let's say that 
he also believes this because he does not want to see her end her days in prison; 
emotionally, the thought is too much to believe for him. Simply, that belief evades 
the truth of her involvement in the crime. These mechanisms of belief acquisition 
(wishful thinking or reliance on emotional attachment) would almost never yield 
true belief. The reliable mechanism for this case, which would yield true belief, is 
deduction from the facts of her involvement.
We will see later how some foundationalists require a justified belief to be 
founded upon (or supported by) a belief that is self-evident. This condition of the 
basicality of belief is such that no reasoning can be carried out beyond it. So, if a 
belief rests on a self-evident proposition (thus, self-justified) that belief too is 
justified by a certain relation to it. The truth of self-evident propositions is 
immediately comprehended. Some have said that 1+1=2 is such a proposition for 
most people. We can say that the self-evidence of a proposition is one criterion of a 
justified belief for the foundationalist. Another criterion that was m ade famous by 
the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle is the verifiability criterion of 
propositions. This view suggests that the justifiedness of a belief is determined by 
the method of its verification. Mathematical propositions can be demonstrated, thus
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verified by tracing calculatory steps of a problem. Empirical or scientific 
propositions satisfy this criterion because their facticity can be verified in the 
natural world. As a consequence, metaphysical propositions (notably ones of 
religious belief, moral truths or aesthetic judgments) are, at best, characterized as 
expressions of attitude or sentiment because they cannot be factually verified. I 
tried to give a wide sample of what are considered criteria of justification to 
illustrate how varied they can be. Ultimately a criterion of justification expresses 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a proposition's justification.
As can be readily seen, Malcolm would not agree with this notion of a 
generalized criterion of justification in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
He would say that a criterion of justification is internal and peculiar to a context. 
The reason why the logical positivists cannot accept the justifiability of truths 
concerning moral and aesthetic judgments, or religious beliefs is because they hold 
onto one contextual form of justifiability as that which is sufficient for all 
propositions of belief. A positivist can justify empirical beliefs because their 
criterion of verifiability is conceptually bound and internal to the 
scientific/empirical mode of inquiry. But, what is involved in establishing 
empirical truth is incommensurable to a context of moral beliefs. Malcolm suggests 
that a criterion of w hat counts as a justifiable moral belief is determined from 
within a context of moral judgments where one is operative.
Epistemologists also notice that if we have the ability to know something 
about our beliefs and the status of their justifiability, then we can presuppose that 
humans are rational beings. It is this ground level presupposition that gives 
support for the post-enlightenment conception of rationality that sets the stage for 
traditional epistemology. Because it is presupposed that humans are rational 
beings, it follows naturally that we ought to investigate the justifiability of our 
beliefs. Our beliefs, therefore, must measure up to the standard of rationality which 
is in accordance to our presupposed nature. This is to say that a conception of 
rationality gives rise to a concomitant conception of the justification of our beliefs.
If humans are rational then their beliefs must be also; and if one believes something 
that is not rational then that person m ust know why it is not rational and discard it. 
What all of this amounts to is that epistemology is not so much concerned with 
knowing per se. To say that epistemology is interested in accounting for what is 
knowable is not entirely accurate. Epistemologists are interested in how one knows, 
or the grounds from which one claims to know something. So, from the conception
that humans are rational beings comes the conception that the justification of beliefs 
m ust accompany that rationality in order to evaluate or rank the justifiability of our 
beliefs.
It seems that the conception of hum an rationality is divergent, however.
How humans are conceived of as rational, or what is considered the appropriate 
natural structure of rationality, is viewed in different ways. The question arises, 
what is a rational person? This, implicitly, is what epistemologists answer by 
giving views of what a rational belief is, and how it ought to be justified. For 
instance, as discussed earlier, a rational subject for the foundationalist is one who 
acquires a belief system with basic propositions that supports all of its other non- 
basic propositions. This principle is considered quite natural. It is not fabricated in 
order to create rationality for humans to have, as if humans were not rational by 
nature. When reflecting on what it means to have rational belief, they feel that this 
is conjoined to the innateness of hum an rationality. They intuit that, when we 
reflect on a certain belief and ask why we believe it, it connects logically to another 
belief and so on, until a belief is reached that cannot be reasoned beyond. Thus, a 
basic belief cannot be reasoned beyond because we attain its truth merely by 
understanding it; a basic belief refers to no other proposition that requires 
justification, it is an immediate recognition of truth. From this view of the naturally 
rational subject, we get the accompanying view of how beliefs ought to be justified, 
i.e. a criterion of justification.
Chisholm notes19 that we have certain properties as rational beings, which 
are such that if we ask ourselves if we have a kind of property (such as the ability to 
reflect upon the rationality of our beliefs) it will be evident that we have it only 
upon reflection. So, it can be presupposed that we can know what we think and 
believe as well as recognizing inconsistencies of logic and reasoning. However, 
these presuppositions give rise to the assumption that the epistemologist can 
succeed in accounting for knowledge. This is reflected in Keith Lehrer's statement:
The only security we have in the quest for truth is our trust in our own intellectual powers to
20
reach our objective and the sense not to fall into needless error.
It is with these presuppositions that the epistemologist is confident that he can
20
R.J. Brodgan, Profiles: Keith Lehrer (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981), p. 98.
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account for knowledge. From these presuppositions emerges the post­
enlightenment conception of rationality, which buttresses their program for the 
imperative justification of beliefs.
III. Internalism
A. The conditions of knowledge
In an effort to distinguish internalism from externalism we can say that it is a 
matter of seeing where the conditions of knowledge are primarily focused. That is 
to say, to know X we m ust comprehend what makes that possible, e.g. how is its 
possibility conditioned. The internalist will say that the conditions of a justified 
belief lie in mental processes. All of the conditions for claiming a belief to be 
justified are cognitively accessible. Therefore, merely by reflection we can 
determine if a belief is justified or not. Internal conditions for knowledge are what 
the subject must be aware of (or possibly aware of, in the sense of being at least 
mentally accessible), regardless of external considerations, to be rational. By 
contrast, externalism views the conditions of knowledge to be in mental processes 
congruent with the environment which one is in while acquiring a belief.
Therefore, externalists consider states of affairs, facts of the world, and causal 
connections, for example, to be conditional to knowing X also. The subject is not 
aware of these external conditions by mental processes alone. These conditions must 
be investigated outside of the mind. So, the externalist broadens the conditions of 
knowledge held by the internalist to also include environmental factors. The 
externalist, as we will see by an example below, holds that it is certainly possible 
that some sensory impressions can be mistaken. Internalists hold that we receive 
knowledge of the world by sense impressions and that they cannot be mistaken at a 
fundamental level. Thus, externalists m ust venture outside the m ind in search for 
some justificatory factors that are not mentally accessible, where the internalists 
claims that all that is needed is an analysis of one's mental states. The distinction 
between these two epistemological views, then, is a case of awareness. To make a 
claim of knowledge, where do we turn our investigative attention? What do we 
need to be aware of in order to make an informed argument about rational belief?
Is it the justifiability of our mental processes alone, or the justifiability of holding a 
belief about the external world given its particular environmental conditions, and 
external justifying factors?
In the last section we noted that the classical definition of knowledge is 
justified true belief. Externalism and internalism, as viewed 
by many, seemingly vie for which quality (justification or truth) is to be 
emphasized when investigating and affirming particular propositions of 
knowledge. To help us define internalism and externalism, Adam Morton notes21 
that there are particular qualities of a rational belief emphasized by both camps. He 
sees the internalist emphasizing justification (as well as coherence, reasonability, 
and not being undermined by another person's belief) hence their focus on mental 
processes or internal justificatory mechanisms. This is in contrast to the externalist 
who emphasizes truth (as well as reliability, fact-tracking or tracing one's belief to 
facts in the world, and the usability of one's belief by others) by focusing on 
external considerations, particularly ones concerning the objectivity of beliefs. I 
m ust make it clear that both internalists and externalists consider a proposition of 
knowledge to be one that is true, as well as justified. The internalist does not call 
knowledge that which can merely be justified from within the mind, 
correspondingly the externalist does not totally disregard the correctness of mental 
processes in justification either. When drawing a stark contrast between these views 
of knowledge it can appear that truth is missing from the internalist position, and 
justifiability is missing from the externalist view. It seems that these different 
views stem from an intuition that one quality of rational belief ought to take 
precedence over the other. Later in this section we will see w hat role truth has in 
internalist theory, while in the next section we will consider the place that 
justification has in externalism.
The point of departure for the internalist theorist is the premise that 
knowledge of the world comes to us by perception. Naturally, the theorist wants a 
starting point to justify our beliefs of the world which does not rest on beliefs 
already held, and is not in need of justification also. He wants to proceed from the 
origin from which our beliefs emanate. Immediate sense perception is where he 
sees the firm ground of inquiry to be, primarily because the reception of sense data 
does not require beliefs about it. Immediate sense perception is direct and 
unmediated in the sense that it happens to us and does not require reflection or 
cognitive mediation in order to report it. Registering sense data (ability to report 
sensations) is a direct mental process which epistemologists call "internal states".
21 Adam Morton, A  Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge (Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford, 1997), 
p. 125.
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6. Internal states and states of mind
It is crucial at the outset to discuss the similarities and differences between 
internal states and propositions of knowledge and belief. The distinction between 
internal states and propositions of knowledge and belief is not always a clear one to 
describe, however. Firstly, propositions of belief and knowledge are distinct from 
one another in that they both assert a degree of justifiability about the truth of a 
proposition. What the epistemologist desires is knowledge, meaning certainty, of a 
proposition's truth, and that is distinguished from belief which involves holding a 
proposition by a range of "good" justifiable grounds. So, a distinguishing aspect of 
internalist theory on this issue is that a belief is justified if it is logically connected, 
or related, to another justified belief. As we will see is the case for the 
foundationalist, justified beliefs eventually rest upon self-justified grounds. The 
internalist starts by asserting that knowledge comes to us by perception. They 
notice that perception is immediate and direct, meaning that propositions which 
stem from it are not based upon other beliefs. Therefore, foundationalists describe 
propositions of immediate sense perception as basic, foundational or the ground of 
belief. The details surrounding these propositions will be given in a following 
section on foundationalism. The character of basic propositions which issue from 
perception is similar to internal states, in that perception, or acquisition of sense 
data, is an indubitable acquisition of knowledge about the representation of an 
object. It is a description of our visual field (as one mode of sensing) prior to any 
reasoning about it. A perceptual state is the experience of recognizing, or merely 
registering, sensory input; it is apprehended passively. To perceive an object also 
has the character of a basic proposition in that one does not doubt, one knows, what 
one describes in his visual field. So, basic propositions and perception are alike 
because (for the internalist) they are internal states. This is an important point 
because when justifying beliefs we recognize that our cognitive processes - that 
which directs our reasoning or evaluation of truth claims - can appeal to internal 
states (which are immediate, passive, and indubitable) and not only beliefs that are 
logically supported by other ones. Perhaps it is helpful to say generally that 
internal states make up a category which include perceptual states and basic beliefs 
(the latter being that which the foundationalist depends upon for his theory).
One internalist intuition about knowledge in general is that there m ust be a 
reason why a person uses the expression "I know" rather than "I believe". When a 
person communicates what he knows about the world by making use of either of
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the two expressions above, it is clear that he does not make that choice because there 
is something out in the empirical world eliciting it from him (whatever that may 
mean). It is thought by internalists that the choice of "I know" or "I believe" is 
made by the subject with the aim of giving an accurate expression of his internal 
state of mind. Therefore, they are tempted to think that knowing and believing are 
states of mind. If the distinction between believing and knowing is to have any 
force it must issue from describing the two distinct states of mind concerning 
knowledge, vis-a-vis, the one of believing and the one of knowing.
C. The doxastic assumption and cognitive essentialism
Given the above, John Pollock identifies internalist theories as affirming 
what he calls the "doxastic assumption". This assumption derives directly from 
their sole focus upon internal mental states (which he also calls "doxastic states"). It 
suggests that justification is a function exclusively of what beliefs one holds. This is 
the case for them because the beliefs that one holds is what comprises one's internal 
state. So, the justification of beliefs will never alter in relation to whatever the 
circumstances or environmental affairs may be. Environment and circumstance do 
not explain the justifiability of beliefs. In order to analyze a beliefs justification one 
focuses on internal states alone. This point is supported by their presupposition that 
knowing that one knows is an internal affair and not elicited by the external world. 
John Pollock writes:
The rationale for it [the doxastic assumption] is something like the following: all our
information about the world is encapsulated in beliefs. It seems that in deciding what to
believe, we cannot take account of anything except insofar as we have beliefs about it.
Consequently, nothing can enter into the determination of epistemic justification except our
beliefs. Thus all an epistemological theory can do is tell us how our overall doxastic state
22
determines which of our beliefs are justified.
An important notion about this assumption of the conditions of epistemic 
justification is that there is no investigation into how we get from "I seem to see a 
tree" to "I see a tree". What this amounts to is that there is no analysis of the truth 
of an object in itself, or objectivity. It is externalism that will explicitly make that 
move because they claim that investigating the environmental conditions of an 
object can be a significant factor for knowledge of that object. So, the bottom line
22
John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories o f Knowledge (Rowm an and Littlefield Publishers, N ew
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for internalism, as it is stated above, is that nothing can enter into the determination 
of epistemic justification except our beliefs. To put it another way, justification is 
internal to our doxastic states. Because all of our knowledge of the world comes to 
us by simple propositions of perception for them, and those simple propositions are 
apprehended in some self-justifying way, it is this doxastic state that is the ground 
for justifying our beliefs. When we apprehend the proposition "I seem to see a 
tree", we are not mistaken about w hat we seem to see. That we seem to see it is a 
mental affair. Thus cautiously, internalists (particularly Roderick Chisolm) have 
made some use of the term "being appeared to X-ly". They would assert, upon 
seeing a tree, that one is "being appeared to tree-ly". One cannot be mistaken about 
how one is being appeared to. Justification, in this sense of being appeared to, is 
internal to the immediate apprehension of that truth in this doxastic state.
Generally, the subject can say that he knows that he seems to see a tree. But, it is the 
proposition "I see a tree" which creates problems for the internalist. It creates 
problems because it does not refer to doxastic states as such, but a tree objectively 
being in the subject's visual field. W ithout inquiring into the environment from 
which our perceptual beliefs come, the internalist cannot justify objects that may be 
there. The internalist can only consider the thoughts of the subject when justifying 
beliefs. This issue has caused much debate within internalism concerning the 
problem of perception and its relation (if there is any at all) to objectivity.
The doxastic assumption is formulated in the conceptual heart of internalism 
by the principle of cognitive essentialism. As the prime question for 
epistemologists is how to account for the justification of belief, or knowledge, we 
find the principle of cognitive essentialism providing the answer for internalists.
The justification of a belief is internal to a cognitive process. It can be said that there 
are two kinds of cognitive processes: one set of cognitive processes is correct 
(rationally justified) and the other is incorrect (rationally unjustified). A justified 
belief is one that is held or arrived at by a correct cognitive process. Of course the 
question arises, how do we distinguish a correct cognitive process from an incorrect 
one?
D. Correct cognitive processes, epistemic norms, and truth
A cognitive process that is considered correct is one that conforms to an 
epistemic norm. In my mind, the analysis of epistemic normalcy is essential to the 
project of internalism, yet it is one of the most nebulous aspects of the theory to
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grasp. A person who holds a rational belief is one that "makes the right moves" 
with respect to the epistemic norm. However, making the right moves with respect 
to an epistemic norm is an inherent feature of a cognitive process that it conforms 
to. The fact that justifiability is inherent in a correct cognitive process constitutes 
their principle of cognitive essentialism. That is, a belief produced by a cognitive 
process conforming to an epistemic norm is justified in any circumstance regardless 
of time, place, environment, or context. This is very much like views stemming 
from a moral norm which describe what is correct or incorrect about actions.
Pollock specifically emphasizes the normative character of epistemic justification. 
As he puts it "Justification is a matter of 'epistemic permissibility'".23 For him, 
when we ask if a belief is justified we are asking if it is all right to believe it. Thus, 
for the internalist it is all right (or justified) to believe X if it conforms to an 
epistemic norm. We see here how enticing it is to characterize epistemic norms in 
the same way that we characterize moral norms. Certain rules of conduct may 
pervade a community and provide support for one who considers them when 
deciding what is correct and incorrect about one's action or behavior. However, the 
analogy of moral norms and epistemic norms cannot be taken too far. A belief 
stemming from a moral norm  may be prudent or morally permissible, i.e. correct, 
in as much as it conforms to a communal sense of standard behavior, but that does 
not necessarily say anything about the logical validity of holding that belief. That 
is, a moral norm may state that it is permissible, or prudentially rational, to believe 
P even when one does not have adequate logical justification to believe P. Pollock 
gives the following example:
...it is popularly alleged that lobsters do not feel pain when they are dunked alive into 
boiling water. It is extremely doubtful that anyone has good reason to believe that, but it 
may be prudentially rational to hold that belief because otherwise one would deprive oneself 
of the gustatory delight of eating boiled lobster.24
Epistemic norms, however, would never allow for such a conclusion. Epistemic 
norms provide guidance in reasoning, because they are the rules of logical validity. 
Also, epistemic considerations, as opposed to moral ones, would impel one to 
discern if it is true or not that lobsters feel pain when boiled alive. W hether one has 
moral permission to eat the beasts or not, is entirely external to the truth of the 
question that epistemic norms would force us to determine. We certainly cannot
“Ibid., p. 124.
24Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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say that moral norms provide us with logical rules: they provide us with rules 
about correct, incorrect, or permissible actions and behavior, and not necessarily 
modes of reasoning. At any rate, Pollock defines epistemic norms as, "Rules
25describing the circumstances under which it is permissible to hold beliefs..." He 
also says in terms of internalism in particular, "...an internalist theory is any theory 
proposing epistemic norms that appeal only to logical properties of and logical 
relations between internal states of the believer."26
It is at least implicit in internalist theory that epistemic norms act as a rule 
book for reasoning. This is like a police officer who may not know what to do in a 
situation and so he consults the penal code which will govern and help him guide 
his actions. A difficulty for the internalist is how to account for the inherent 
justification of beliefs that are produced by cognitive processes which are in 
conformance to epistemic norms if epistemic norms function in this rule book 
fashion. Pollock puts this dilemma as follows:
...if we are to reason by making explicit appeal to a norm telling us that it is permissible to 
move from the belief that something looks red to us to the belief that it is red, we would first 
have to become justified in believing that that norm is included among our epistemic
27
norms...
The problem for the internalist rests in the effort to make epistemic norms 
explicit and clearly defined. But, by making epistemic norms explicit we m ust 
reason about them. That is, we must logically analyze them, and thereby justify 
their inclusion in our stock of epistemic norms. They then become an object of 
knowledge and require justification when epistemic norms are that which guide our 
reasoning to perform that very task. By this account we are faced with an infinite 
regress. If we seek an epistemic norm which is justified we need to justify its 
inclusion amongst our set of epistemic norms. Pollock shows that this difficulty can
be avoided by saying that epistemic norms are not a positive force for reasoning but
28a negative one. He suggests that "our reasoning is innocent until proven guilty." 
Furthermore, Pollock claims most internalists agree that we can use reasoning to 
evaluate reasoning, and use reasoning in applying epistemic norms, but "We cannot
25Ibid., p. 8.
26Ibid., p. 136.
27Ibid„ p. 127.
28Ibid., p. 128.
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29be required to reason about norms before we can do any reasoning." So it seems 
for most internalists that epistemic norms are embedded within our reasoning; we 
can evaluate norms in as much as they take part in our reasoning. By epistemic 
norms being "embedded" in our reasoning I mean that they implicitly inform our 
reasoning. Therefore, epistemic norms in a sense are part of the concept of 
reasoning itself. This implies that modus ponens is an epistemic norm  and wishful 
thinking is not. This primarily stands true because wishing that X be the case is not 
a part of reasoning generally considered. This is to say that wishing X to be true 
does not involve an analysis or verification (or reasoning in any guise) of a 
proposition being true in any manner whatsoever. Ultimately, the internalist finds 
beliefs to be justified if arrived at and sustained by correct cognitive processes that 
are in conformance to epistemic norms embedded within our reasoning.
One difficulty is to find an intelligible place for the acquisition of the truth of 
beliefs in internalist theory. This weighs heavily upon the function and purpose of 
epistemic norms if their role is indeed integral to the plausibility of internalism as a 
theory of knowledge. Internalists often concentrate on mental processes and modes 
of reasoning to such an extent that the notion of truth gets obscured in their 
discussions. It seems correct that we must appeal to some normative notions 
concerning reasoning processes. If my exposition of epistemic norms was directed 
towards elucidating that point I could risk evading the greater epistemological issue 
of how those reasoning processes yield true belief. If I merely discussed mental 
processes we may gain great clarity concerning issues of justification, but not truth. 
After all knowledge is justified true belief, not merely justified belief. Therefore, 
later in this section I will focus on a great difficulty for the internalist: how do 
epistemic norms yield true beliefs? By directing this exposition of internalism 
toward possibly answering this question the clearest view of the viability of their 
project may be attained. However, before that question can be intelligibly 
answered more ground concerning the nature of epistemic norms m ust be covered.
The definition of epistemic norms as the rules describing the correct 
circumstances in which one may hold a belief permissibly, is not completely clear. 
There is ambiguity as to what amounts to "circumstances". Both internalists and 
externalists, for the most part, agree that the justification of a belief is determined 
by w hat epistemic norms are at work in acquiring a belief. But, just for clarification,
29
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the internalist affirms norms to be internal to doxastic states where the externalist 
holds that epistemic norms are those which can, for the most part, be evaluated by 
external considerations.30 Hence the externalist does not hold that all norms are 
always correct like the internalist claims. However, both internalists and 
externalists differ about what is embedded within an epistemic norm. For the 
internalist epistemic norms are constants: they are logical rules that one m ust obey 
regardless of environmental circumstances or external conditions. Epistemic norms 
describe correct reasoning for the internalist. That is, the rules have nothing to do 
with environmental factors: they define the regulations of reasoning and logical 
validity. However, for the externalist epistemic norms can guide us in determining 
if a belief is justified by commenting on the harmony or disharmony between belief 
P and the environmental circumstance of believing P: they are relative to 
environmental affairs. The externalist insists, as Pollock writes, "...that the purpose 
of reasoning is to achieve certain epistemic goals (most notably the acquisition of 
true beliefs) and hence correct epistemic norms should be those enabling us to 
achieve these goals."31 Pollock notes that an externalist epistemic norm may be that 
it is permissible to hold a belief if it is generated by a reliable belief-forming 
process or mechanism.32 Concentrating on what belief-forming processes are 
reliable to yield a true belief can most often require information external to one's 
mental processes.
Given the nature of the internalist view of epistemic norms, they are never 
subject to critique by external considerations (like circumstance, environmental 
conditions and so on), they are always correct. An example given by Pollock is that 
it is always correct to reason by modus ponens and it is always incorrect to reason by
33wishful thinking. Modus ponens is an epistemic norm, and regardless of external 
considerations, it is always correct. It guides our reasoning, and if a belief is 
acquired by conformance to it, the belief is correct by this example, and we cannot 
be accused of using incorrect rational processing. Below I will address the obvious
30Pollock and others make the distinction between norm and belief externalism. Belief externalism 
appropriates externalist norms, e. g. all norms can be evaluated by information that is not internally 
accessible to the cognizer. Norm externalism claims that we must employ internalist norms when 
reasoning, but holds that an alternative set of internalist norms should be evaluated by external 
considerations. Both views reject the notion that all epistemic norms are always correct.
31John L. Pollock, "Epistemic Norms" in Ernest Sosa (ed) Knowledge and Justification, vol. 2 of 2 vols., 
(Dartmouth Publishing Company, Brookfield, VT, 1994), p. 62.
32Ibid.
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objection that one could reason by modus ponens, and even though there will not be 
a flaw in reasoning, the belief may be false. For now we can see that the law of non­
contradiction would fall into the same category of an internalist norm as modus 
ponens. To reason contrary to the law of non-contradiction would always yield an 
unjustified belief. Wishful thinking is not an epistemic norm because there is no 
consideration given to logical consistency, deduction, induction, reason or logic in 
any manifestation, but only sentiments of hope. We can extrapolate from these 
examples that internalist epistemic norms seemingly adhere to the canons of 
traditional logic. This is quite natural seeing that internalism has its roots in the 
work of Aristotle and formal logic. I am not saying, however, that the externalist 
denies the normative character of the canons of logical reasoning. The externalist 
finds more than the internal logical regulation of mental processes to be relevant 
for the justification of beliefs, i. e. cause and effect which may not be mentally 
accessible for a subject, but may require an investigation of the subject's empirical 
surroundings.
The distinction between what are epistemic norms for the internalist, as 
opposed to the externalist, is certainly bound to what characteristic of a rational 
belief one thinks ought to be emphasized. Justification is emphasized by the 
internalist thus it is natural that they hold traditional logic to be the epistemic 
norms which guide our reasoning and are central to making claims concerning 
rational belief. Conversely, the externalists emphasize truth which is bound to 
objectivity and discovered in the environment of belief acquisition. There are 
differences in the concept of objectivity, however. The externalist focuses upon 
empirical and perceptual objectivity. The coherence theorist, on the other hand, sees 
logical coherence as being objective, so he too operates with a notion of objectivity. 
For the externalist, at any rate, reliable mechanisms of belief acquisition can be 
affirmed as normative and yield true, i. e. rational, beliefs.
We can see that the internalist view of epistemic norms consists of the rules 
governing logical validity, e.g. modus ponens, the law of non-contradiction etc. 
Therefore, internalism remains consistent to their claim that the justification of a 
belief is internal to one's doxastic state. If one acquires a belief while violating 
modus ponens, for example, it will be an unjustified belief regardless of external 
circumstances. But, if modus ponens is part of one's doxastic state when one procures 
a belief, the belief will always be justified in terms of a correct rational process.
This is to say that if one's reasoning is based upon that logical rule, the product will
34
be epistemically permissible; no rule integral to logical processes will be violated. 
Because knowledge is a state of mind for them we can only police our mental 
processes in terms of the violation of logical rules. And if no violation has occurred, 
what else is there that a subject can be mentally aware of which would cause her to 
think that her belief is not permissible? The canon of traditional (formal) logic is 
comprised of fundamental and rudimentary rules concerning logical connections, 
deductions, or extrapolations. These rules simply describe what reasoning is, and 
by implication, that which directs correct (permissible) mental processes.
In order to place basic propositions in this schematic of justifying beliefs, we 
can say that they are like the basis for a complex, and interconnected, chain of 
reasoning. They are like correct cognitive processes in that they are always 
unmistakably correct. Basic beliefs, as discussed earlier, are typically appearance 
beliefs. We saw that the foundationalist affirms propositions of the sort, "I seem to 
see P", rather than "I see P". By focussing on seeming to see P, or being appeared to 
as if P, the internal state cannot be mistaken. But the obvious objection by some 
philosophers (typically the externalists) is that one can be well justified in seeming to 
see anything, but what we want is to be justified in believing that our appearance 
beliefs reflect ontological reality of the empirical world. Is there no epistemic norm 
that the internalist can appeal to which would justify an intimate link between our 
beliefs about reality and w hat the reality actually is?
The internalist's claim that all epistemic norms are automatically correct, 
seems very difficult to reconcile. One person may employ different norms when 
reasoning than another. If Mary and Laurence believe proposition P for the same 
reasons, they are either both justified or unjustified. There is no room for subjective 
idiosyncrasies of personality or psychology to be relative to the justification of their 
beliefs. Pollock, who makes this point, writes:
This seems to imply that there is just one set of correct epistemic norms, and the norms a 
person actually employs may fail to be correct. This conclusion would seem to be obvious if it 
were not for the fact that there is no apparent basis for criticizing a person's norms.34
If epistemic norms are internal to the doxastic state of the cognizer and, pace 
internalist, they are always correct (but with Pollock I must note that mental 
processes are either correct or incorrect, so some will fail), how can two people
^Ibid., p. 142.
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criticize and amend each other's stock of epistemic norms if all they can appeal to is 
their own doxastic system? This further accentuates the problems created by the 
absence of the role that the concept of truth has in claims of knowledge for the 
internalist. If this issue is not dealt with we are left with a thorough-going 
epistemological relativism. I ought to make explicit that for internalists knowledge 
can only be claimed by evaluating one's own doxastic state without reference to 
anything outside of it, e. g. if one's cognitive processes can be used and accepted by 
another person for his claim of knowledge. Even though that may be true (the law 
of non-contradiction is necessarily a universal law), the usability of a mental process 
by all does not make it justified. What is normative for the externalist is, perhaps, a 
belief-forming process that is considered reliable for the use of all people in 
accruing propositions of knowledge. Therefore, the present characterization of 
internalist justification leads to relativism in that it becomes very difficult for them 
to hold that one person's failing cognitive process about X can be amended by 
reference to another person's correct one about the same proposition. If the 
correctness of the latter's cognitive process is available for the critique and 
correction of the former's doxastic state, then the very concept of internalism is 
violated. Indeed, there seems to be no way to sanction criticism of another's mental 
processes. If there were a way to give the concept of truth a central role in claims of 
knowledge for the internalist then that could be a regulatory factor in terms of 
determining what are correct and incorrect cognitive processes. One could critique 
another's failing mental process for not yielding true beliefs.
One way that some internalists have tried to save their project from this 
objection is by introducing the concept of truth conditions. This sort of move is 
necessary if epistemic norms solely adhere to the canons of classical logic and 
cannot themselves yield true belief, but only regulate our reasoning processes. 
Epistemic norms, as we have seen thus far, regulate justification for the internalist, 
but up until now they have not accommodated the condition of truth for claims of 
knowledge. The standard view individuates concepts according to their truth 
conditions. This theory suggests that what makes concept X what it is are the 
conditions that must be satisfied in order for X to exemplify, embody, or represent 
that concept. Pollock gives the following examples:
The truth condition of the concept red is the condition of being red, and the truth condition of
the concept blue is the condition of being blue. The following is undeniable:
36
red = blue if and only if being red = being blue35
Even though this sounds appealing (in as much as I am imagining that we 
could accept it as plausible), we could easily assign truth conditions to concepts and 
dispense with the Chisholmian language of "being appeared to as if X-ly". 
Internalists would have access to claims of truth as much as claims of justification. 
The shortcoming of this theory is considerable, however. I agree w ith Pollock's 
following remarks regarding this view:
...it is hardly illuminating. Rather than explaining the concepts, the truth conditions 
presuppose the concepts. We might as well define the "identity condition" of a physical 
object to be the condition of being that object and then claim that physical objects are 
individuated by their identity conditions. That is about as unilluminating as a theory can 
be.36
The use of truth conditions does not really get us very far because we want 
the explanation of how one may be justified in thinking that the red object one sees 
is in fact red. Truth condition theory, construed in this way, merely asserts that an 
object must actually be red if we think it is.
I could continue illustrating many other suggestions which attem pt to cure 
this problem that the internalist faces; some which incidentally involve introducing 
significant contemporary epistemic terms which cater to truth and falsity like 
entailment, warrant, and so on. My goal however, is not to resuscitate and accept a 
form of internalism but to provide clarity to some details of internalist theory in the 
broadest manner possible, within the limited space of this section.
It seems obvious that the issue of a true belief is very important in terms of 
understanding internalism as a viable epistemic theory. Therefore, for the sake of 
brevity, I will consider Pollock's own internalist view regarding how the concept of 
truth can be successfully accommodated. Until now I have referred to Pollock's 
work to clarify most theories of knowledge because he is a recognized authority on 
the field of epistemology. Now we will critically investigate a view that he 
personally argues for. This will provide an example of how an internalist can argue 
against critics who claim that internalists cannot move from "I seem to see a tree" to 
"I see a tree."
Pollock claims that we ought not be draw n into the common internalist 
fashion of considering hum an cognition as if it involved machines which only
35Ibid., p. 143. Pollock's emphases.
36Ibid. Pollock's emphasis.
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receive input and then determine the justifiability of that input w ithout justifying 
the justification of that input. This is to say that it is important to recognize and 
focus upon the correction and judgement of our own reasoning processes. This 
would also answer to the charge that internalist theory is committed to a form of 
relativism because there is no basis to critique another's epistemic norms. He 
intends to show us how we can do it ourselves. Ultimately, he views cognizers as 
machines that justify beliefs in conjunction with an acute self-awareness about their 
reasoning processes. This is, of course, an issue of analyzing and judging our 
epistemic norms. Thus, he considers defeasible reasoning to be integral in 
understanding cognition, justifying beliefs, and accommodating the concept of truth 
to those beliefs. Defeasible reasoning involves reaching a conclusion by a kind of 
thought process, then undercutting that conclusion by another which is derived 
from an alternative reasoning process. If the functioning of concepts - as we think 
about their ordinary use in our life - do not strictly require truth conditions (we saw 
that truth conditions were mere stipulations of the concept of truth), Pollock 
rhetorically wonders why we have the concept of truth at all. He writes, "The 
answer is that this concept [truth] is required for defeasible reasoning"37 He claims 
that we do not need truth in order to affirm a thought, because the affirmation of a 
thought is a part of thinking it. Evaluative concepts, such as truth and falsity, are 
internal to, and constitutive of, thinking about one's thoughts and judging them. He 
writes furthermore:
The way in which we...ascribe truth values to propositions is dictated by our epistemic norms. 
If P is a proposition I am able to entertain, then my language of thought must contain a 
mental representation 'P  of P, and my epistemic norms must license reasoning something 
like the following:
What I believed was 'P'.
P
Therefore, what I believed was true.
Just to have a label, I will call this disquotational reasoning.x
We must be clear on how our epistemic norms license truth values to our 
beliefs. I will quote the following at length because it expresses his conclusion from 
the above as well as answering the question of how one may justify applying truth 
value to our beliefs. He writes:
37Ibid., p. 165.
38Ibid., pp. 165-166. Pollock's emphasis.
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That schema [disquotational reasoning] is supposed to be dictated by our epistemic norms. 
But in order for our epistemic norms to dictate any such schema, it must be predetermined 
that 'P' designates P. Thus 'P' cannot designate P just accidentally. 'P' must designate P 
necessarily (this is precisely analogous to the observation that practical reasoning requires me 
to have a special way of thinking of myself that is necessarily a way of thinking about 
myself). T' designates P necessarily because our epistemic norms predetermine that it does, 
and the way they predetermine that is by licensing the above schema of disquotational 
reasoning.39
Disquotational reasoning is a necessary condition (licensed by our epistemic 
norms) of thinking about an object while seeing it and judging it to be true. The 
objectivity of a proposition (its truth) is therefore predetermined in our mental 
processes when thinking about it. This is like thinking about oneself which must be 
necessarily present to, and therefore predetermined upon thinking about oneself. 
One of his main points is to demystify the concept of truth by arguing that it is not 
outside of the mind somehow being elicited from the natural world. For Pollock 
truth is:
...just one more concept in our ratiocinative arsenal. The concept of truth is characterized by 
its role in reasoning just like any other concept. Rather than truth being fundamental and 
rules for reasoning being derived from it, the rules for reasoning come first and truth is 
characterized by the rules for reasoning about truth.40
As an example of why defeasible reasoning requires the concepts of truth and 
falsity Pollock considers a general kind of defeater which is applicable to all prima 
facie reasoning. He claims that all prima facie reasons for a belief are subject to 
defeat by "reliability defeaters". Briefly, if we know many X's which are all Y's that 
justifies us in believing that all X's are Y's, but if we discover a single X which is not 
a Y, all of our previous evidence for this prima facie reason stands for nothing. We 
may still hold this prima facie reason, but we have additional information which 
constitutes a defeater against the conclusion that all X's are Y's. Prima facie reasons 
which can be defeated by reliability defeaters must presuppose truth. For 
instance,41 imagine that I believe the sheet of paper before me is red on the basis of 
its looking red. This reasoning is defeated by the discovery that there is a red light 
illuminating it and under such circumstances something looking red is not a 
reliable indicator that it is red. Pollock writes, "The reliability of P as an indicator 
of Q under circumstances of type C is just the probability of Q 's being true under 
circumstances of type C given that P is true."42
39Ibid., p. 166.
40Ibid., p. 167.
41 Ibid. Pollock's example.
42Ibid.
So, truth is predetermined in our thinking about objects in the world.
Moving from a thought of an object to claiming that one's thought of that object is 
true is a mental process that is internal and judged correct because it is epistemically 
and logically normative. For the internalists truth itself is not something that is 
elicited from us in the empirical world as the externalist presupposes. Truth is a 
regulatory feature of judging our mental processes and thus in line w ith their thesis 
that knowledge (justified true belief) is a state of mind.
It is difficult for me to appreciate this conclusion, however. W hat surrounds 
the concept of truth in the above is that it aids in, and seems crucial for, knowing 
that one knows. Earlier we heard Pollock claim that the concept of truth is not 
required in first order reasoning (thinking a thought and not thinking about 
thinking a thought), because affirmation is a part of thinking a thought. Thus,
"tru th  values" come in the capacity to affirm, critique, or judge if our first order 
mental processes are true or false. However, we saw with Malcolm that an absolute 
and unmistakable truth is when we look at an ink-bottle and say "Here is an ink- 
bottle". The proposition that one has a heart is also held as true by most people 
without question. We do not ascribe the value of truth to propositions of this kind 
after reflecting on, and apprehending, the epistemic norm which sanctions such 
judgements. One may assure oneself of the truth of his belief by checking relevant 
evidence. Truth does not issue from internalist norms, that which orchestrates the 
rudiments of our reasoning skills; truth requires an attitude of certainty towards a 
proposition which is apprehended by different means according to context.
Knowing that one has a heart is different than knowing that there is an ink-bottle in 
front of oneself when looking at it. Truth is implicit in both propositions, but the 
latter is based on empirical apprehension (identifying an ink-bottle by the senses, 
and having no doubt that it is an ink-bottle) and the former concerns, to perhaps put 
it crudely, a necessary postulate for all hum an beings. Again we must reiterate, if 
the ink-bottle and the heart propositions are not true then I do not know what truth 
could possibly be. Ultimately, truth is not a regulatory factor of our thinking about 
our thinking of thoughts. We consider a proposition true when it is held with great 
firmness because no question of its truth arises.43
43This stands true for both the ink-bottle and the heart propositions. I agree with Malcolm that the 
ink-bottle proposition could never be false, yet the heart proposition (along with a host of other 
propositions) is properly held as true, but it is strictly conceivable that a context could arise which 
would question its truth (like a doctor who thoroughly search for one's heart and found nothing). 
However, until a context arises which questions the truth of propositions such as I have a heart, it is 
held as true.
E. Foundationalism and coherentism
For my present purposes I will discuss the list of internalist sub-theories 
which is exhausted by two groups: the foundationalists and the coherentists. 
Traditional foundationalism44 holds that there are two classes of propositions of 
belief. One kind of proposition is foundational or self-justified, and the other is not, 
needing evidence and justification. This distinction will be described in great detail 
later within a section devoted to defining foundationalism.
Coherence theory maintains that a proposition is justified if it coheres 
rationally, or consistently, with a set of beliefs that are already held. It is true that 
the importance of cohering propositions in a system of beliefs is as present in 
foundationalism as it is in coherence theory. The difference between the two is that 
a rational belief system for foundationalism begins with the acceptance of a single 
kind of proposition which is basic, or foundational, thus rational as it is. Therefore, 
a rational belief system is one where the non-basic beliefs cohere with the basic 
ones in a supportive relationship. A logical chain of reasoning from non-basic 
propositions comes to rest on a basic proposition which is self-justified.
Coherence theory places no crucial importance on a single kind of 
proposition, but views the rationality of a belief system to be the manner in which 
all propositions comprising the belief system cohere. As we saw with all doxastic 
theories, the only components that can be appealed to for justification are the beliefs 
that one holds. The issue of the objectivity of the world outside of the m ind plays 
no role in the justification of our beliefs in classical internalist theories, because 
knowledge is a mental phenomenon or state of mind.
One idea that surrounds coherence theory that is often appealed to in order to 
persuade philosophers of its correctness is called the "Neurath metaphor". It can be 
expressed as follows: "We are like sailors who must rebuild their ship upon the 
open seas." 45 At any given moment we have an enormous inventory of beliefs, 
which comprises our doxastic system. Among our stock of beliefs, are ones that 
inform us on how to modify this group of beliefs. It is intuitively correct to say that 
we cannot discard all of our beliefs and start afresh, because then we would not
44I say "traditional" because even though reformed epistemology cleaves to the foundationalist 
picture of knowledge I do not wish to include them in the group of mainstream foundationalists 
because their object of inquiry and interests are greatly divergent.
45 John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, New  
Jersey, 1986), p. 67.
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know where to start in reconstructing our doxastic system. To proceed in 
rebuilding our ship of beliefs in a rational fashion we m ust have beliefs that guide 
us in this task. These guiding beliefs, however, cannot be viewed as somehow 
logically primary to our overall system of beliefs in the way that basic beliefs are 
primary for the foundationalist. The reason that they cannot be considered logically 
primary is somewhat of a perplexing issue, but one that is at the core of the Neurath 
metaphor, and I think, unmistakably correct. The very core idea is that our beliefs 
are innocent until proven guilty. If we hypothetically imagine that a person starts 
out with a set of beliefs, we will notice that the reasons that he held those beliefs in 
the first place dissipate with time; they eventually fade away, until he no longer 
remembers the reasons for holding them. We tend not to remember these reasons, 
we just know our conclusions from them. Pollock, who describes this point well, 
continues:
If we no longer remember our reasons for a belief, then it seems that the credentials of the 
belief no longer depend upon those reasons. Finding something wrong with the reasons 
cannot discredit the belief if we have no idea that the belief was originally derived from those 
reasons. This might seem perplexing. It might seem that we should keep track of our 
reasons. But it is an undeniable matter of fact that we do not. For example, we all believe 
that Columbus landed in America in 1492. But how many of us have any idea what our 
original reason was for believing that? We can guess that we learned it from our parents or 
from our teacher, but we do not really know and we certainly do not know the details.46
Coherence theory, then, is supported by this psychological presupposition 
that when we begin to interrogate our beliefs for justification we cannot determine 
a starting point for them.47 Given all of the above, the question that needs 
answering is: how can we identify our reason guiding beliefs which aid us in 
discarding beliefs and acquiring others? Coherence theorists make ample appeal to 
epistemic norms which guide the coherence of a belief system. If a proposition can 
be held within a coherent system and its norms, then it is kept and justified; but if it 
does not then it is rejected for reasons of non-justification or incoherence.
46Ibid., p. 70. Pollock's emphasis.
47This insight is not peculiar to coherence theorists. There are many philosophical 
theories, with a wide range of interests, that recognize that there are some beliefs that a 
person cannot abandon, nor objectively interrogate, primarily because they are part and 
parcel of one's being. For instance, I have in mind Martin Heidegger's analysis of 
Dasein's existential constitution. The presupposition that he holds involves the idea 
of eventually finding oneself interrogating one's sense of being. But, one cannot locate the 
origins of one's sense of being; that is, one's consciousness of being and there is no identifiable 
moment when one acquired such knowledge. Dasein's existential constitution is that of "falling and 
thrownness". Heidegger's metaphor is that we have fallen, or have been thrown, into the world.
See the section "Falling and Throwness" in his Being and Time (Harper and Row, London, 1962), pp. 
219-224.
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Because coherence theory places no particular emphases on any one belief in 
a system of beliefs as being the origin of the system's rationality, reasonableness is 
internal to it. The consequence of this is that:
...insofar as we can be justified in holding one belief without having a reason for doing so (for 
instance, an epistemic norm), we can be justified in holding any belief without having a 
reason for doing so.48
I do not think that it is inconsistent to say that the coherence theorist does not 
consider belief systems as tautological. When they focus on the character of 
epistemic norms, as that which guides the modification of belief systems, we could 
suppose that they hold the coherence of a system to be a fairly accurate reflection of 
the way the world is. In support of this point they would readily point out that 
there are not an infinite number of epistemic norms. We can assume that epistemic 
normalcy is not a random affair. There is something about the way the world is 
which yields some beliefs as normative and others not. Perhaps the coherentist 
m ust embrace a trust in our epistemic norms, that they issue from objective reality 
even though we cannot rely on what reasoning there may be for holding them.
F. A rejection of internalism
I will now discuss why internalism and its variants (classical foundationalism 
and coherence theory) are implausible. W hat is problematic with the internalist 
views of knowledge is that which marks it as a unique domain of inquiry: its view 
of cognitive essentialism.
There are two criticisms of cognitive essentialism that I will focus upon. The 
first argument is to deny that we can determine if one is justified in claiming to 
know, or believe, proposition P by introspection alone. The second argument is a 
denial that we can determine if the truth of proposition P is known or merely 
believed by introspection alone. These arguments could be connected in many 
intricate and revealing ways, which perhaps would yield some interesting insights. 
But given the scope and space available in this chapter I wish to keep them 
somewhat distinct from one another. The only connection between them that I will 
make explicit (because it is my aim in this section) is that they reveal problems for 
cognitive essentialism. The first argument will highlight a problem surrounding
48John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories o f Knowledge (Rowm an and Littlefield Publishers, N ew
Jersey, 1986), p. 72.
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the internalist concept of justification of empirical propositions. The second 
argum ent questions the intelligibility of discovering within the m ind alone if one 
believes, or knows, P.
For the internalist justification is only found by analyzing our immediate 
impressions and mental processes about an object. An important question to raise 
is: can our sense impressions ever be wrong? If it can be shown that our beliefs 
about our perceptions are at times mistaken, then an evaluation of the 
environmental conditions one is in while procuring a belief would be called for in 
order to determine the truth of our perceptual beliefs. Information would be 
needed for justification that is not internally available to the mental processes of the 
believer. I will recount a particularly clear example given by Pollock which shows 
that, when it comes to empirical propositions, an external evaluation is imperative 
for their justification. All that one has to show is if it is possible to be wrong about
one's beliefs regarding sensory experience. Pollock suggests49 the scenario of a man 
who sits before a clock that upon the hour flashes a red light in the lower left corner 
of his visual field. He claims that there can be a time when that man is concentrated 
on something elsewhere in his visual field when the light flashes (e.g. a wasp flying 
about his nose). He may then form the belief that the red light flashed when he did 
not directly experience it. Furthermore, perhaps this time the clock was broken and 
the light did not flash. He had no sensory experience at all, but believed that there 
was a flash, though he didn 't see it because he was distracted. In this case he would 
hold the belief of an immediate sensory impression, but he had none at all. This 
example convincingly shows that when it comes to empirical propositions an 
evaluation of the outside world (the reliability of the facts and the conditions they 
are in) must be taken into consideration. If it were a matter of prima facie 
justification of sense perception we still lack the notion of facticity, which I take to 
be essential when we speak of empirical propositions. Our thoughts of an object 
must agree with the facticity of that object in the world, apart from our mental 
processes. The internalist cannot directly justify the facticity of our beliefs. Some 
internalists assume that epistemic norms in some sense implicitly reflect objective 
reality, however they reject the notion that we can discover objective truth by fact­
finding (which is required of the man in the example above). This is because 
justification is internal to mental processes and has nothing to do with evaluating
49
Ibid., pp. 59-60.
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conditions outside of our mind. I think that the internalist intuits that mental 
processes are accurate reflections of reality, but at times our thoughts are mistaken 
about what we think about reality.
What the above example also indicates is that classical internalist theory has 
some difficulty distinguishing between appearance and reality. The internalist may 
respond to the example above by noting that appearances are often cashed out in 
terms of beliefs that do not cohere very well with the rest of our beliefs. 
Nevertheless, because our norms somehow implicitly reflect objective reality, and 
the way in which our beliefs cohere is informed by our norms for the internalist, the 
coherence of our beliefs somehow says something about objectivity. This response 
by the internalist does not answer the question at hand. We would like a response 
to the possibility that one can be mistaken about thinking that one has been 
appeared to at all. The example above is an instance when the coherence of beliefs 
is not really an important feature. We want to know if the red light flashed or not. 
Regardless of what appearance beliefs the man may have had, we want to know if 
he is correct about the light flashing. The subject in the example thought that the 
red light appeared, but it did not in reality. The facticity of an object, for 
internalism, is not possibly a part of justification because they maintain that belief 
and knowledge are states of mind. We see that the justification of objects ought to 
involve an evaluation of external factors.
This brings us to my second argument against internalism which is that 
knowledge and belief are not states of mind. We see at this point that the work of 
Norman Malcolm becomes pertinent. The reason this is so is because he questions 
the initial intuition of internalism that knowledge and belief are descriptions of 
mental states.50 His argument centers on the investigation of the sense in our uses 
of "know". When we use the word "know" it partly involves a high degree of 
confidence in the truth of the proposition. If nothing could count against the truth 
of a proposition, then we say that we know it, it is certain. What is there in mental 
processes that would give us that confidence? Can that confidence be discovered 
there? Malcolm claims that knowledge is like an attitude toward a proposition; an 
attitude comprised of confidence in a proposition in relation to the possibility of it
50Norman Malcolm argues against this central theme in his essay "Knowledge and Belief" in 
Knowledge and Certainty: Essays and Lectures (Printice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965), 
pp. 58-72. In part, the object of his critique in this essay is a statement made by H. A. Prichard. 
Malcolm begins the essay by quoting Prichard, on page 58, as saying, "We must recognize that 
when we know something we either do, or by reflecting, can know that our condition is one of 
knowing that thing..."
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being discounted. Also, by implication, Malcolm contends that there are no general 
criteria of knowledge that one could appeal to as necessary and sufficient 
conditions. He affirms that criteria for knowledge are contextually circumscribed.
The internalist would object to the notion that a claim of knowledge can be 
made only if there is no evidence to discount it. This is so because evidence which 
discounts the truth of a proposition is found outside of the mind, e.g. apart from our 
beliefs about an object and our mental processes which issue those beliefs. Often 
evidence can take the form of facts about an object that discount our beliefs about it, 
and which we recognize, understand, by discovering them outside of our set of 
beliefs that we already have in our mind. This stands true when we think of 
Pollock's example that I discussed above, which he uses to reject internalist 
epistemology. If one believes that the light flashed when he was concentrating on a 
wasp flying around his nose and it actually did not flash, then this shows that the 
facts of the world, and understanding them, have extreme importance in holding 
claims of knowledge. Ultimately, we must be responsive to discovering the facts of 
the world which help form and reject the beliefs which we already have. Thus, 
when we seek to justify beliefs about objects in the world we must take much more 
into consideration than merely our beliefs about them. I do not see any substantial 
objection that the internalists could make at this point which would challenge 
Pollock's example, and cause them to continue to hold onto their presupposition 
that the justification of belief is made by an analysis of internal states alone. With 
what I have said it seems that all internalist theories, in relying on the principle of 
cognitive essentialism, must be rejected.
Given this I think that externalism is headed in a better direction than 
internalism. They recognize that an environmental investigation which an object is 
in may offer information which one is not mentally aware of yet is pertinent to 
holding a justified true proposition about it. But, we will see that they also cannot 
evade the criticism of traditional epistemology leveled by Malcolm.
IV. Externalism
Externalism can be defined in terms of a denial of cognitive essentialism. The 
externalist insists that there must be a form of inquiry that links the fact or reality of 
empirical propositions to our thinking about them.
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There are two externalist sub-theories that dominate contemporary 
epistemology, reliabilism and probabilism. Both of them accommodate for the 
evaluation of environmental affairs which allows for the acquisition of information 
not mentally accessible to the subject for claims of knowledge.
A. Reliabilism
The reliabilist would agree with the internalist to the extent that the 
epistemic worth of a belief is to be found by an analysis of the cognitive processes 
that produce it, but he would disagree with his position that justification is part of a 
correct cognitive process without any reference to environmental conditions or 
states of affairs. Cognitive processes for the reliabilist can be correct in some 
circumstances and incorrect in others. The point is that the reliability of our 
cognitive processes is what provides for an analysis of the possibility of 
justification. For instance, our color vision is one hum an sense that we place great 
reliability in. If we found ourselves in an environment where color varied 
erratically we would no longer find color vision reliable. No a priori assessment of 
color vision is possible, however. Pollock who gives this example concludes:
It [color vision] depends upon contingent matters of fact. Thus reliabilism makes epistemic
51
justification turn on contingent matters of fact. Cognitive essentialism is false on this view.
Reliabilist investigations hinge on contingent matters of fact such as the reliability 
of the senses. For instance when one looks at a color wheel in the normal light of 
day one can distinguish red from green, and there is agreement on the reliability of 
one making that distinction. However, a color wheel bathed in red light may 
present green as if it were identical to black. Because of the contingent matters of 
fact - the red lighting - what is green appears black and thus that fact makes all the 
difference to the justification of the belief of the color being viewed. Normal color 
vision is unreliable in this case because of the circumstances.
B. Probabilism
Probabilism generally does not seek an investigation into the reliability of 
cognitive processes concerning sensory experience. Justification for the probabilist 
is subordinate to the degree of probability of a proposition being true. There is an
51
John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories o f Knowledge (Rowm an and Littlefield Publishers, N ew
Jersey, 1986), p. 23.
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obvious hint of probability theory within reliabilism in that the reliabilist is 
concerned, to some degree, with the probability of a cognitive process yielding true 
belief. Generally, if process X is reliable in yielding belief Y, one may believe that 
process X will probably yield belief Y rather than not. Nonetheless, it is obvious 
that reliabilism is not a species of probability theory. The reliabilist is concerned 
with what trust we can justifiably have in our mental processes pertaining to 
sensory perception. Therefore, the probabilist focuses his investigation on the 
ordinary (non-philosophical) truism that one ought not hold a belief unless it is at 
least probably true. To have a justified belief implies that there is high probability 
of it being true. For instance, if a person waited for another person to meet him at a 
location, yet believed that it was not even probable that that person would show up, 
naturally we would think that person was irrational, crazy. It is true, then, that 
probabilism has strong links with statistical analysis. A common example given by 
probabilists concerns the odds on rolling dice and probable outcomes. For instance, 
because there are 36 possible outcomes on a roll of a pair of dice, and 11 rolls will 
include at least one 6, the probability of getting one 6 on one roll is 11/36. So, for 
some probabilists, the justification of belief is a mathematical or statistical matter. 
This is so because, classically, probability theory has been concerned with the 
theory of mathematics which underlies the probability of truths. This form of 
probabilism has had a lot of weight in the philosophy of science (and in other fields 
as well) in determining the probability of acquiring justifiable results from a given 
experiment.
However, one form of probabilism linked to the above intends to make 
direct comment on the justification of beliefs outside of the practice of science. The 
subjectivist theory of probabilism analyzes a belief in terms of its degree of 
probability. This involves a belief that is measured by a degree of confidence by the 
subject in relation to the bets he is willing to make on it being true. It is said that a 
subject is only entitled to use "probability" if his bets are "coherent". This means 
that one's bets are not coherent if he bets in such a way that he will lose whatever 
the outcome. It is the case, with this form of probability theory, that probability is 
the degree of the rational man's belief. The probabilist is intent on applying the 
power of statistical analysis to justify the assumptions (non-analyzed propositions 
of belief) of the rational person. Therefore, they try to express the idea that 
probability is objective, thus probability works as a guide in the rationality of one's 
beliefs, or the justification of propositions of one's beliefs. It raises the question,
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how certain is the subject about proposition X?, and what is the subject's awareness 
of probability itself about proposition X? These are two different questions indeed. 
The former interrogates the attitude of the subject, while the latter comments on the 
objective nature of probability itself. The latter concern involves the notion that 
probability is not of our making. We do not create probabilities in the world.
Given any number of circumstances and their related beliefs we will be faced with 
probable truths. If we are to be rational, for the probabilist, we m ust decide on the 
most probable truth. On probability and objectivity A. R. Lacey writes:
Between them these theories [of probabilism] try to account for the ideas that probability is
objective and not of our choosing, and yet is somehow relative to our knowledge, since things
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in the world are either so or not so, and not probably so.
It is then the objective component of probability theory that gives it its force. The 
probabilist considers the objective nature of probability to be that which guides all 
hum an beliefs, and categorizes them into the justified and the unjustified.
C. A rejection of externalism
For my critical thoughts about these two externalist theories, with the aid of 
Malcolm's insights, I can say that reliabilism is a far more acceptable view of 
justification of belief than probabilism. With reliabilism we understand that the 
justification of a belief involves an investigation into the reliability of 
apprehending objects. For the most part, I have no argument against what they say 
about the justification of knowing objects. My critical question regarding the theory 
concerns how exhaustive it may be as a theory of knowledge. We can recall that 
Malcolm would never stipulate a general criterion of knowledge. A criterion of 
knowledge is contextually determined. Even though reliabilism seems to be quite 
sensible for empirical propositions, we run into some confusion if we try to 
investigate what amounts to our uses of "know" outside such a context of inquiry. I 
have in mind ethical or aesthetic judgements, as well as religious truths. It is clear 
to me that, in those cases, we cannot identify some kind of reliable mechanism or 
form of sensory perception for justification. I am not saying, at this point, that 
ethical or aesthetic judgements and religious truths are not objective reflections of 
reality. My point of contention with reliabilism is that it remains mute when faced 
with the fact that ethical or aesthetic judgements and religious truths are not issued
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by extended objects to be apprehended within a sensory field. By this account the 
reliabilist is using a general criterion of knowledge that is only applicable to 
propositions seized by a reliable mechanism or the senses.
I cannot accept probabilism, however, because it seems to confuse all 
knowledge claims with having at least some degree of "probability" and never 
certainty. The concept of "probability" is the common denominator for all justified 
propositions of belief for them. Imagine that my wife and I are preparing for the 
arrival of dinner guests. There are not enough chairs around the table, so my wife 
asks me "Are there four chairs in the spare room?" The criterion of knowing that 
there are four chairs in the next room is not contingent on intricate modes of 
reasoning. Nor is there a sense that the anticipated response would properly be of a 
degree of probability. In fact, one may wonder w hat place "probability" may have 
here at all. The fact that there are four chairs in the next room is discernible by 
looking to see if there are that many chairs in the next room. The conclusion would 
require the response to be either yes or no. The response would be based on 
certainty, knowledge, undeniable truth, and not the probability of the proposition 
being true. Imagine my response to my wife being, "It's probable that there are four 
chairs in the spare room". Strictly speaking it may be an interim statement, of 
course. This means that I may not in fact know for sure I believe so, but I will soon 
see if it is true or not. As it is, "It's probable", is no response at all in this context. 
The question requires a yes or no, while bringing the chairs or not bringing the 
chairs. This relates to Malcolm's statement about appearance beliefs of an object. If 
I can only be certain of the appearance of an object (the sense data of it) what would 
one make of a comment that "There appears to be an ink-bottle here" when asked if 
there is one there. "Here is an ink-bottle" says nothing exclusively about sense data 
or appearances. Likewise, if I responded to my wife by saying "It is probable that 
there are four chairs" when she needs them, it would seem like I was joking and 
evading a straight answer to her question. But, her question, "Are there four chairs 
in the spare room?", is distinctively marked by the copula which refers to the 
ontological status of the chairs being in the next room. Her question does not refer 
to the likelihood of the chairs being there.
An epistemologist might object because it seems that I am merely stipulating 
that there are chairs in the next room, then, by seeing them. Thus, the question 
arises, how do I infer the existence of an object from merely seeing it? What 
warrants that inference? We could put the question negatively: what would
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discount against my belief that the chairs are there when I seem to see them in the 
next room? We find ourselves in the same position as Malcolm when seeing the 
ink-bottle and saying "Here is an ink-bottle". I have no idea w hat would be 
evidence to discount the belief of the chairs being there upon seeing them at that 
moment. It is unintelligible for me to think that I do not really see them  then. 
Therefore, my seeing the chairs is a case of knowledge, because there is no evidence 
around to dissuade me from that belief. What would count as evidence is 
determined by the context in which a claim of knowledge is being made. Malcolm, 
of course, may say "I seem to see an ink-bottle" in the particular context of 
describing what he thinks is on a table in the corner of a darkened room. But, when 
he stands over one in a well lit room and there is nothing that questions his ability 
to observe with certainty that there is an ink-bottle, having doubt that one is there, 
is unintelligible.
The classical internalist, perhaps, would claim that Malcolm's view on this 
issue lacks the essential analysis of what the epistemic norms are which are at work 
in claiming that "Here is an ink-bottle". Malcolm does not describe his mental state 
of knowing that proposition by analyzing w hat is epistemically normative about it. 
In the context of seeing four chairs in a room, he would suggest, nothing counts as 
that which could caste doubt on my knowing that there are four chairs. Knowledge 
is not a description of a mental phenomenon.
Probabilism and reliabilism get us nowhere when considering knowledge 
claims about belief in God. It appears absurd to view belief in God as a 
"probability" or in some sense "reliable". If this were plausible we would be forced 
to criticize St. Paul's belief in God, as expressed in his letters of the New Testament. 
St. Paul never says that all ought to have theistic belief because its truth is highly 
probable, nor does he indicate what mechanism it is that can be counted on to yield 
the true proposition that God exists. His writings reflect a certainty about his belief 
in God that does not involve probabilities, or statements about reliable mechanisms 
of belief acquisition. If his belief in God was to be subject to these analyses then it 
seems that the whole face of his belief would be radically altered. A 
mischaracterization of the kind of belief he had would arise. His belief in God 
would be characterized as if it were a probability he was entertaining, or an 
affirmation of a reliable process in which he acquired the belief, and not the 
steadfast conviction that it was.
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V. Foundationalism and Basic Beliefs
We can now consider the mode of analysis involved in the internalist theory 
of foundationalism. This will provide the apparatus in which the reformed 
epistemologists find religious belief to be logically justified. The project of 
foundationalism has, for the most part, been seen to rely on the possibility of 
apprehending a single kind of proposition; those that are foundational or basic. We 
see here a sharp contrast with coherence theory, the other internalist view of 
knowledge. Foundationalists maintain the reality of self-justifying propositions 
which the rest of their epistemological theory is built upon. Coherence theory, by 
contrast, focuses on a proposition cohering within a whole system of belief, and not 
the logical status of a single proposition or a set of propositions. Thus, it is said by 
this kind of single proposition that foundationalists discover a foundation for 
knowledge. Quite naturally, foundationalism has/had  a substantial voice in 
various empirical investigations of knowledge. Many foundationalists maintain 
that some foundational propositions of knowledge are apprehended by sense 
experience. Keith Lehrer writes:
...there are some empirical statements (for example, that I see something moving or, more 
cautiously, that it appears to me as though I see something moving) which constitute the content
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of basic beliefs. The belief that such statements are true is a self-justified belief.
So at the center of understanding foundationalism is the requirement that basic 
apprehensions are among its sources of epistemic justification.
From an empirical point of view Lehrer notes that basic beliefs are, to put it
cautiously, appearance beliefs. These are beliefs of the appearance of irreducible or
basic concepts, such as movement or color. Even though Lehrer claims that 
empirical propositions often constitute the content of foundational beliefs, this is 
not to say that foundationalism is necessarily empiricist. In fact, all to the contrary. 
Foundationalists affirm cognitive essentialism, thus the justification of belief is 
internal to a cognitive process for them. The internal justification of cognitive 
processes has been an enduring feature of rationalist philosophy. Empiricism 
proper is best applied to externalist theories of knowledge where the focus is on 
evaluating the environment and conditions of empirical truths. Rationalism, by
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contrast, claims that basic propositions have characteristics which inherently afford 
them  a distinctively rational status. Such criteria for their basicality would be 
determined by distinctions of logical or rational //indubitability,/, for instance. 
However, the justification of a basic belief is not certified by an empirical 
apprehension, but by reason alone i.e., holding it because of its inherent rational 
characteristics regardless of the modality of procuring the belief. An example of 
rationalistic basic beliefs can be found in mathematics.54 For the foundationalist, 
1+2=3 is an indubitable truth which is basic in the sense that its truth is registered 
immediately to the mind and requires no reasoning about it. So, within the 
rationalist perspective, basic beliefs are irreducible, and constitute the base of a 
system of knowledge for them; such as color, or simple mathematics.
However, one rarely finds a foundationalist explicitly arguing for the 
primacy of rationalism over empiricism. That is, it is rarely insinuated that 
rationalism has precedence over the empirical. As you can see above, the 
foundationalist finds basic beliefs within empirical propositions as well as the 
(rationalist) domain of mathematics. So, ultimately the distinction between 
rationalist and empiricist for my purposes here is not too revealing, thus the 
application of the terms is not essential to understanding these domains of 
epistemology. Foundationalism, then seems to cut across traditional lines with a 
common assumption of what ought to be attained by it; namely, that an 
epistemological foundation is a guarantee of truth by a central, necessarily self­
justified and basic proposition, either of an empirical or rational nature.
The existence of self-justified propositions is what differentiates 
foundationalist theories from coherence theories. It is true that in traditional 
coherentism beliefs rest on others in a logically complementary fashion akin to the 
way non-basic propositions rest on others for justification in foundationalism. 
Because of this we may speak loosely and say that some propositions are 
foundational in coherentism in the sense that an ample number of propositions rest 
upon them. For instance, both physics and psychotherapy are bound to, and 
founded upon, sense perception and its attendant concepts, yet these two systems of 
thought are radically divergent in many other respects. Nonetheless, we cannot say
54I must note that this distinction between rationalism as internalist and empiricism as externalist is 
not as simple as my discussion my lead one to believe. For example, it is unintelligible to imagine a 
person knowing a mathematical proposition without any empirical considerations whatsoever. We 
all seemingly learn arithmetic by counting on our fingers or discerning how many apples there are 
in a page of our work book of mathematical excercises. So, rationalist/internalist propositions 
involve, as Kant would perhaps put it, empirical intuitions.
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that what we may call foundational propositions in coherentism are self-justified 
basic beliefs as the foundationalist understands it. Basic beliefs, for the 
foundationalist, have a rational justification internal to them and are not to be 
considered by reference to other beliefs as is the case for all propositions in 
coherence theory. John Pollock writes:
Basic beliefs must be justified independently of reasoning — if a belief can only be justified
through reasoning, its justification is dependent on the justification of the beliefs from which the
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reasoning proceeds, and hence, by definition, it is not a basic belief.
Basic beliefs have rational characteristics, and so are rational as they are. But 
that is not discovered by a chain of reasoning about them. A course of reasoning 
about them inevitably requires the consideration of other justified beliefs that are 
held. If reasoning about them were dependent on other justified beliefs, then their 
justification would also be dependent on the justification of those other beliefs. If a 
belief is not held on the basis of reasoning about them, then it seems that basic 
beliefs are those involved in various kinds of perception. Thus, foundational beliefs 
are typically perceptual ones. But we have still to see how they can be secured into 
an epistemologically favorable status.
It is obvious that we can be mistaken about perceptual beliefs; however, if 
this is so then the content of perceptual beliefs need further justification also. For 
example, I may believe that a person who is walking toward me in the fog is my 
brother, but when he approaches further, I discover that I am mistaken; that it is 
someone who merely possesses a similar height and girth. Another example is of 
viewing a dark blue shirt in a poorly lit, gloomy room, and believing it to be coal- 
black. Pollock raises the question, regardless of whether a given perceptual belief is 
mistaken or not, can a person be wrong in that h e / she is perceiving something? He 
writes:
If not, we might reasonably regard beliefs as basic, and take beliefs about physical objects to be
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supported only indirectly, by reasoning from beliefs about our sensory experience.
In an effort to place a term on this idea, contemporary epistemology refers to 
"being appeared to". So, in association with an environmental state of affairs, when
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one perceives P we may say that one is "being appeared to as if P". Thus, 
philosophers, in this way, speak of perceiving something red as "being appeared to
redly".57
At any rate, this suggests that foundational beliefs are those that are ways of 
being appeared to and not about physical objects themselves. Also, this assumes 
that ordinary perceptual beliefs can be mistaken, and if so they are not basic beliefs. 
However, "appearances", or "being appeared to" cannot be mistaken. "Being 
appeared to" excludes the source or object that seems to be appearing.
By way of summing up what foundational propositions can be, Pollock offers 
two conditions for them:
For a foundations theory to work, the class of basic beliefs must satisfy two conditions: (1)
there must be enough basic beliefs to provide a foundation for all other justified beliefs, and
(2) the basic beliefs must have a secure status that does not require them to be justified by
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appeal to further justified beliefs.
The second condition suggests that foundational beliefs m ust be self- 
justifying. That is, merely by holding the belief one is justified. This section is 
designed to be a general overview of the foundationalist view and his interests in 
basic propositions, therefore, we will see in detail, at the beginning of the next 
chapter, what amounts to the reasoning behind the conditions that the 
foundationalist sets down for basicality. By way of telegraphing that discussion we 
will see why the foundationalist holds the criteria of the self-justification of basic 
propositions to be either self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses.
At the bottom of foundationalism, if it is to have force, there m ust be such a 
thing as a self-justifying basic belief. The picture of knowledge that 
foundationalism often puts forward is one of a pyramid. A foundational belief lies 
at the base/foundations of a belief system with the related and non-foundational 
beliefs being supported by it. Non-basic propositions find their justification by 
being related to the self-justifying foundational proposition.
These philosophers can be regarded as sense-datum theorists. Some of the standard critical 
discussions on the subject are: Roderick Chisholm, Perceiving (Cornell University Press, Ithica, New  
York, 1957); Micheal Tyre, "The Averbial Approach to Visual Experience", The Philosophical Review 
93:195-226,1984; Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1998), chapter 1; C. D. Broad, Scientific Knowledge (Thoemmes Press, London, 1996), chapters 7 and
8 .
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There is the question in contemporary epistemology of whether foundational 
beliefs do, in fact, exist. Even if that question can be answered affirmatively, we can 
ask that if there are such beliefs, are there really enough of them to support a whole 
system of beliefs? These issues are involved in a continuous debate w ith many and 
various avenues and positions being considered. I merely wanted to point out the 
logical landscape to indicate what is involved in the space of thinking 
"foundationalism" which will provide an intelligible path to the next chapter on 
reformed epistemology.
VI. The Status of Religious Propositions in Traditional 
Epistemology and Foundationalism
Foundationalism views all propositions to be of two kinds. For them, there 
are basic, self-justifying propositions, and non-basic propositions which are in need 
of justifying support. Because the former are self-justified and are in no need of 
further epistemic investigation, they constitute part of the framework of what is 
counted as a rational belief. But the latter kind of proposition is in need of further 
epistemological investigation, because it requires further evidence and justification. 
Non-basic propositions are discerned as having a degree of justification depending 
on their relation to the justification or evidence, but they can never be inherently 
rational as they are like basic ones. Therefore, these propositions are not rational as 
they are, but seem to take on a degree of rationality when holding them because 
they are reliant on other justified beliefs. We can see this degree of justification 
emerge if we look at the propositions of belief focused on by externalists, for 
example. They would say that non-basic proposition P has a high probability of 
being rational to hold, or the process by which proposition P was acquired has a 
high reliability of producing rational beliefs.
My point of concern for now is to bring out the kind of characterization that 
religious propositions may have in this scheme of justifying beliefs. It is said that, 
within foundationalism, propositions of religious belief are non-basic. It is thought 
that belief in God is not foundational because it requires further evidence to attain 
rational status. Thus, religious propositions are subjected to taking on various 
degrees of justification, or degrees of rationality. It is not my focus here to argue 
against the foundationalist characterization of religious propositions for their status 
to be basic rather than non-basic. It ought to be assumed, given my critique of the
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internalist and externalist theories of knowledge by reference to Norman Malcolm, 
that I would not accept foundationalism proper in any guise because of their 
acceptance of cognitive essentialism. It is in the next chapter that we will see the 
reformed epistemologists argue for religious propositions to be considered basic 
rather than non-basic.
59I will support an argument made by D. Z. Phillips , against viewing 
religious propositions of belief as taking on various degrees of justification or 
rationality, since this does not reflect the character of belief that can be described in 
the lives of people holding a belief in God. The crux of this mischaracterization is 
that in treating propositions of religious belief in terms of degrees of rational 
evidence we cannot get away from the fact that holding a religious proposition is 
like entertaining a probability. The evidentialist, then, views religious propositions 
as never being conclusively verified, thus rationally justified in terms of certainty, 
knowledge. That is, they are rational in as much as the evidence indicates, but God 
can never be an object of knowledge for foundationalism, thus never thoroughly 
rational to believe in. Can we characterize a person holding belief in God in this 
way, e.g. as if a believer awaits further evidence or justification? Is a believer 
characteristically justified by degrees of rationality? This would give cause for a 
believer to refer to God's existence as probable, or another term that expresses at least 
a little uncertainty. I view this as another version of philosophical theism, or a view 
in regard to the God of philosophy, which has ignored the character of belief 
revealed in the God of scripture. I insist on this point if philosophy is to be 
conceived of as making a concerted effort to reflect upon issues that enter the lives 
of people (I assume that Christians are informed about their beliefs from the Bible 
and its interpretation by a Christian community, and not from texts on traditional 
epistemology) and not free to construct fictions about what believing in God is and 
m ust be. If we take religious belief as the foundationalist wants us to, that of an 
issue of competing probable hypotheses, what happens to a reading of the Bible? It 
follows that the character of presentation of the knowledge claims in the Bible 
would be surprisingly altered from Genesis to Revelations. We would read this 
mischaracterization of the scriptures from, "It is highly probable that in the beginning 
God created the heaven and the earth" to "Probably you are justified in holding the 
belief that the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ is with you all. Amen." From Genesis
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to Revelations there is no religiously recommended assessment of, nor 
consideration to, various degrees of rationality about having belief in God. We 
read, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth" to "The grace of our 
Lord Jesus Christ is with you all. Amen".
What Phillips' argument above directs us to is the necessity for a vigilant 
attentiveness to the use of concepts in our language. If we disregard the fact that 
one mode of thought cannot intelligibly be reduced to all other modes of thought, 
we may characterize religious belief as if it involves probabilities for all devotees. 
But, if we investigate how concepts expressed in language alter from context to 
context, and are often incommensurable to one another, we may avoid a 
mischaracterization of a context of belief like the one discussed above. This focus on 
language intends to reveal how a context of belief is to be assuredly characterized 
by showing how the concepts are definitively (and peculiarly) used within it.
I can imagine a probabilist making the following point, however, regarding 
the belief in God and the evidentialist mode of inquiry: whatever it is that the 
belief in God amounts to, she may assert, it does not seem to fall into the category 
of experientially or empirically supportable beliefs. This is the assumption that 
underlies classical foundationalism's view of religious propositions also. This 
assumption, in my mind, certainly gives their view considerable force, because it is 
true. A person who expresses her faith by saying, "Jesus Christ is my personal lord 
and savior" does not know that because it rests upon the basic belief, "God exists", 
which was invoked by an empirical experience. If she did say that she knows Christ 
is her personal lord and savior because it is connected to an empirical experience, I 
would not know what she could be referring to. Must that utterance, or any kind of 
expression of knowledge, always be justified in terms of the apprehension of 
empirical propositions? This relates to one of the objections that I have been 
making through the work of Malcolm: there ought not be one criteria of 
knowledge seen as that which can intelligibly cover all forms of the expression of 
knowledge. I contend that something is wrong about claiming that religious 
propositions require empirical support to be known. I will argue in the second and 
third chapters that not all propositions of knowledge require empirical or 
experiential support.
However, to assume that all believing characters in the Gospels did not 
require empirical evidence for the certainty of their belief is not entirely accurate. 
For instance, the disciple Thomas was not present at the first visitation by the risen
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Christ. Afterward, the other disciples told Thomas that they had seen him. He said 
that he would not believe unless he touched his wounds. On the second visitation 
Thomas was present, and Christ said to him, "Put your finger here and see my 
hands, and bring your hand and put it into my side, and do not be unbelieving, but 
believe." At Thomas' inspection of the evidence of Christ in their midst after death, 
he said in affirmation of his belief, "My lord and my God!". Nevertheless, this is
not the end to this episode and message about the character of believing.60 If it were 
we could conclude that Thomas was lucky indeed to really make sure, in the 
evidentialist fashion, that Jesus Christ is the risen Lord. The depth and certainty of 
belief in God would really be a matter of luck. Thomas was lucky to be able to 
empirically inspect the wounds of Christ. Furthermore, the generations of 
Christians who came after this recorded incident would be epistemically estranged 
or alienated from the certainty of their belief. Thus, we Christians m ust believe, in 
some sense, on the say so of Thomas. Also, Thomas would be exemplified as the 
paradigmatic Christian, because he was really sure about Christ. But, Jesus 
responds to Thomas' sudden belief by evidence in saying, "Have you come to 
believe because you have seen me? Blessed are those that have not seen and have 
believed." I think to best understand this statement we must consider the sense of 
"blessed". My understanding of one who is blessed is one who is holy and in 
Divine favor. It was good that Thomas, in the end, believed rather than not, as Jesus 
insinuated, regardless of what brought the belief. Jesus did allow him to come to 
belief by empirical investigation. But, the holy ones who are in Divine favor, or are 
"closer" to Divinity, are those who believe by the testimony of their heart and not 
their senses. But still, why? If one today, like Thomas, says that he will not believe 
unless he touches the wounds of Christ he will forever be in doubt. He would 
perhaps claim that it is possible or probable, that Jesus is the risen Christ, but 
because he did not touch his wounds he can only believe by a certain degree (or not 
at all) which will forever be at least shy of certainty. But, the favored one from 
Jesus' teaching is he who professes his lordship (knows him) within his heart, and 
apart from any empirical investigation. By Jesus' teaching - that he who has not 
seen and believed is blessed and in Divine favor - we get a sense that he who must 
believe in an empirical manner like Thomas, and not by the testimony of his heart, 
is lacking in his faith and Divine blessing. He does not know the fullness
6°John 20: 24-31.
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of faith or the preferred character of belief. The truth of belief in God, its preferred 
character, is with one who has no empirical evidence yet believes. From this 
account we notice that the foundationalist who considers religious belief 
conceptualizes a logicality which can be viewed as contrary to the biblical teaching 
in the story of the doubting Thomas.
At this stage I can imagine the confident yet raw criticism against w hat I have 
said above by traditional epistemologists that it seems scripture is, and religious 
devotees are, imprudent and logically apathetic with respect to the rational standing 
of their beliefs. But, as we saw implied through my description of internalism, 
externalism and their respective sub-theories, most of traditional epistemology 
claims that knowledge is gained by our senses, or mental processes, which are both 
considered in relation to apprehending empirical propositions. Because the concept 
of God does not fall into the domain of empirical propositions, the rationality of 
holding a concept of God is reduced to degrees of rationality. The thrust of my 
criticism, which will be argued in detail in chapter three, is that perhaps there is a 
wholly different logical sense to believing in God that cannot be informed or 
scrutinized by an investigation based on empirical propositions as the paradigm  of 
all propositions of belief. With this criticism an investigation into the grammar of 
religious belief will be crucial in order to challenge the assumption of traditional 
epistemology; that what is fully rational to believe, is that which emanates from the 
empirical world.
With sole consideration to the foundationalist project, shall we say that 
religious propositions ought to be treated as basic rather than non-basic? I will 
leave it to the reformed epistemologists to argue for that position in the next 
chapter. In order to lead into the main arguments against traditional 
foundationalism by the reformed philosophers to be covered in the following 
chapter, I ought to offer some further detail about the basis of their view of justified 
belief. Therefore, we must look at the problem of determining the criteria of 
basicality of foundational propositions.
VII. The Problem of the Criterion of Basicality
In order to set the stage for reformed epistemology and their critique of 
foundationalism in excluding belief in religious propositions from the set that are 
considered foundational, we m ust have a general look at the problem of the
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criterion of basicality. I will not present this issue in terms of reformed 
epistemology in particular. I intend to explicate this problem in view of presenting 
foundational epistemology as comprehensively as possible given the limited space 
and scope of this chapter.
As I said at the outset, traditional epistemology asks "w hat can we know?" 
and "How does one know that one knows?" It has long been thought by traditional 
epistemologists, that if they are seeking justification, or evidence for (true) belief 
then the project of determining a criterion of things that are known would be an 
immensely fruitful area of inquiry. It would be to discover the criteria of the 
rationale which logically buttresses the search for justified belief. This is one of the 
most ardently debated topics within epistemology. There have been various 
criteria of knowledge put forward by philosophers, but certainly, not one of them 
has been decided upon.
Roderick Chisholm offers an interesting discussion about the problem of the 
criterion of knowledge. He views the following classical question to be one which, 
if answered, would benefit the whole agenda. The question, "w hat is the criterion 
of knowing?" leads one to ask "what is the extent of our knowledge?" Chisholm 
believes that if an answer is given to one of the two questions, then an answer can 
possibly be given to the other. If we could answer what the extent of our 
knowledge is, then we would have insight into what can be known and what cannot 
be known, which would serve as a portal into organizing a set of criteria that would 
demarcate what is knowable from what is not knowable.
However, in the event that we cannot find any answers to what the criterion 
of knowledge is, we cannot answer the question of what the extent of knowledge is, 
and vice versa. Chisholm rhetorically asks, "Is there a way past this problem?" His 
answer is:
(1) We may try to find out what we know or what we are justified in believing without making
use of any criterion of knowledge or of justified belief. Or (2) we may try to formulate a criterion
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of knowledge without appeal to any instances of knowledge or justified belief.
An affirmation of the first case would result in a "particularism position and the 
second could be described as a "generalist" position. A "particularism is one who 
identifies particular instances of knowledge we already have. Malcolm could be
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identified as a particularist in that he focuses on a particular context of belief, and 
considers if there is anything in that context that would count against a claim of 
knowledge. A "generalist", on the other hand, is one who gives a general or 
universal criteria for all things that can be said to be known.
Chisholm seems to think that we begin making claims of knowledge as 
"particularists". We identify particular moments of knowing without applying any 
general criteria of knowing or justification. His example is that of knowing that 
dogs exist. In order to know that dogs exist one need not apply criteria of knowing 
in order to hold that proposition. They have always been in most peoples lives, and 
that is something that we have understood and not logically interrogated for its 
justification. Furthermore, one need not prove how one came to know that dogs 
exist. It is hard to think of w hat such proof would be like. One would search in vain 
for such a moment that marks its beginning; an instance where by virtue of a logical 
investigation the proposition was analyzed, then accepted. This shows that some 
truths do not require a criterion in order for them to be justifiably believed. Merely 
by encountering dogs throughout a lifetime, we can say that dogs exist. That 
knowledge is embedded in the meaning of our existence, because dogs have always 
been around us. Chisholm cites D. J. Mercier62 in claiming that the concept of 
epistemic justification then is objective, internal and immediate. This concept, of 
course, supports the dog proposition. Chisholm, therefore, shows that the 
justification of belief and knowledge does not firstly require a general criterion, but 
the reflection of our knowledge can be recognized as justified by the understanding 
of this concept of epistemic justification. He writes:
It is internal and immediate in that one can find out directly, by reflection, what one is justified in 
believing at any time. And epistemic justification is objective in that it can itself constitute an 
object of justification and knowledge. It is possible to know that we know and it is possible to be
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justified in believing.
We can see by this quote that Chisholm -- if we take his comments to be a 
typical sort of internalist apologetics as discussed by Malcolm — is directly in 
contention w ith my ongoing criticism of traditional epistemology. We have seen 
that it is unintelligible to assume that we can discover knowledge and belief 
directly from  reflection alone. However, considering the above quote in light of
62Ibid., p. 7.
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Malcom's work, we may not object to the notion that the justification of certain 
beliefs (empirical and ontological ones in particular) is internal and immediate.
This perhaps could be the correct characterization of what takes place with one who 
says, "I know that there is an ink-bottle on my desk" when looking at it. But we 
may object to what he has in mind in terms of reflection about it, which has a 
definite "knowledge is a state of mind" ring to it. We could easily imagine one 
saying emphatically, "I know that I know that there is an ink-bottle here!" This 
would express that the subject knows that he knows, or that he simply knows for 
certain that there is an ink-bottle on his desk. Therefore, we may ask to what extent 
do we reflect about knowing that we know. Is it not a steadfast internal and 
immediate reaction to a certainty?
Furthermore, again if we take his comments as supportive of internalism, a 
confusion seemingly surrounds Chisholm's notion of the objectivity of epistemic 
justification itself; that it constitutes an object also of justification and knowledge. 
Nonetheless, this is the quest of traditional epistemology. That is to describe 
systems of justification which will be an object itself by which we examine our 
knowledge claims. Thus, by examining our claims of knowledge by an 
epistemological system we can then, "know that we know". What I think is implied 
in Malcolm's work is that the notion of having knowledge that one knows is 
redundant and says nothing. At least I take that as a consequence of his argument 
against discovering knowledge and belief by cognitive processes alone. Given his 
view that the concept of knowledge, or the word "know", is used when there is no 
evidence around that would keep one from holding a belief as true, the notion of 
the knowledge of knowledge is asking something other than the role of evidence in 
understanding what knowledge is. Malcolm is, nonetheless, not prepared to give a 
universal account of what all knowledge claims amount to. Looking for 
discounting evidence in one context could amount to something different in 
another. But, he does show that evidence and subjective certainty have a role to 
play in many kinds of knowledge claims. But what would he say to the question, 
what is the knowledge of knowledge? For Malcolm the knowledge of knowledge is 
not that which requires justification also. To make a claim of knowledge in our 
everyday experiences, whatever that may involve, is to rest upon certainty itself.
We could say, in somewhat of an awkward fashion, that knowledge includes the 
knowledge of knowing.
63
To continue on clarifying this domain of investigation as it is traditionally 
conceived, the criterion of basicality has been considered differently by 
philosophers other than Chisholm. Some have claimed a generalist position as 
regards the criterion of knowledge such as Hume, who is considered a skeptic in 
requiring a deducability from sense-experience as the criterion of knowing.64 It was 
in finding this criterion failing in some fundamental cases which caused him to turn 
to skepticism. Traditionally, generalist epistemologists have thought that criteria 
are discoverable through reflection or introspection where ultimate concern is 
given to internal factors about our thoughts and experiences. Furthermore, 
generalists do focus upon epistemic principles that are derived by factual 
knowledge (empirical); principles of factual knowledge being those that are derived 
from outside of the mind, such as external causes, environmental states of affairs, 
and so on. Naturally, it can be seen why generalists often become skeptics. If no 
normative empirical criterion of knowledge can be accepted, and no factual 
statement can be relied upon that originates from outside of the mind, then 
questions of doubt about there being justifiable knowledge arise.
Skepticism is not an acceptable position either. This is primarily because 
with everyday knowledge claims, such as "I know that the keys are in the kitchen 
drawer, as I distinctively remember putting them there.", there is no evidence, in 
ordinary circumstances, that would lead me to doubt that this is a claim of 
knowledge. But, mostly this involves the issue, again, of knowing that one knows. 
The skeptic does not think there could ever be good grounds for claiming to know, 
therefore, one cannot say that one is justified in knowing. However, considering 
my argument against the view of Chisholm, knowing involves knowing that one 
knows. So, by my account the generalist view of the criterion of knowledge reveals 
very little about the condition of knowing.
There are yet others who claim a criterion of knowledge can be discerned by 
our relationship to our sources of knowledge. This is to focus upon the means of 
how we come to know anything. Given this investigative focus, the particularists 
and generalists perspectives are irrelevant. Nevertheless, it is thought that if we 
discover the right method of receiving knowledge we may have an infallible 
justification of a proposition as we found earlier with our consideration of the
MDavid Hume's discussion surrounding his requirements for knowledge can be found in his essay 
"An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" in R. Cummins and D. Owen (eds) Central 
Reading in the History of Modern Philosophy, (Wadsworth Publishing Co., Belmont, 1992), pp. 343-411.
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reliabilist view. It has been thought by reliabilist philosophers that the reliable 
mechanism of acquiring knowledge could be that infallible method. However, 
even though this sounds remotely promising, what the reliable mechanism is, is far 
from clear.
I have tried to reveal not only why such a discovery of the criterion of 
basicality is sought by traditional epistemologists, but also that the answers and 
ways of looking at the problem from the traditional view are many and varied, 
indeed, with no acceptable conclusion of the issue in sight. It seems that there is no 
sure and decided way to account for such a criterion from within their styles of 
investigation. We will find this problem as the central issue that brings reformed 
epistemology in conflict w ith classical foundationalism in terms of the criterion of 
discerning which propositions are basic and which are not. We have seen that 
foundationalism rejects religious propositions as having a self-justifiably rational 
role in that domain of theory. Even though reformed epistemology will argue the 
contrary, they certainly wish to work within the foundationalist picture of 
knowledge as a theory to discern rational religious belief. The details of the kind of 
foundationalism advocated by reformed epistemology will comprise the following 
chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
Reformed Epistemology's Claim of Reason
I. Introduction
I will begin my explication of reformed epistemology by clarifying some 
essential points about foundationalism which will prove to be indispensable for 
my critical discussion about their work. I will focus on how reformed epistemology 
discerns the foundationalist project. Proceeding this way will give us the eyes of 
the reformed philosopher,1 thereby allowing us to see how the project of 
foundationalism is intricately related to their own reflections. I will begin with a 
discussion about noetic structures, which the reformist holds as the object of 
inquiry and critique of foundationalism. For the reformist, it is exclusively 
concerned with rational noetic structures; which means that foundationalism is 
motivated by seeking the proper expression of the logicality between propositions 
within a whole belief system. With an understanding of noetic structures, we can 
see what is at stake in the issue of determining the criteria of basic beliefs. By 
understanding the problem of the criteria of basicality we can consider the 
arguments by reformed epistemology concerning the collapse of classical 
foundationalism and their neo-foundationalist view of rational religious belief.
I intend to present reformed epistemology in a comprehensive fashion. This requires that I 
overlook most idiosyncratic views of particular reformed philosophers. Reformed epistemology is 
generally considered to be a reformation of the classical internalist theory of foundationalism. All 
reformists do not agree on every epistemological issue, of course. Alvin Plantinga, for example, is 
the most discussed reformed epistemologist and is a figure who will overshadow the others in my 
discussion. He turned to various externalist ideas in his later work. It is not typical at all for a 
reformed epistemologist to be influenced by externalist ideas. As interesting as it may be to see 
where various untypical ideas may lead the reformist project, I am determined to attempt to strike at 
the heart of reformed epistemology. Therefore, this chapter will feature what I take to be the most 
typical characterization of their views.
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II. The Advent of a Reformed Epistemology
A. The concept of a noetic structure
Reformed epistemology wants to hold on to the foundationalist picture of 
rational belief. And it wants to claim that there is no criterion of rationality to 
exclude religious propositions from those propositions which can be accepted as 
foundational, they can be placed in the foundations of a belief system. Thus, 
reformed epistemology wishes to work within foundationalism to comment on the 
basicality of religious propositions and the rationality of religious belief systems. 
They m ust rely on a concept that expresses a particular kind of logical structure - a 
structure that foundationalism is accustomed to - as well as the knowledge of God. 
They are, firstly, interested in the logical status of single basic religious 
propositions, and secondly, how holding basic propositions in the foundations of 
one's beliefs secures the rationality of a whole structure of interrelated propositions, 
i.e. the logical structure of religious systems of belief. As a noetic structure is 
integral to understanding reformed epistemology I will briefly clarify w hat is 
meant by their use of this concept.
Alvin Plantinga introduces the concept of a noetic structure by saying:
A person's noetic structure is the set of propositions he believes, together with certain epistemic
2
relations that hold among him and these propositions.
Because Plantinga is working within the foundationalist tradition he wishes 
to use this concept to indicate a coherently bound organization of propositions 
comprising a system of belief along with a clear awareness of w hat the basic 
proposition is within it. He writes, "An account of a person's noetic structure, then,
3
would specify which of his beliefs are basic and which non-basic." In a noetic 
structure w hat separates basic from non-basic beliefs is that non-basic beliefs are 
held on the basis of others and basic beliefs are not.
Plantinga uses the concept of noetic structure commensurately w ith the 
project of foundationalism. Plantinga writes:
2
Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God", in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds)
Faith and Rationality (University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983), p. 48.
Ibid., p. 49.
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We may think of the foundationalist as beginning with the observation that some of our beliefs 
are based upon others. According to the foundationalist a rational noetic structure will have a 
foundation - a set of beliefs not accepted on the basis of others; in a rational noetic structure some
4
belief will be basic.
I will quote the following at length because it clarifies how he understands w hat a 
rational noetic structure is. This will also give us insight into his thinking 
throughout his whole philosophical enterprise.
He writes:
...foundationalism is best construed, I think, as a thesis about rational noetic structures. A noetic 
structure is rational if it could be the noetic structure of a person who was completely rational.
To be completely rational, as I am using the term, is not to believe only what is true, or to 
believe all the logical consequences of what one believes, or to believe all necessary truths with 
equal firmness, or to be uninfluenced by emotion in forming belief; it is, instead, to do the right 
thing with respect to one's believings. It is to violate no epistemic duties. From this point of 
view, a rational person is one whose believings meet the appropriate standards; to criticize a 
person as irrational is to criticize her for failing to fulfil these duties or responsibilities, for failing 
to conform to the relevant norms or standards. To draw the ethical analogy, the irrational is the
5
impermissible; the rational is the permissible.
I feel that with this quote we can understand how Plantinga views noetic 
structures as having a central role within foundationalism. We get a general sense 
of how Plantinga characterizes the reformed view of rational belief itself. He views 
rational belief to be a permissibility, not a wholesale dogmatic exclamation of what 
the rational belief is. A rational believer, for Plantinga, is one who maintains 
consistency within the norms and standards of a noetic structure. For him, there is 
not only one rational noetic structure. A description of the rational believer for him 
does not involve any philosophical assertion about any particular form of belief.
He intends to analyze the relationship between propositions w ithin a noetic 
structure and the rationality of one who holds the noetic structure by adhering to 
the epistemic duties of it. Epistemic duties are those which one is compelled to 
obey while seeking to remain consistent to the norms and standards of a noetic 
structure. To believe in the Christian God can carry with it norms and standards 
given the particular noetic structure in which that belief is held. Imagine that a 
Christian refused to give any assistance to the suffering. Some Christians would
4
Ibid., p. 52. Plantinga's emphasis.
5
Ibid. Plantinga's emphasis.
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claim that there is an explicit duty for the Christian to give assistance and aid to 
those in need. If one thinks that not giving assistance to those in need is one of his 
Christian beliefs, some could say that that person is not obeying the norms and 
standards of his Christian community. The notion of Christianity, with such a belief 
included in the foundations of its noetic structure, is confused and not permissible, 
because a central standard belief is to care for those who suffer. But if a Christian 
did give assistance to those requesting it, we could say that he is obeying his duties 
w ith respect to his Christian beliefs. He may be said to have rational justification, 
or rational permissibility, for that belief within his noetic structure. The rational 
then is the permissible.6
John Pollock points out that, "The foundationalist picture [the pyramid 
formation] seems to derive rather directly from psychological truisms, and this 
gives it considerable force."7 The foundationalist views knowledge as being 
concerned with noetic structures. At first consideration, so assumes the traditional 
epistemologist, our everyday knowledge involves propositions that are related to 
the justification of others, until the final propositions are reached. These 
propositions form the base of a pyramid and do not rest on others, but seem to be 
basic in one's noetic structure. In the following chapter I will argue that this 
intuition is actually mistaken. Self-justifying propositions are not the point of 
reference for all claims of knowledge. Knowledge, then, does not rest upon 
foundational propositions.
B. Rational criteria of basic beliefs
The crucial question that has to be asked by the traditional foundationalist, 
given noetic structures, is what are the necessary characteristics, or attributes of a 
basic belief? What are the criteria of rationality of foundational beliefs? One 
response to this question, offered by Saint Thomas Aquinas8, is that a basic belief 
m ust be self-evident. The self-evidence of a proposition means that its justification
^This notion that the rational is the permissible will be elaborated upon in detail later as it will be 
central to my discussion of reformed epistemology.
7John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, New Jersey, 1986) 
p. 27.
^aint Aquinas' discussion of the criterion of basicality can be found in his Summa Theologica, ed. 
Thomas Gilfy (Harper and Row, London, 1963-1975), book I, Q, xii, a, 4. Aquinas typically follows 
Aristotle by distinguishing what is known through itself (per se nota) from what is known through 
another {per aliud nota).
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or truth can be immediately comprehended. By understanding it, one immediately 
and simultaneously attains its truth. Certain mathematical propositions, for 
instance, fall into this category of immediate justification. 1+2=3 is not said to be 
justified because of reference to something else one justifiably believes; its truth is 
immediately attained by understanding it.
In order to make use of the concept of self-evident truth, which is 
fundamental to understanding foundationalism, we can further distinguish at least 
three different forms of self-evidence. 1+2=3 is self-evident, but only for those who 
have learned the technique of arithmetic. This is why we hear the foundationalist 
say that 1+2=3 is self-evident to most people. When we consider more complicated 
propositions of arithmetic the notion of self-evidence begins to lose hold. For 
instance, 5+14=19 is most likely self-evident to university students, but not to many 
children who have only begun to study mathematics. They m ust make calculations 
in order to assure themselves of the answer. Furthermore, 579x357=206,703 is not 
self-evident to anybody save the few individuals with an uncanny ability to 
immediately comprehend high level calculations. A second kind of self-evident 
proposition is that "All Bachelors are unmarried". Again, one m ust firstly know 
the concept of bachelor in order to immediately comprehend the truth of this 
proposition. A third form of a self-evident proposition is the kind that plays a key 
role in the work of Norman Malcolm, which we discussed in the last chapter. This 
form involves the sensations of claiming, for example, "Here is an ink-bottle" 
while looking at it on one's desk. Generally, however, a self-evident proposition is 
so if no evidence is needed to believe it, or understand its truth.
The way in which the reformed philosophers will allege that the truth of a 
religious proposition is foundational will, albeit in a non-detailed fashion, 
generally fit the concept of basicality. To grasp the sense of "basicality" used by 
the reformist is to seize that which is essential to his argument. We will see 
reformed epistemology affirm a general descriptive concept of basicality, and not a 
particular one that is defined by a single criterion, thus being prescriptive. If we 
assert that only one kind of basic belief justifies all belief systems, we are 
prescribing what kind of belief must be held in its foundations. For the reformist if 
we can describe a belief in a noetic structure as basic to the noetic structure (that all 
other non-basic beliefs logically refer to the basic one, e.g. the basic belief is the
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basis of the noetic structure) it is de facto foundational.
From the classical foundationalist perspective, there are two criteria of 
basicality which are descriptive of intuition and sensory perception respectively. 
Firstly, the criterion of incorrigibility describes an intuitive basic belief. To clarify 
the epistemological term "incorrigible" we can say, quite simply, that one has an 
incorrigible belief if it is impossible for one not to hold that belief. It is difficult 
indeed to offer an example of a properly incorrigible belief because ordinary 
beliefs seem to be disqualified. For instance, if I believe that there is a candle in 
front of me it is not out of the realm of possibilities that I am mistaken (i.e. I am 
hallucinating). That is to say, it is possible for me not to believe it even though the 
reasons involve such notions as insentient hallucination, or various tricks of the 
mind. Skepticism has strong currency in the analysis of incorrigible beliefs.
Some philosophers have focused on perceptual beliefs which give rise to a 
second kind of criterion of basicality. This criterion of basicality involves 
propositions that are evident to the senses, thus they do not rule out ordinary 
beliefs. The sensations are immediate and refer to nothing other than themselves. 
When one reports the vision of a candle in front of oneself, it is evident to their 
sense of vision that that is what is there. For instance, to use Chisholm's language, 
in seeing a candle we can perhaps, at least cautiously, claim that we are being 
"appeared to candlely". Others may have good evidence as to why I may be wrong 
about being appeared to in this way, but it cannot be relevant in that I believe that I 
am being appeared to as such.
These criteria of basicality have had a long history in traditional 
epistemology from Descartes' notion of clear and distinct ideas, to Locke's 
agreement and disagreement of ideas concerning perception. A basic belief does 
not require a reason for holding that belief independently of it. For Plantinga it is 
essential for the classical foundationalist to embrace that:
A proposition P is properly basic for a person S if and only if P is either self-evident to S or
incorrigible for S or evident to the senses for S.9
The issues and argumentative avenues of what is a basic belief have been
9Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God", in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds) 
Faith and Rationality (University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983), p. 59.
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hotly debated by foundationalists since the inception of traditional epistemology. 
The intricacies involved in these arguments - for example, the very possibility of 
holding incorrigible beliefs, how the relation between basic and non-basic beliefs 
ought to be properly understood, or if there are really enough basic beliefs to 
support a whole belief structure, etc.- is not what I am prepared to debate here in 
their terms. I wish only to sketch the ground of foundationalism. I will consider 
w hat is the rationale of determining what foundational beliefs can be, which is the 
starting point of their work and constitutes the very possibility of their enterprise.
C. Reforming classical foundationalism
1. Why can't belief in God be basic?
As related to this fundamental principle of classical foundationalism, it 
follows (in their collective work) that belief in God cannot be among foundational 
beliefs. As we saw above foundational propositions do not stand in need of 
evidence (by reference to another proposition), because they are basic in one of the 
three ways. Reformed thinkers however, persist in asking why it is that belief in 
God cannot be basic, thus foundational. These requirements for the basicality of 
foundational propositions seemingly are the basis for the foundationalist to deem 
religious propositions to be irrational. The foundationalist requires religious 
belief to have this rational evidence; a religious proposition m ust be logically 
linked to a properly foundational belief to be justified.
The crux of the reformed challenge to foundationalism is concerning this 
view. The reformists argue that foundationalism requires a religious proposition 
to be judged by too narrow a conception of rationality. In identifying 
evidentialism as that which constrains the foundationalist's concept of rationality, 
which is central to foundationalist thought, Plantinga offers the following 
comment:
The existence of God ... is not among the propositions that are properly basic: hence a 
person is rational in accepting theistic belief only if he has evidence for it. The vast 
majority of those in the western world who have thought about our topic have accepted 
some form of classical foundationalism. The evidentialist objection to the belief in God, 
furthermore, is obviously rooted in this way of looking at things.10
10Ibid., p. 48.
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It is this way of looking at things, vis-a-vis the foundationalist requirement 
of evidence for rational belief in God, that they wish to put into question and offer 
an alternative to.
2. The rationale for basic beliefs
Given the foundationalist's motivation towards determining rational belief, 
it would follow that they would have reasons for these requirements of what can be 
basic beliefs. They m ust have rational justification for their criteria of a 
proposition's basicality. It seems that they make such judgements of what 
propositions are foundational because they can justify choosing the criteria that 
they do, which is used to assess if a belief is, or is not, properly basic. The reformed 
philosopher challenges foundationalism with the problem of criteria that I 
discussed in the last chapter. The reformists press the foundationalist to be explicit 
about what the rationale for their criterion actually is -- some reasoning m ust be at 
work in their assessment of what propositions are, and are not, properly 
foundational in relation to a criterion of rationality. And the further the reformists 
press this point the more it is apparent that the foundationalist cannot provide a 
rationale for the criteria of foundational beliefs, because they do not in fact possess 
any such rational justification for them. For Plantinga et al., there are no 
justifications for these kinds of propositions which support the foundatinalist's 
argum ent that they ought to be the foundational ones.
In defense of foundationalism, however, we m ust note that they could 
respond to this interrogation by arguing that the entire debate about providing 
justifying reasons for which beliefs are basic and which are not, is a confusion. It is 
confused because by definition basic beliefs are not ultimately grounded upon 
anything else. There is good reason why most foundationalists have remained 
silent when confronted with this argument. It is not that they lack ideas or an 
adequate grasp of their own project - quite the contrary - they are rightly confused 
by w hat the reformist could mean by providing justification for a basic belief. The 
moment the foundationalist determines a justifying reason for holding a particular 
basic belief, the belief in question cannot be basic because it m ust be resting on 
another proposition from which issues a reason for holding it. Even though this 
argument, I think, is unmistakably correct about the idea of justifying basic beliefs
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("justification" being what is involved in seeking the rationale for them), the 
reformists m ust acknowledge that there is a confusion about what they are asking 
the foundationalist to provide. Nonetheless, the foundationalist response 
(whatever it may be) does not impede the reformists from being united in their 
enterprise by affirming the argument that the possibilities of foundational beliefs, 
as conceived by the tradition, are far too narrow. In fact, the notion that basic 
beliefs cannot be justified by a criterion of rationality is what gives force and 
motivation to the reformed project.
The reformists see that propositions which are self-evident, incorrigible, or 
evident to the senses are generally basic. They describe a basis for knowledge. 
Those criteria of basicality describe beliefs that are held w ithout logical reference 
to any other belief. Conversely, the foundationalist (when affirming one of the 
three criteria of basicality) is prescribing what a basic belief m ust be. Given that 
they have no rationale for prescribing particular basic beliefs, why couldn't theistic 
beliefs (and atheistic beliefs as well), the reformists suggest, be viewed as basic if 
they also act as a basis for knowledge in a noetic structure? Therefore, for the 
reformists, if religious beliefs can be revealed as generally basic, then they should 
also be, de facto, a foundation for knowledge.
3. Traditional foundationalism  collapses
In an essay by Alvin Plantinga called Reason and Belief in God, he dedicates a 
section to this problem that the foundationalist faces, which he titles "The Collapse 
of Foundationalism". He raises the simple question: Why should belief in God not 
be among the foundations of my noetic structure? He then gives the foundationalist's 
response:
...even if this belief were true[God exists], it does not have the characteristics a 
proposition must have to deserve a place in the foundations. There is no room in 
the foundations for a proposition that can be rationally accepted only on the basis of 
other propositions. The only properly basic propositions are those that are self- 
evident or incorrigible or evident to the senses. Since the proposition that God 
exists is none of the above, it is not properly basic for anyone; that is, no well- 
informed, rational noetic structure contains this proposition in its foundations.11
Plantinga is right in noting two claims being asserted in the response by the
"Ibid., p. 59.
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foundationalist. The first is that a proposition is properly basic if it is self-evident, 
incorrigible, or evident to the senses. This seems reasonable enough, because all 
can see that those kinds of beliefs are, in fact, not based on any other. For the sake 
of argument, Plantinga suggests, we can concede it. The second is that a 
proposition is properly basic only if  it meets one of these conditions. Then he asks:
But what is to be said for the second? Is there any reason to accept it? Why does the 
foundationalist accept it? Why does he think the theist ought to?12
If the foundationalist thesis of what can be basic beliefs, and therefore what 
can be rational systems of belief (which follow from basic beliefs), is indeed 
correct, Plantinga continues, then "...enormous quantities of what we all in fact 
believe are irrational."13 He continues:
Consider all those propositions that entail, say, that there are enduring physical 
objects, or that there are persons distinct from myself, or that the world has existed 
for more than five minutes: none of these propositions, I think, is more probable 
than not with respect to what is self-evident or incorrigible for me; at any rate no 
one has given good reason to think any of them is.14
We can see that Plantinga is moving in a direction to dismantle the classical 
foundationalist's restrictive criteria of basicality. When we consider the 
foundationalist's criteria of basicality, a lot of our everyday beliefs seem to be 
irrational. Generally we see that the reformist intends to displace the narrow 
prescriptive view of basicality and argue, instead, that there is a wide variety of 
basic beliefs. We can see the wide variety of basic beliefs if we just describe how 
they function in a foundation of a noetic structure: a basic belief supports its many 
related non-basic beliefs. This emphasis on describing rational belief rather than 
prescribing what ought to be believed in order to have rational belief, comprises 
an important Wittgensteinian insight which will be elaborated on in the following 
chapter.
Plantinga raises another convincing argument against classical 
foundationalism, concerning this problem of criteria of basic beliefs, and that is
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
14Ibid., pp. 59-60.
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that it seems to be " self-referentially inconsistent"15. This means that the 
foundationalist has constructed the criteria of what must be the basic beliefs in the 
foundations of a rational belief system without conforming to his own program of 
assessing rational belief. Particularly, the belief that basic beliefs must be self- 
evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses is neither self-evident, incorrigible, 
nor evident to the senses, and thus, cannot be properly basic for the foundationalist. 
Plantinga writes:
...if he [the foundationalist] cannot find such an argument for [the rationality of his 
conditions for basic beliefs] he ought to give it up. Furthermore, he ought not to urge and I 
ought not to accept any objection to theistic belief that crucially depends upon a proposition 
that is true only if I ought not believe it.16
As a reformed epistemologist, Plantinga does not accept the exclusion of 
religious propositions from those that can be considered basic by the seemingly 
arbitrary conditions that classical foundationalism sets down for them. But, it is 
nonetheless true that the reformist perpetuates the foundationalist picture of 
knowledge because he finds it compelling as the correct description of the working 
structure of rational belief.
Before investigating the reformist's claim of reason with respect to theistic 
belief it is prudent to offer a recapitulation of the results that we can glean from the 
discussion thus far. Firstly, we are faced with a certain psychological dissonance if 
we accept traditional foundationalism as the true theory of knowledge. Given their 
eminently restrictive criteria of basicality, we saw that most of our everyday 
beliefs are rendered irrational by reference to their view of knowledge. Secondly, 
while considering the reformist's discussions on the viability of foundationalism, 
we are presented with the conclusion that their criteria of basicality are stipulative. 
And lastly, that it is still correct (from the reformed view) to speak of the 
rationality of belief to have grounds or foundations, e.g. some proposition must be 
foundational, but we do not have to accept the foundationalist's formulation of 
what must be that basic proposition.
15Ibid., p. 60.
16Ibid.
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III. Reformed Epistemology and Rational Religious Belief
An obvious and encroaching question presents itself to the reformist. How 
can one rationally justify the inclusion of religious propositions among those that 
are properly basic? To keep the foundationalist picture of knowledge and submit 
religious propositions as properly basic while casting aside rational criteria of 
basic beliefs that the foundationalist insists upon, one m ust respond to the 
possibility of holding a rational belief that is not accordingly justified by a rational 
criteria for holding it.
Before I go on to describe what their response will be to this question, I must 
make a few general remarks about the characterization of reformed epistemology 
and foundationalism in terms of their argumentative basis. Particularly, this is to 
ask the question: from what basis does the reformed epistemologist argue if he 
rejects strict criteria for basic beliefs? It can be extrapolated from what we saw 
above, and in the previous chapter, that the classical foundationalist position is a 
strong foundationalism. This means that they have a very strict argumentative 
base for their project which assesses what can and cannot be a rational belief. If 
belief P is not linked to, or deducible from, a proposition that is either self-evident, 
incorrigible, or evident to the senses, it is not a foundation of knowledge . This 
makes their critique of rational beliefs broad and conclusive without leaving any 
room for a gray area of what a rational belief is. Any system of belief can thus be 
dismissed or accepted by seeing if the beliefs held in its foundations fulfil their 
criteria of basicality. The reformist, in holding onto foundationalism but absolving 
themselves of prescriptive rational criteria for basic beliefs, develops what can be 
called a weak foundationalism. We will see how they accept a vast plurality of 
basic beliefs. Their project is not based upon stipulating what the restrictive 
rational requirements of basic beliefs m ust be in the style of traditional 
foundationalism. They argue that a basic belief is that which does not depend on 
another for holding it, and it supports a whole system of beliefs. We will also see 
how they maintain an argumentative basis (that is, to argue for and against certain 
kinds of belief as being properly basic), albeit a weak one, while rejecting the 
strong argumentative basis of traditional foundationalism.
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A. A reformed view of basic beliefs and the role of argument
We have discussed that the classical foundationalist, in holding that religious 
propositions are not properly basic, means to suggest that to hold such a 
proposition, and be rational, one must accept an argument for it that stems or 
emanates from properly foundational propositions. This kind of domain or 
schematic in thinking about the rationality of belief in God is what has enforced the 
labor spent throughout past centuries on natural theology. This, to put it simply, is 
providing positive argument for the belief in God. I conjecture that within 
philosophy there are few other domains of inquiry with such an impressive 
history. To recognize this I merely mention such illustrious figures as St.
Augustine, St. Anselm,17 Ockham, Descartes, Abelard, St. Aquinas, Pascal and 
Leibniz, who have engaged themselves in producing logical proofs or arguments 
for belief in God. This has everything to do with the program of classical 
foundationalism. Indeed, it can be seen that the history of natural theology 
stretches back in tandem and parallels the history of foundationalism. On this 
historical path what is asserted is that rational belief in God needs argument or 
proof which is delivered from  properly basic beliefs. This is because it is not self- 
evident, incorrigible, nor evident to the senses. So they endeavor to argue for 
belief in God from what they take to be properly basic beliefs, and try to show that 
theistic belief can be a deliverance of reason. Even though natural theology 
constitutes an illustrious, eminent and distinguished tradition, Plantinga suggests 
that many reformed theologians react with tepid endorsement, while others have a 
mildly stated uncomplimentary view of the enterprise. In fact, rejections of 
arguments for the existence of God by some Protestant theologians have ranged 
from indifference, to amiable opposition, on to flamingly hostile accusations of 
blasphemy. What does Plantinga see in the reformed opposition to positive
17I am presenting the work of these figures as I think that they are currently or popularly received.
In my experience, the proofs of God's existence, as argued by St. Anselm, were presented as what I 
am calling positive arguments for His existence. That such arguments will give reasons for one to 
have belief. However, the sense of "proof" may be understood in divergent ways. St. Anselm 
acclaimed the dictum fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking understanding) and St. Augustine 
affirmed credo ut intelligam (I believe that I might understand). This means that their respective 
theological reflections aim toward clarifying the knowledge of God for one who already believes, and 
not proving it for those who do not. St. Anselm's argument from design would then be directed 
towards aiding a believer to clearly see (in perhaps a contemplative fashion for worship) how God 
orchestrates the world and the cosmos in perfect harmony. If this note was not added, then my 
inclusion of St. Anselm and St. Augustine in this group would make my present objections a straw- 
man argument.
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argument or proof for the existence of God? What kind of theistic belief underlies 
this range of responses? Why is there not an enthusiastic promotion in Protestant 
theology for this species of inquiry into the belief in God that saturates pre­
reformation theology? Plantinga observes that there is a legion of theologians18 
who take belief in God to be basic, thus in no need of argument whatsoever.
At this point I m ust discuss an example of theistic belief as a basic belief (in 
the descriptive sense of basicality as discussed above), that Plantinga makes use of 
in his work, in order to become clear on what he means by it, and how it differs 
from the classical foundationalist's formulation of the concept. Out of the 
references he uses there is one that strikes me as particularly strong for our present 
purposes. In it we get the sense of why belief in God ought not be attained nor 
sustained by natural theology and what kind of thing theistic belief, therefore, is. 
He quotes the following by the nineteenth-century Dutch theologian Herman 
Bavinck:
We receive the impression that belief in the existence of God is based entirely upon 
these proofs. But indeed that would be "a wretched faith, which, before it evokes 
God, must first prove his existence." The contrary, however, is the truth. There is 
not a single object the existence of which we hesitate to accept until definite proofs 
are furnished. Of the existence of self, of the world round about us, of logical and 
moral laws, etc., we are so deeply convinced because of the indelible impressions 
which all these things make upon our consciousness that we need no arguments or 
demonstration. Spontaneously, altogether involuntarily: without any constraint or 
coercion, we accept that existence. Now the same is true in regard to the existence 
of God. The so-called proofs are by no means the final grounds of our most certain 
conviction that God exists. This certainty is established only by faith; that is, by the 
spontaneous testimony which forces itself upon us from every side.19
There is quite a lot to cull from this passage; for the sake of brevity I will 
strike at what I consider the heart of the matter. It is clear that the most important 
position being asserted in the above is that the belief in God, like belief in the self 
or the world around us, is in no need of argument. Thus, we ought to recognize 
that belief in God is experienced as, and characteristically, basic. Therefore, we do 
not have to accept the foundationalist characterization of religious belief in as
18//A legion of theologians" perhaps is a bit excessive, however, I wish to express and 
recognize the utter power and influence of the formidable thinkers, and not the number 
of them, that Plantinga recruits as examples of those who take belief in God to be basic.
Those whom he mentions, and discusses in most of his work, are Herman Bavinck, Karl 
Barth, Abraham Kuyper, and most notably, John Calvin.
19Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, trans. William Hendricksen, (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 
1951), pp. 78-79.
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much as they assume that it awaits, and needs, argument to be held. What is 
certainly connected to this, is the question of how it can be argued that it is a 
rationally self-justified belief. Plantinga finds Bavinck to be saying that argument 
is not needed here for rational justification of belief in God. The believer is 
"...entirely within his epistemic rights... "20 to hold this belief as basic. This second 
point will show how reformed epistemology claims the basicality of belief in God 
to be rational.
It seems apparent that what Bavinck means by "argument", in his statement 
that belief in God does not need argument, is the kind offered by natural theology 
in the style of Aquinas, et al. But, why not? and need it for what? "...Arguments and 
proofs are not, in general", claims Plantinga "the source of the believer's 
confidence in God."21 He goes on to claim that the believer does not affirm that 
God has created all the world on the basis of argument. If argument is not the source 
of belief in God then what is? There are many passages in the Bible that urge the 
believer to see the existence of God, for different reasons, in the natural world.22 In 
religious or devotional literature there are monumental volumes containing 
detailed descriptions of this kind of belief. Its character is such that when the 
believer gazes slack-faced into the mysteriously exacting intricacies of a flower's 
petal he does not recount acceptable arguments of its genesis, and therefore reaches 
and accepts the conclusion that there is a God that makes such things. The believer 
sees the power, glory, goodness and wonder of God within it, surrounding it, and 
illuminating it. The existence of God is the point of origin from which this believer 
sees the flower's petal. In this case we do see a belief in God that seemingly can be 
described as a basic belief. The existence of God is a basis for seeing the natural 
world.
Another rich quotation from Bavinck that Plantinga focuses on is the 
following:
20Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God", in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds) 
Faith and Rationality (University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983), p.71.
21 Ibid., p. 64.
22A few examples can be found in the following passages: Genesis 1:29-30, 27:28; Exodus 8:22, 9:14, 
19:5; Numbers 14:21; Deuteronomy 4:39; 2 Kings 19:15; Nehemiah 9:6; Psalms 24:1, 33:5; Mathew 
16:19, 28:18; Luke 21:26; Acts 2:19; 1 Corinthians 10:26. Also, the apocryphal Gnostic gospel of 
Thomas is well known as being particularly forceful in expressing the view that, not only can God 
be seen working in (and effecting) nature, but nature is metaphysically imbued with Divine 
presence.
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Scripture urges us to behold heaven and earth, birds and ants, flowers and lilies, in 
order that we may see and recognize God in them. "Lift up your eyes on high, and 
see who hath created these." Is. 40:26. Scripture does not reason in the abstract. It 
does not make God the conclusion of a syllogism, leaving it to us whether we think 
the argument holds or not. But it speaks with authority. Both theologically and 
religiously it proceeds from God as the starting point.23
This is a very crucial statement in support of Plantinga's case that religious 
belief ought to be seen as basic and not based upon other propositions. Also, we 
can see within it, that it does lend itself to a neo-foundationalist reading. This is 
because Bavinck holds that God is to be believed as basic (so, not based on 
argument), therefore, and most importantly, that basic belief is the starting point of 
the Christian's system of belief. Plantinga reads this quote as speaking directly to 
the need for Christians to view their belief in the existence of God as their 
foundation for their Christian view of reality. This basic proposition can then be 
affirmed as resting in the foundations of a Christian's belief system. Plantinga 
obviously and enthusiastically embraces this idea in writing:
...scripture "proceeds from God as the starting point," and so should the believer. There is 
nothing by way of proofs or arguments for God's existence in the Bible; that is simply 
presupposed. The same should be true of the Christian believer then; he should start from 
belief in God rather than from the premises of some argument whose conclusion is that God 
exists.24
In order to be very clear on how belief in God can be held as basic we must 
consider the work of another reformist theologian that Plantinga et al., claim expresses 
such a belief in God. That theologian is John Calvin. The central aspect of Calvin's 
thought, which Plantinga finds to have epistemological import, involves his use of the 
concept of the sensus divinitatis. This concept is one that describes a pre-reflexive belief 
in God. As its name indicates, it is to have a sense of the Divine. The way that Calvin 
describes it, we can recognize that it is in agreement with belief in God as basic and not 
based on argument. In Calvin's Institutes o f The Christian Religion he claims that the 
sensus divinitatis can be activated in certain conditions. One such condition is 
environmental, as in observing the beauty of the natural world. Plantinga refers to the 
passages in Calvin's text that indicate that one can apprehend the existence of God 
within this condition, and concludes that one is within his or her epistemic rights in
“Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, trans. William Hendricksen, (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids,
1951), pp. 78-79.
24Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God", in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds)
Faith and Rationalty (University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983), p. 65.
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doing so. He claims that if we believe that "God created all of that beauty" it is not 
because we have affirmed the logicality of the propositions regarding it. Thus, 
Plantinga finds support in Calvin when he claims that we can apprehend this belief in 
God without any argument whatsoever. Belief in God is not apprehended by 
argument, but continuously reaffirmed by the enactment of the sensus divinitatis.
However, none of this is meant to diminish the role and power of argum ent or 
logical persuasion. We must still see that reasoning is central in arguing for and 
against certain beliefs in theological reflection. Even though it is not the starting point 
of faith, it provides clarity and sense to beliefs based upon these experiences of God 
that Plantinga discusses. For instance, Calvin's Institutes is not a logical starting point 
for faith. We do not consult Calvin's work in order to have proof that the Christian faith 
reflects a viable view of reality. Nonetheless, the Institutes clarifies and makes sense of 
experiencing God as basic for those who readily identify with the knowledge of God as 
being bound to concepts akin to the sensus divinitatis. Reasoning, then, is indispensable 
for clarification within a belief system, but it comes after the affirmation of a particular 
view of reality.
In the first sentence of the first chapter of Calvin's Institutes o f the Christian 
Religion we read:
Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two 
parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves.25
Partly then, sound wisdom is based upon knowing God. So, Calvin 
illuminates in the Institutes what is reasonable if one possesses this basic starting 
point of hum an wisdom. He endeavors to clarify by reasoning what results from 
possessing this basic belief. Notions about the Divine, sanctity, morality, the after 
life, vocation, and so on, will come after and reveal a clear view of what it means to 
be a Christian.
What is important, in order to explicate Plantinga's use of Calvin, is that we 
further investigate the character of the sensus divinitatis. Calvin strictly couples the 
knowledge of God with the knowledge of ourselves. He writes:
No one can look upon himself without immediately turning his thoughts to the 
contemplation of God, in whom he "lives and moves" [Acts 17:28]. For, quite 
clearly, the mighty gifts with which we are endowed are hardly from ourselves;
25John Calvin, Institutes of The Christian Religion (Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1960), p. 35.
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indeed, our very being is nothing but subsistence in the one God.26
I think it is reasonably clear that these sentiments are in perfect agreement 
with his concept of the sensus divinitatis. I believe Calvin can be paraphrased here 
as saying that if one reflects upon God, one reflects upon the foundation of one's 
being, oneself, and vice versa. For Calvin, then, the knowledge of God is 
implanted in all humans; it is a part of our very make-up.
It is in great measure insubstantial for one to ask me if I philosophically find 
this to be a plausible belief, even though many philosophers throughout history 
have considered it to be the most essential question. The belief that all humans 
have an intuitive knowledge of God, as we will see, can be viewed as basic, as it is 
by the reformed philosophers. It can be held for a person as the ground from 
which all other beliefs about the world emanate. The classical foundationalist 
would call for argumentative proofs for this belief, and thus the justifiability of 
holding it logically. However, we have seen that there is no need for the logical 
proofs of beliefs such as this one. A person may not hold this belief; they may see 
nothing in it whatsoever. This is an issue, however, of what the reformists would 
call a noetic structure, simply, a context of belief. It has an absolutely substantial 
place within the noetic structure of Calvinist Christianity, but we cannot say that it 
has any place at all in the noetic structure of the Korean Shaman. All that I can say 
philosophically is that I can see how this Calvinist belief can be considered basic by 
the reformed epistemologists regardless of whether I am willing to endorse it 
myself. It coheres with the logic of "basicality". The nature of these remarks will 
become much clearer later when we consider how the reformists provide a 
plurality of beliefs within their reflections, which I will maintain in the third 
chapter even though I reject reformed epistemology. For now, we m ust continue to 
describe this Calvinist concept in greater detail.
In the third chapter of the Institutes we read a more direct description of the 
characterization of the sensus divinitatis:
There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of 
Divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge 
in the pretence of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain 
understanding of his Divine majesty.27
26Ibid.
27Ibid., p. 43.
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By the language above, that the belief in God is a "natural instinct" and 
"implanted", we get the direct sense that for Calvin theistic belief is basic and 
part of our being. It is not to be received or accepted externally by argument. 
Indeed, if the belief in God is implanted by Him, I know of no other truly basic 
belief! Belief in God - by this example - via an affirmation of the sensus 
divinitatis, may be among one's foundational beliefs; therefore it is not to be 
held on the basis of any other belief, nor affirmed by an acceptance of any 
argument for it.
The concept of the sensus divinitatis, therefore, is an implanted and intuitive 
awareness of a transcendent being, presence, the creator of the universe, or the 
source of reality. It is an experience which recognizes, or recalls to the mind, the 
background to which all believers view reality. That background, as that which 
created and sustains the universe, is God. Within theology and inspirational 
religious literature this can be viewed as the most normal of all forms of Divine 
recognition. Vivacious traditions of communal life have centered around such 
principles as the sensus divinitatis as the life-source of the deepest Christian 
existence. The Christian monastic traditions of the west are informed by, and 
founded on, writings (concerning this form of Divine recognition) by St. John of the 
Cross, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, St. Teresa of Avila, or St. Benedict. In their writings 
we are offered teachings concerned with how to be in a perpetual state of prayer by 
seeing all of life's manifestations as contingent upon the will of God. In a general 
sense, prayer is to simply turn one's thoughts to God, or to be "mindful" of the 
Divine. The sensus divinitatis is one such, shall we say, existential conception of 
being mindful of God as the ground of one's being. In monastic communities there 
is the expressed desire to see God in all things, actions, thoughts, ambitions and so 
on: that is, to constantly recognize God as the foundation of one's existence. My 
example of seeing the glory and power of God in a flower's petal is clearly at home 
in this form of community. In the same manner the eastern Christian monastic 
communities, which were partly founded on the writings of St. John Chrysostom,
St. Maximos the Confessor, St. Thalassios the Libyan, St. John the Presbyter, and St. 
John of Damaskos, have for centuries used The Philokalia28 as the life source of
28The Philokalia is a compilation, or anthology, of writings by Eastern Christian monastic ("desert") 
Fathers that have been collected from the fourth to the fifteenth centuries. All of the texts are 
concerned with the contemplative spiritual path of the Hesychast which centers on the "prayer of the
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communal existence. In The Philokalia we read the teachings of the "prayer of the 
heart", or the "prayer of Jesus", which is a mystical practice to invoke the Divine, in 
part, by contemplating the name of Jesus. About the role of this form of prayer in 
monastic life, the Cistercian (Trappist) monk Thomas Merton writes:
The practice of keeping the name of Jesus ever present in the ground of one's being
was, for the ancient monks, the secret of the "control of thoughts" and of victory
over temptation. It accompanied all other activities of the monastic life imbuing
them with prayer.29
In seeing that this form of monastic life is centered around viewing reality 
from the ground or foundation of one's existence we recognize the wide currency 
and acceptance of such principles as the sensus divinitatis. In any study of monastic 
life this concept of a perpetual state of prayer, which I am linking in similarity to 
what Calvin calls the sensus divinitatis, will be presented. Even though this is 
perfectly sensible and intelligible for religious devotees, what can we say about 
Calvin's universalistic proclamation that all humans have knowledge of God 
implanted in them? If we asked the atheist on the street if she has an intuitive 
knowledge of God, I could anticipate the response being along the lines of, "Of 
course not! There is no God to know!" Calvin interprets this response as the 
atheist being in the grips of sin, thus rejecting this knowledge. With the quote by 
Merton above, we read that keeping the name of Jesus in the ground of one's being 
is a way to avert sinful temptation. A classical and non-controversial formulation 
can be that it is impossible to be sinful and serve God simultaneously: you cannot 
serve two masters, as the traditional aphorism has it. The Christian experience, by 
and large, can be seen as a personal struggle between denying the sin of the world 
and serving God, and being tempted by the sin of the world and denying God. 
Calvin, therefore, seems to suggest that through the sensus divinitatis we recognize 
this sinful aspect of ourselves and thus the perverse tendencies of the human mind 
to deny God and the implanted knowledge of him. Derek S. Jeffreys shows that 
Plantinga holds, by reference to the Calvinist view, that without sin we would
heart", or "the Jesus prayer". Particularly, the prayer of the heart of Hesychia involves a meditative 
recitation of the prayer, "Lord Jesus, son of God, have mercy on me" (or a similar formulation to the 
same effect), while keeping the knowledge of God in the ground of one's being and contemplating 
Christ's passion, death and resurrection. See St. Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St. Makarios 
of Corinth (comps) The Philokalia (4 vols., Faber and Faber, London, 1983).
29Thomas Merton, Contemplative Prayer (Image, Bantam Doubleday, New York, 1996), p. 22.
My emphasis.
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believe in God with the "...same natural spontaneity that we believe in the 
existence of other persons, an external world, or the past."30 Therefore, the atheist, 
for Calvinists is aligned with sinfulness (meaning generally, ignoring, forgetting 
and not serving God), and does not have access to this natural spontaneity. Or, to 
be more precise, at least she does not recognize the potential access to it. Perhaps 
what this suggests is that in the absence of sin fundamental truths would be 
aelieved in without any doubt. Generally, it seems that doubting is a hallmark of 
sin. It traditionally is conceived as that which keeps us second guessing our beliefs.
But we cannot see this as a dogmatic philosophical assertion. This is the 
Calvinist view of people who do not believe in and serve God. For Calvin, those 
who are Christians are so, in part, because they hate sinfulness and all that is bound 
up with it, i. e. forgetting God, fulfilling one's will and ignoring God's, indulging 
in selfish desires and worldly pleasures, and so on. Perhaps it helps, at risk of an 
exaggerated analogy, to see this Calvinist view in terms of a conceptual tribalism. 
Generally the people of a tribe affirm their beliefs and revere their practices. They 
do not accept the beliefs and practices of those outside of their own tribe, e. g. 
meanings expressed by other tribes often contradict or offend their own sense of 
meaningfulness. So, that which is unacceptable and detestable (because it 
represents an offence to that tribes sense of meaningfulness) becomes characteristic 
o: those outside of the tribe. For Calvin, to be sinful, in a broad sense, is not to live 
in accordance to God's will. It seems obvious enough that a person who does not 
believe in God does not live in accordance to His will. So, all people who live 
outside of God's will are living in relation to sin. The non-believer perhaps could 
be said to be in a state akin to moral blindness. I am not saying that for Calvin 
non-believers are blind to morality. Of course, one can be an atheist and possess a 
scrupulous code of moral conduct. The non-believer does not see what the believer 
sees, and no amount of showing or instruction can make him see it; the subject 
must testify to God in his soul in order to overcome sin, for Calvin.
We m ust be rigorous in making the distinction between what Calvin 
professes by his testimony of faith, and what Plantinga is asserting philosophically. 
We m ust recognize that Plantinga is using Calvin's notion of the sensus divinitatis as 
an example of how to have a basic belief in God. I make this point because
30Derek S. Jeffreys, "How Reformed is Reformed Epistemology? Alvin Plantinga and
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Plantinga's quote above could be seen as something other than illustrative of an 
expressed philosophical position: a philosophical position being a disinterested 
conclusion that is not bound to any community of ideas. If we take Plantinga as 
saying exactly what Calvin does - that all hum an beings know that God exists, it is 
u s t that those who are immersed in sin stifle that awareness - we could sum up his 
enterprise by proclaiming reformed Christianity as the one true rationally justified 
religion. But, that is absolutely not what can be drawn from Plantinga's work. The 
reformed epistemologist's view of rational belief accepts a vast plurality of noetic 
structures, ranging from those of the theist's to the atheist's. Whereas the 
distinction between atheist and theist for Calvin is an issue of sinfulness, we will 
see for Plantinga that the distinction is concerning how the atheist and the theist 
hold basic beliefs in the foundations of their noetic structure. In the quote above 
Plantinga, I think, wants to show within the work of Calvin that belief in God is as 
basic as other foundational beliefs like the existence of other people, the past, or the 
external world. The sensus divinitatis recalls basicality to the mind which is 
grounded in experience. It just happens that sinfulness for Calvin distorts or 
disrupts the experience of realizing Divine providence. So, w ithout sin in Calvin's 
work we would recognize a whole host of other properly basic beliefs also. I think 
that Plantinga ought not be thought of as making a claim about sinfulness here.
His interests are focused on the rational structure of belief. It may be, however, 
that personally Plantinga finds religious inspiration and illumination of the tru th  
ir. every word that Calvin has ever uttered or has written down. Actually, his 
personal acceptance of reformist Christianity is a widely known and documented 
fact. But that m ust not be confused with (nor detract from) the epistemological 
position he endeavors to clarify by using Calvin as paradigmatic of one who holds 
a rationally basic religious belief. We ought not be confused in thinking that 
Plantinga asserts any rational argument about w hat sin, Divine providence, the 
resurrection and the rest of it, amount to for all humans. Thus, I think that it is 
helpful to resist this line of argument by always keeping in mind that Plantinga's 
philosophical interests are structural or logical and not inspirational or, it could 
even be said, religious.
Regarding the above, while focusing on Plantinga's philosophical interests,
Calvin's Sensus Divinitatis", Religious Studies 33 (1997): 419-431, p. 421.
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Derek S. Jeffreys writes that he presents:
...John Calvin's sensus divinitatis as an epistemic module akin to those like sense 
perception, a priori knowledge, induction, testimony and other epistemic modules.
Plantinga defines the sensus divinitatis as a "many sided disposition to accept belief in God 
(or propositions that immediately and obviously entail the existence of God) in a variety of 
circumstances." Like other epistemic modules it produces beliefs in an appropriate 
cognitive environment, aims at the production of true beliefs, and generates beliefs which 
have a high statistical probability of being true.31
With this quote we can concur with Jeffereys that Plantinga intends to accept 
Calvin's thoughts here as having serious epistemological import. Cautiously 
however, it m ust be noted that I think Plantinga would object to what is put 
forward at the end of the last sentence. I cannot see Plantinga affirming any 
religious belief (especially in terms of basic one's) in terms of generating a "high 
statistical probability of being true". In fact, I think that that is not true when 
considering Plantinga's work and interests. However, the rest of the quotation 
saems to be correct. The experience of the sensus divinitatis, from what Calvin 
expresses about it, can readily be seen as a "disposition to accept belief in God" in 
an epistemologically basic way. I think that Jeffereys is right in saying that 
Hantinga does submit Calvin's notion of the sensus divinitatis as an epistemic 
module as one which is like those that other foundationalists have focused upon 
that yield rational belief. This can also show that Plantinga is not merely a 
Christian philosopher who labors to make his beliefs acceptable within his 
profession and the increasingly anti-religious, cynical western academic world. I 
think that he has really shown an important likeness of the sensus divinitatis and the 
remarks about belief in God by Bavinck (as just two of his many examples), to be 
relevant to serious epistemological investigations.
For Plantinga belief in God can go in two directions. There is the path of 
classical foundationalism, which when coupled with theology yields something 
akin to natural theology; thus a demand for argument and proof for God's 
existence. This means that before a person has any wisp of religious fervor he m ust 
construct and accept a cogent argument, inductive or deductive, for the existence of 
God. The second path to the rationality of belief in God is to recognize in 
experience that that belief is basic; it is in no need of argument or proof, because
31Ibid., p. 419.
88
it is in the foundation of one's belief system. Given that reformed epistemology 
clearly aims to travel down this second path, it is time to consider how Plantinga et 
al. plan to argue for the rationality of this kind of religious belief.
When Plantinga focuses on the circumstance and environment which enact a 
basic belief in God he means to suggest that the proposition evoked will not 
typically be the simple belief that "God exists". He mentions32 that one may be 
reading the Bible and have a sense that God is speaking to him; after committing a 
wicked deed in the sight of God, one may feel compunction, be contrite in asking 
:or forgiveness, and form the belief that God has granted him forgiveness; or in 
times of sweetness a person may praise God for his condition of contentment and 
have the belief that God is to be thanked and praised. Given these conditions that 
enact beliefs in God, says Plantinga, we see that none of them are the simple and 
generalized belief that God exists. Instead we have beliefs like God is speaking to 
me, God forgives me, and God is to be thanked and praised. Plantinga then writes:
These propositions are properly basic in the right circumstances. But it is quite 
consistent with this to suppose that the proposition there is such a person as God is 
neither properly basic nor taken as basic by those who believe in God... From this 
point of view it is not wholly accurate to say that it is belief in God that is properly 
basic...33
Even though Plantinga makes this point about rigorously determining what 
are properly held basic beliefs, he nevertheless says that it is alright, speaking 
laxly, to claim that "God exists" is properly basic. He writes, "...perhaps there is 
thus no harm in speaking of [God exists]...as properly basic, even though so to 
speak is to speak a bit loosely. "M
On this issue of what it is exactly that comprises a basic religious belief, I 
will argue that in making a claim of rationality we ought not be permitted to speak 
loosely in this way. I will merely point out now that when we speak of "God is to 
be thanked and praised" our investigation into its rationality is strictly confined to 
the very particular moment and circumstance from which this belief is recalled to 
the mind. Therefore, a general sense of the rationality of a Christian form of being 
(outside of any particular experience of holding a basic belief) becomes quite
32Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God", in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds) 
Faith and Rationality (University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983), pp. 80-81. Plantinga's 
emphasis.
33Ibid„ p. 81.
^Ibid., p. 82.
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obscure, and in certain ways, difficult for the reformist to capture. Also, intuitively, 
it seems right to say that that kind of belief is not strictly basic because one m ust 
believe that a God exists before one can be moved to offer him praise. If God does 
not exist there is no object of praise. "God exists" must be primary, in some way, 
to such qualitative propositions. We will see in the next chapter why the reformists 
speak of basic beliefs in this fashion and why it presents grave difficulties w ithin 
their view.
B. Epistemic duty and justifying basic religious beliefs
In moving from the reformed rejection of the criterion of basicality of 
foundational beliefs asserted by classical foundationalism, to their examples of 
belief in God as a kind of basic belief which is not held because of any argum ent 
emanating from other basic beliefs, we must now look at their concept of 
justification of basic religious propositions. As an abrupt beginning, I will offer 
Plantinga's formulation of a justified basic belief. He writes the following with 
appearance beliefs in mind in order to offer a more general formulation, and not 
one that ought to be thought of in terms of religious belief alone.
Let us say that a belief is justified for a person at a time if (a) he is violating no 
epistemic duties and is within his epistemic rights in accepting it [e. g., the 
perception of a tree in this case] and (b) his noetic structure is not defective by 
virtue of his then accepting it. Then my being appeared to in this characteristic way 
(together with other circumstances) is what confers on me the right to hold the 
belief in question; this is what justifies me in accepting it. We could say, if we wish, that 
this experience is what justifies me in holding it; this is the ground of my 
justification, and, by extension, the ground of the belief itself.35
We m ust take a close look at what is being expressed by these two principles 
and raise some serious questions regarding them. What does he mean by 
"violating epistemic duties"?, as well as one being "within his epistemic rights" in 
holding a basic belief? We m ust then ask: how does a noetic structure become 
"defective" by "violating epistemic duties" and holding a belief which is not 
within one's "epistemic rights" to hold?
When reading the texts of reformed epistemology I see that there is not, to 
my knowledge, a profound degree of rigor exerted to exhaust these questions. But,
35Ibid„ p. 79.
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given their sustained critique of strict criteria of basicality asserted by classical 
foundationalism, this may not be a great deficiency. My feeling, when I read the 
passages by reformed epistemologists that involve discussions about holding basic 
beliefs, is that they always develop into explications regarding the violation of 
epistemic duties, or rights. Often, I read allusions to an ethics of belief. However, 
they do not push this too far by developing a system of "belief ethics", if there ever 
could be a justifiable formulation of such a thing.36 Nonetheless, Alvin Plantinga, 
as I understand his work, sees the very concept of justification, as it has been 
handed down by the tradition and modified along the way by seminal 
epistemological figures, to be a deontological one. This means that there is an 
ethical parallel to be drawn from properly holding justified beliefs. He writes that 
"...we could call [justification] to remind ourselves of the reference to duty and 
obligation, deontological epistemic justification."37 To support his claim of the 
centrality of a deontological conception of justification in traditional epistemology, 
he writes, "For Descartes and Locke... deontological notions enter [justification] in a 
way that is explicit in excelsis"38 Furthermore, Plantinga holds that a deontological 
sense of justification can be found in more implicit ways within the work of many 
others.39 He particularly recognizes that it plays an essential role in internalist 
theories. He writes, "Cut off the deontology, and the internalism looks like an 
arbitrary appendage."40 This is not an idiosyncratic characteristic of reformed 
epistemology, and I do not think that Plantinga displays any kind of radical 
perspective by suggesting that epistemology is interwoven with deontological
36There have been a few attempts, nevertheless, at formulating an ethics of belief. So, I do 
not intend, by any means, to give the impression here that this enterprise is completely 
inane. In fact, it plays a role in Roderick Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed., Prentice Hall, 
Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1977); as well as his Perceiving (Cornell University Press, Ithica, New  
York, 1957). Also, there have been some epistemologists who have constructed theories which 
promote the maximization of epistemic values. For example see Isaac Levi's Gambling With Truth: 
An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1967); and Alvin 
Goldman's "The Internalist Conception of Justification", M idwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 5,1981, 
pp. 27-52.
37Alvin Plantinga, "Justification in the 20th Century", in Ernest Sosa (ed) Justification and Knowledge, 
Vol. 2 of 2 Vols, (Dartmouth Publishing Company, Brookfield, VT, 1994), p. 751. Plantinga's 
emphasis.
^Ibid., p. 750.
39See the entirety of Plantinga's paper referenced in note 37. In this paper he traces and makes 
explicit the dependence that the tradition has upon a deontological conception of justification which is 
central, as he sees it, to understand classical internalism and the justified true belief conception of 
knowledge.
40Alvin Plantinga, "Justification in the 20th Century", in Ernest Sosa (ed) Justification and Knowledge, 
Vol. 2 of 2 Vols., (Dartmouth Publishing Company, Brookfield, VT, 1994), p. 768.
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notions. All epistemology is seemingly founded upon some kind of underlying 
intellectual ethic, or virtue. We saw this come to the fore in the last chapter by 
coisidering the presuppositions of traditional epistemology which state that one 
mist trust oneself to not fall into needless error, to improve one's system of beliefs, 
anl so on. At the base of traditional epistemology there is the presupposition that 
hunans are rational by nature. Therefore, it is the apparent duty of the 
epstemologist to help humanity get their beliefs right, or to be intellectually 
secure in the rationality of their beliefs. In this respect one thinks of Spinoza's De 
Intllectu Emendatione41 on the improvement of understanding, as well as Descartes' 
Regdee ad Directionem Ingenii12 or "Rules for the Direction of the Mind".
I gather that epistemologists of any persuasion would claim that, as rational 
beiigs, we have a duty to avoid irrational beliefs and not to fall into needless 
epiitemic error. What else has been the motivation for epistemological inquiry? I 
doibt that it is like becoming adept at a technique, in the sense that one hopes to 
hore a personal skill in the same manner one may pursue a hobby which is 
corgruent with one's personal tastes. It is considered important, and by some 
crudal; and those who work within the field labor with their thoughts in order to 
discover what is right and wrong about justifying belief for all. It depends on how 
that epistemic motivation is interpreted, however. The classical foundationalist 
clains that only particular kinds of belief can be properly basic. Thus, we have a 
duty to acquire a belief system with such beliefs in its foundations. The reformist 
has i much looser conception of what can be a basic belief, thus a much looser 
conception of epistemic duty with respect to believing.
For the reformists one has a duty to believe X in accordance to one's 
environmental circumstances, thus the claim of rationality itself hinges upon the 
fulfilment of these duties. This circumstantial rationality is evidently a part of the 
forns of belief that we saw expressed by Calvin and Bavinck above. They claimed 
that the basicality of belief in God is part of a circumstance and environment where 
that <ind of belief is enacted. Where the classical foundationalist submits a 
criterion of basic beliefs to be equally relevant in all circumstances, the reformists
41In Btnedict Spinoza's "Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione" (1701) collected in The Chief Works of 
Spino'M, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, 2 vols., New York, 1955-1956.
42In Rtne Descartes' "Regulae ad directionem Ingenii" (1628) collected in C. Adam and P. Tannery 
(eds) Tuvres de Descartes, 12 vols., Paris, 1964-1976.
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clam that a rational basic belief is one that is held because of, or concomitant with, 
ce tain circumstances. "Certain circumstances" partly amounts to, as I understand 
it, occasions or events in a person's life which call on him to believe a proposition 
wlich is congruent with his noetic structure. If there are any constraints on what 
cai be a basic belief for the reformist it involves the circumstances or context the 
beiever is in which determines what can or cannot be believed. This also holds for 
empirical beliefs, like those stemming from sensory experience, for instance. Quite 
obziously, if one were swimming under water there is no room to procure a belief 
stenming from the sense of smell. Thus, there are epistemic duties that come with 
this environment which naturally regulate which beliefs are rational to hold and 
which are not.
For an example of a religious belief we can consider the lack of fulfilling 
one's epistemic duty as a Christian in holding that one ought not care for those in 
need, which we discussed earlier. The Christian noetic structure, by and large, has 
no room for such a belief. In a community of believers, as they inform themselves 
about their belief by reading the scriptures (that is, to love one's neighbor, cloth the 
naked, feed the hungry and so on), to not care for those in need would be an act in 
violation of Christian duty. Acting on that belief would not be epistemically 
permissible. Simply, it is epistemologically relevant to say, as a Christian you can't 
believe that. In this sense, if one were to believe a proposition that confused their 
system of beliefs, and everyone else's within that system, it would be irrational, 
thus, impermissible. Furthermore, I imagine that this would occur if one held 
proposition P and found their whole community to be utterly confused as to how 
or why this member of their community believes that proposition, i.e. the 
surrounding community sees proposition P as not making sense against the 
background of their belief system. By the internal logic of their own noetic 
structure, proposition P is not permitted. It seems that the principle issue 
concerning the permissibility of a belief involves this idea of the sense and 
intelligibility of it being held within a noetic structure. An impermissible belief 
for the Muslim, for instance, would be the belief that Allah is not merciful, but 
vindictive and sadistic. We can easily see how a believer would confuse Islam by 
holding this belief. The entire Muslim community surrounding this believer is 
imbued with the concept that Allah is to be praised because he is a merciful God.
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There are no circumstances for the Muslim to hold the belief that He is not 
merciful. For the Muslim community one cannot believe that Allah is sadistic and 
cruel, and still take part in their daily prayers which involves worshipping him 
because he is merciful. The concepts of mercy and cruelty, in as much as they are 
involved in identifying the character of God, are mutually exclusive.
The rational person carries out the logical consequences of his beliefs; he 
does the right thing with respect to the context of his belief. A rational person then 
is one who obeys the duties of his belief system, and therefore, can be seen to have 
consistency and permissibility with regard to his beliefs. If a member of a Catholic 
community were attending a funeral and affirmed the proposition that death is a 
sleep of infinite duration, people would be rightly confused at that belief. There is 
no environment or circumstance that would demand a Catholic to believe such a 
thing in order to fulfil his epistemic duties with respect to the Catholic noetic 
structure. I can imagine people saying that he is wrong, or at least that he has an 
immensely shallow belief about death. For the reformist this is not because the 
essence of death is known and he is mistaken about a fact, or he does not 
comprehend the logical entailment of a deductive or inductive argum ent for it. The 
community would call him wrong because his concept of death is completely 
logically unconnected to any other concepts within Catholicism, e.g. praying for 
the soul of the dead to enter heaven and be spared from a long stay in purgatory. 
Within this problematic belief in death we can see that he has not obeyed the duties 
or responsibilities of his Christian beliefs as a member of that community. His 
Christian belief system is defective with that belief of death among it. That belief 
of death confuses his Christianity and makes it problematic by conceptual 
opposition w ithin the belief system. For instance, there is no distinction between 
w hat sleep ordinarily is, and what he means by death as eternal sleep. When he 
sleeps at night does he believe that that is exactly what death is? This confused 
conception of death takes the finality of perishing away along with w hat the 
finality of existing may entail for a Christian. But, to judge him as holding a wrong 
belief is made from the view that he has disobeyed the duties and responsibilities 
w ith respect to his beliefs, (particularly that he had ignored the "Parting this earth 
to join the father in heaven" sense that death has in Christianity), thus his belief is 
defective. In this way it can be viewed as a defect of the beliefs he has about his
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Christian experience within his particular communal environment.
C. The accusation of irrationality
A fundamental question about accounting for rational belief, which can be 
anticipated by the classical foundationalist regarding the whole enterprise of 
reformed epistemology, is: if they dismiss a restrictive criterion of rationality for 
basic propositions why, then, cannot any proposition be held as foundational in a 
noetic structure? Plantinga writes:
Suppose I believe that if I flap my arms with sufficient vigor, I can take off and fly about the 
room; could I defend myself against the charge of irrationality by claiming this belief is 
basic? If we say that belief in God is properly basic, will we not be committed to holding that 
just anything, or nearly anything, can properly be taken as basic, thus throwing wide the 
gates to irrationalism and superstition?43
Plantinga et al., clearly wish to cut this criticism off at the roots. This is 
because, if they cannot argue against the charge that they must accept any 
proposition as basic, thus forced to let the gate to irrationalism swing widely and 
let any proposition to be held as basic, then (as insinuated in Plantinga's quote 
above) their work becomes a source of perverse amusement, and not a statement 
about what is rational to believe, and what is not. To put it strictly, if they cannot 
argue against this insinuation then their work can be viewed as merely negative 
and destructive to the western canonical understanding of rational belief. It would 
be viewed as negative in the sense that they have torn down classical 
foundationalism, but cannot put anything constructive in its place, save arguments 
supporting an "anything goes" or "laissez-faire" epistemology,44 while not 
arguing for, nor clarifying, what the logical limits of holding basic beliefs are.
Also, by implication, it would be difficult for them to provide examples which 
show what difference there is between the concepts of rationality and irrationality
43Ibid., p. 74.
^This is not an unknown species of legitimate epistemological inquiry for some 
philosophers, however; in fact, all to the contrary. So, I do not intend to suggest that laissez-faire 
epistemology is without supporters, and therefore, an obviously absurd path to take. Some standard 
expressions of this view can be found in the following texts: Richard Rorty's, "Deconstruction and 
Circumvention", Critical Inquiry, V ol.ll, 1-23; Consequences of Pragmatism  (University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 1982); and Irony, Contingency, Solidarity (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1989): Jean Baudrillard's, Oublier Foucault (Editions Galilee, Paris, 1997): Gianni 
Vattimo's, The End O f Modernity, trans. Jon R. Snyder (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988): and Stanley 
Fish's, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980).
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themselves. We would not be able to compile a catalogue of beliefs which could 
never be rational regardless of contextual circumstances that could issue them.
Some may protest that it would not be a philosophy of intellectual guidance to aid 
one in getting their beliefs right. It would be a promotion for humanity to believe 
what they wish, because one could always find justification for his beliefs by appeal 
to some circumstantial experience. This would also show the enterprise of 
philosophy to be, in one sense, impotent. A ny  assertion, that one could think of, 
can be regarded as rational as the next. Plantinga, therefore, wants to argue that 
certainly not all propositions can be held in the foundations of a noetic structure.
He claims that:
According to the reformed epistemologist certain beliefs are properly basic in 
certain circumstances; those same beliefs may not be properly basic in other 
circumstances.45
He further exemplifies this by saying that if one sees a tree it is properly 
basic in certain circumstances which are hard to describe in detail, but it involves 
being appeared to in a characteristic way. However, that same belief is not taken as 
properly basic in circumstances including, "...say, my knowledge that I am sitting 
in the living room listening to music with my eyes closed."46 So, circumstance and 
environment are crucial for the acceptance of a properly basic belief to be held in 
the foundations of a noetic structure. When one is in a particular environment 
there is a connection between w hat one is experiencing and what one thinks about 
it. To take Plantinga's example, if he knows that he is sitting in his living room 
listening to music with his eyes closed, the conditions to which seeing a tree is 
properly basic, are non-existent. In those circumstances, that there is a tree in front 
of him, is not basic. What he knows in this example is determined by a 
circumstance that has no room for appearance beliefs. For him, the domain of 
possible propositions of knowledge are constrained in conjunction with the 
conditions of listening to music with his eyes closed.
These remarks do not thoroughly cut the criticism off at the roots. He is 
right in saying above that when one is listening to music with his eyes closed there
45Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God", in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds) 
Faith and Rationality (University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983), p. 74. Plantinga's emphasis.
46Ibid.
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is no place for an appearance belief to be basic. This is unmistakably correct. 
However, another, and most crucial part of the critical question that the reformists 
face is if there is a belief that could never be held rationally in any environmental 
circumstance. The reformists rightly suggest that a basic belief is contingent upon 
the environment of a noetic structure, but we can say that any proposition could be 
claimed as rational by appeal to the appropriate circumstances and accompanying 
noetic structure in which it is used. Plantinga has written about w hat he calls "the 
Great Pum pkin objection"47. By the title he makes reference to the odd basic belief 
that the Great Pum pkin visits on Halloween. Throughout his discussion he focuses 
on how a belief could be considered basic in some circumstances while not in 
others. This is like I just discussed; walking in a wooded area is obviously 
conducive to evoking the basic belief that one sees a tree, whereas this basic belief 
is not possible (there are no commensurable circumstances for it) when listening to 
music w ith one's eyes closed. But, nonetheless, one could still logically justify the 
belief in the Great Pum pkin by imagining and describing the correct circumstances 
in which it could possibly be believed basically. Can't we imagine some person 
strolling through a pum pkin patch at midnight on Halloween and believing that 
the Great Pumpkin visits on such occasions? W ouldn't that comprise proper 
circumstances for holding such a belief? Isn't this akin to the Christian who 
performs a wicked deed, feels remorse and is contrite in asking God for 
forgiveness, then believes that God has granted him that forgiveness?
The prime question facing the reformists, then, is not about how one 
proposition could be basic in some circumstances while not in others, but whether 
there is a kind of belief that could never be basic in any circumstance? We find out 
that Plantinga et al., cannot completely stave off this objection from within their 
work. We will see that there are perhaps some basic beliefs (in the sense 
accustomed to Malcolm's discussion on the matter which we saw in the last chapter) 
that all people agree upon regardless of circumstantial events. I do not mean to 
suggest that these beliefs have necessary and sufficient conditions, but they are a 
part of a person's noetic structure, context of belief, regardless of what the content 
of the propositions comprising the noetic structure, context of belief, may be. I will 
address this issue in great detail in the next chapter, and argue that there are certain
4Tbid., pp. 74-78.
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beliefs that seemingly all people have that become confused when certain religious 
beliefs contradict them.
For now let's continue with citations from the work of Plantinga to see how 
he tries to deal with this objection. Plantinga protests that just because reformed 
epistemologists reject the problem of the criterion of basicality and embrace a de 
facto concept of foundational beliefs, they should not be viewed as having to 
tolerate such irrationalism? He offers the following analogy to consider:
In the palmy days of positivism the positivists went along confidently wielding their 
verifiability criterion and declaring meaningless much that was clearly meaningful. Now  
suppose someone rejected a formulation of that criterion - the one to be found in the second 
edition of A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, for example. Would that mean she was 
committed to holding that
(1) T'was brillig: and the slithy toves did gyre and gymble in the wabe,
contrary to appearances, makes good sense? Of course not. But then the same goes 
for the reformed epistemologist: the fact that he rejects the criterion of proper 
basicality purveyed by classical foundationalism does not mean that he is 
committed to supposing just anything is properly basic.48
Plantinga, therefore, argues that just because there is no justifiable criterion 
for rational basic beliefs does not force them to pronounce that the epistemologist 
must close shop and academically bow-out, then follow in the footsteps of the 
philologist on the path of obsolete disciplines. Crucial importance is given to 
environmental conditions or circumstances which govern or regulate the 
possibility of a basic proposition being held permissibly. According to Plantinga, a 
formal criterion of basicality need not be in place, and accepted by all, in order for 
a person to claim that a proposition is foundational for him in certain circumstances. 
Plantinga argues that a person can realize the proper basicality of a proposition in 
his noetic structure regardless of any formal criterion of basicality that is expected 
to be referred to. A proposition may be trusted as foundational in as much as it is 
in accordance with the epistemic claims of that person living w ithin that particular 
noetic structure. Given the claims of the reformists about epistemic rights and 
duties in holding basic beliefs, they think that that is the vantage point from which 
they can argue against a nihilistic, "anything goes", view of knowledge. But, from 
my view it does not. We can still appeal to such circumstances of a noetic structure
^Ibid., pp. 74-75.
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in which we could justify any proposition as basic: their view of the rationality of 
belief ought to be seen as necessarily bound to that consequential, and 
considerable, shortcoming.
D. Experience as the grounds for belief
Plantinga, nevertheless, suggests that even though basic beliefs are not 
justified by a rational criterion of basicality in the style of classical 
foundationalism, they are not groundless. He claims that having characteristic 
sorts of experiences of holding basic beliefs provide a crucial role in their 
acquisition. He uses the example of believing that a person is in pain. We may 
witness a person doubled-over and moaning, or at least displaying this sort of 
typical, pain behavior. He claims that that is not the evidence of believing that this 
person is in pain; we do not infer that this person is in pain on the basis of other 
beliefs, nor do we accept it from other beliefs. He writes:
...my perceiving the pain behavior plays a unique role in the formation and
justification of that belief; it forms the ground of my justification for the belief in question.49
Therefore, the reformed epistemologists find the justification of basic beliefs 
to be grounded in these experiences. We noted earlier that the sensus divinitatis 
requires a similar kind of experience to be enacted. That basic belief in God is 
grounded in one's environment and experiences which enact it without any 
requirement of its rational acceptability by virtue of a criterion of basicality. A 
rational basic belief for the reformist is then not linked to rational evidence in 
being related and evaluated by a rational criterion of basicality as it is for the 
classical foundationalist. Perhaps it can be said to be rationally justified internally 
to a noetic structure, together with circumstances that give rise to the belief, rather 
than a logically arguable proof. In the classical foundationalist manner of 
evaluating rational belief there is very little concern for context, or other 
propositions that are linked to the basic one. Exclusively, the classical 
foundationalist interrogates the possible basicality of one proposition while 
disregarding any contingent circumstances. This is a program of purely logical 
concern. However, the reformist has the hum an condition in mind along w ith the
49Ibid„ p. 79.
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context of belief, and the cogency of holding particular beliefs in the foundations of 
a noetic structure. Therefore, there is an important psychological dimension to 
their claim of rational belief. The mindset, or the understanding that a believer has 
about her belief in God (by recognizing it in the foundations of her noetic 
structure) makes all the difference in the world for her to claim that she holds her 
belief rationally. If a believer understands that her belief - God is to be thanked 
and praised, for instance - is the root, or the very base of her being, in a 
circumstance that evokes that belief, she can say it is rational to hold. A believer in 
this circumstance may look around her and see birds foraging for berries in the 
trees and think that God is to be thanked and praised because He provides for his 
creations. She may look at a Mother and daughter talking and laughing, holding 
onto each other's arm, while shuffling through the market place and think, God is 
to be thanked and praised because He is present at the center of such moments of 
joy and contentment that His children share together. In this moment the concept 
that God is to be thanked and praised reaffirms itself to her from all directions. To 
be rational she m ust know that she has no other belief supporting this one. In these 
experiences, all of the world's meaningfulness originates from that ground level 
belief for her.
However, imagine that a person believes that God is to be thanked and 
praised because she also believes that if  she does not thank and praise God, she will 
spend eternity in hell after death. This proposition is conditional upon another, 
thus her reasons for her to thank and praise God do not stem from a circumstance 
where that belief is basic. Her noetic structure is based on the belief that God is to 
be pleased or else one will suffer an eternal and undesirable fate as a consequence.
In both examples above the subject must be cognizant of what beliefs rest in the 
foundations of her noetic structure to be rational about her belief. This cognizance 
or awareness of w hat beliefs are truly basic is essential for one to be rational with 
respect to one's beliefs. If one is not aware of what beliefs are basic in his or her 
noetic structure, then one does not know what amounts to one's belief system 
being rational.
E. Communal discourse as the margins of rational belief
Plantinga also makes the point that not everyone may agree with an
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example of a basic belief. In fact, he seems to say that how we judge a belief to be 
basic is often divergent from others. He speaks of a Christian who holds that belief 
in God is properly basic and rational for him. He writes:
...if he does not accept this belief on the basis of other propositions, he will conclude that it is 
basic for him and quite properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murray 
O'Hare may disagree; but how is that relevant? Must my criteria, or those of the Christian 
community, conform to their examples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible 
to its set of examples, not to theirs.50
As we noticed earlier, the reformed epistemologists cannot guard against the 
criticism that any belief can be held foundationally if one can appeal to what may 
be proper circumstances for evoking it. Reformed epistemology, in mostly 
focussing on the individual and her circumstances of holding basic beliefs, m ust be 
committed to a position which could support a mode of thought that is reminiscent 
of, or related to, sophistry.51 An individual could justify any belief merely by 
coming up with a circumstance in which that belief was evoked. However, perhaps 
the above remarks point to a saving dimension in the work of Plantinga et al. A 
community teaches its members about the permissibility of beliefs by the sense of 
practices, behavior, and rituals. By this communal focus we no longer only 
consider an individual in isolation, justifying beliefs merely by giving an account 
of what he takes to be proper circumstances for holding a basic belief. It is an 
established communal existence which affirms what counts as basic and what does 
not. The Christian community is responsible for its set of examples of basicality. I 
take this as meaning that what counts as basic is determined by dialogue internal to 
a community, which affirms what beliefs are permissible and which ones are not.
By this account, it may be argued in defense of reformed epistemology, that 
nothing can be held as basic if a community does not affirm it.
Have the reformed epistemologists cut this criticism off at the roots now? 
From my point of view, not entirely. We may think that a move from the
50Ibid., p. 77. Plantinga's emphasis.
51To accuse the reformists of sophistry perhaps seems a bit strong. However, I am thinking of the 
sophist, Aristophanes and his satirical play, The Clouds. Partly in this play we are introduced to a 
man who wishes to be a student of Socrates in order that he may argue his way out of his debts. The 
debtor is not interested in truth or duty, but seemingly wishes to use a philosophical system to 
believe and live as he wishes. I see a similar attitude that could possibly be applied to the project of 
reformed epistemolgy. I have maintained that a person can believe what she wishes, and by 
reference to any conducive circumstance, she may argue that her belief is rational.
individual to a communal determination of a criterion of basicality helps because 
we can appeal to norms, canonical beliefs, shared practices and experiences. It is 
true that in a community there is dialogue about the meaningfulness of "the 
people". Therefore, anyone w ith an impermissible belief will be considered wrong 
and corrected by virtue of standards or mainstream beliefs. But, can't we raise the 
same objection of a community which we raised about the individual? Can't we 
imagine a community holding any kind of belief as basic? It is true that, with a 
communal focus, we no longer have a collection of individuals believing rational 
basic propositions in isolation from others around them, with equal epistemic 
firmness. But, I am  not convinced that we completely escape irrationalism by 
saying that the criterion of w hat is a permissible basic belief is determined by a 
community. Just because we can appeal to norms and standards does not mean that 
all communities have norms or standards that are not fantastic or irrational.52
Antithetically, it is true that some individuals in the past have acted alone in 
their discoveries or reflections, and in the course of expressing their views they 
have challenged various norms, standards and canonical beliefs of their historical 
epoch. Some of these examples reveal that the individuals were correct, and the 
communities at large were wrong.53 I particularly have the story of Galileo's 
astrological work and fight against the Catholic church in mind, concerning the 
operation of the solar system. If Galileo was in fact irrational (and still considered 
so) because he did not adhere to the norms and standards of the Catholic 
community and the Aristotelian professors who surrounded him and his work at 
the time, we would not have had the truth that it is the earth which rotates around 
the sun, and not vice versa.54
52One will find a remarkable catalogue of irrational beliefs held by communities throughout the 
history of western civilization in Charles Mackay's Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of 
Crowds (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1932). The fact that communities can many times be 
irrational with respect to their beliefs is what makes such texts possible.
53It is generally the case that Wittgensteinians make ample appeal to the internal logic of communal 
discourse in order to make a claim of rational, justified, or permissible belief. This focus challenges 
restrictive criteria of rationality by traditional philosophers and fulfils their goal of calling attention to 
the divergent forms of logic that can be described in, and comprising, various forms of discourse. 
However, because this focus is so dominant I feel that my present point risks not being sufficiently 
appreciated by philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein.
^It ought to be noted that in October 1992 a Papal commission finally acknowledged the Vatican's 
error in condemning Galileo and his work by linking it to heresy. This is not to say that the Vatican 
once thought that his work fulfilled her criteria of heresy, and she was wrong about her application 
of that criteria. The greater acknowledgment involved the admission that the Vatican was simply 
wrong about the facts concerning the operation of the solar system.
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As another example (that a communal criterion of basicality cannot serve, de 
facto, as a justification for rational belief), we can consider a community (called 
"Heaven's Gate") from southern California. This community believed that a 
passing comet (in 1997) intended to "pick them up" if they all committed suicide at 
a particular time when it was visible from earth. They believed that they would be 
transported to paradise in the comet's fiery tail. There are no remarks by the 
reformed epistemologists which could classify this belief as fantastic. It is more 
elaborate than the belief in the Great Pumpkin, nonetheless, we could still see from 
the reformed view that it could be held as a basic belief. By my view we cannot say 
that this group knew what they believed. The problem is what this group meant 
by "paradise", being "transported" in a comet's tail, and how killing themselves 
would have gotten them to the comet, and so on. Another problem with this belief 
is that scientists can track the course of a comet, thus they know where they go. 
They apparently believed that "paradise" spatially exists at the end of the comet's 
course, thus it can be scientifically verified that paradise occupies a particular 
location in the universe. All of those ambiguities involve unintelligible conceptual 
grammars. The problem, to some extent, is that a lot of what is involved in this 
belief system violates what is known about cause and effect. In the next chapter I 
will explicate this general problem of a religious belief that incorporates 
conflicting grammars, and offer many examples. Partly, this problem involves a 
person (seemingly every person) who knows the cause and effect of, for instance, 
throwing a ball in the air and watching it fall, yet also believing (like the members 
of this community) that killing oneself would cause one to be transported to a 
comet's tail. Briefly, I will say here that the latter belief is confused, unintelligible, 
in light of the causes and effects that we know govern the empirical world. What 
are the causes and effects that they are appealing to, which would partly justify the 
beliefs of this community? The cause of a ball falling when we throw it in the air is 
gravity. But when we consider the cause of a person being transported to a comet's 
fiery tail after committing suicide we are reduced to shrugging our shoulders. We 
know what it means for a person to be transported to New York from Paris via the 
Concorde, but that is not and cannot be what this cult meant by being transported. 
We are dumbfounded by what the concept of transportation amounts to in this case. 
A logical problem surrounding their belief that paradise spatially exists
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somewhere in the cosmos, is not that they are necessarily wrong, as if everybody 
knows in fact where paradise is and it is not there, but another place. The problem 
concerns the intelligibility of what the concept of paradise could am ount to if we 
are to think of it in the same manner than we think of spatially and temporally 
bound places like Casablanca, Morocco or Kiev, Ukraine. We m ust concede, for the 
same reasons, that no island could be Orgygia,55 and no wheat field could be 
Yaru.56 We strictly cannot make sense of their use of the concept of paradise, nor 
the role cause and effect had within their beliefs.
Many Christian beliefs seemingly fall into the same category because they 
use propositions which have confused conceptual grammars. For instance, some 
may suggest that the belief in the resurrection is similar to the above example. 
Doesn't that belief appeal to a cause and effect which confusingly mimics the cause 
and effect which governs empirical bodies? If I say that I know w hat caused a ball 
to fall when I threw it in the air - that it was gravity - we must adm it that that same 
logic of knowing empirical laws is confused when we apply it to hum an beings 
being resurrected from the dead. We do not know what it means for a person to 
die, and then later, rising again, like we do the effect of gravity. W hat the concept 
of cause and effect amounts to in the belief in the resurrection is indiscernible.
F. The plurality of basic beliefs
At any rate, let's continue with the exegetical issues of reformed 
epistemology. They hold that accounting for basic beliefs may differ from noetic 
structure to noetic structure. Because of this point, one important and characteristic 
aspect of the reformed epistemological project is that it is distinctively pluralistic. 
Even though they find an immense amount of valid epistemological examples of 
w hat they claim is a rational belief system in the work of Christian reformers, their 
claim of rationality is a universal one, regardless of what kind of belief is being 
proclaimed. For Plantinga, not all people may agree with an example of a 
religious basic belief. But all will be able to see, and agree, if it functions 
foundationally in relation to other propositions within its noetic structure. As we
55Orgygia is the mythical island in the Ionian sea where the sea nymph Calypso lived alone in 
ancient Greek mythology.
56Yaru is the heavenly realm in ancient Egyptian religion which is characterized as a glorious wheat 
field where the wheat grows 3.7 meters high (12 feet) and one lives for eternity in extraordinary 
earthly comfort.
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have seen, Plantinga holds a rational believer to be one who consistently adheres 
to and obeys the epistemic duties of his noetic structure. An atheist could see the 
conceptual foundations of a Christian being the belief in God, even though he or 
she does not hold the same propositions in the foundation of his or her belief 
structure. It seems to be an issue of recognizing w hat logically is the case for 
another, understanding the logical relationship (consistency) between propositions, 
even if one does not hold the same concepts to be true.
Seeing the differences in the logicality of belief systems is what makes 
university departments of comparative religions possible. As an example, we can 
consider how Gandhi decided in his later life to cease any kind of sexual 
relationship with his wife for religious reasons. Gandhi, being Hindu, believed 
that the soul (or Atm an  in Hinduism) is not male nor female. It is impossible in this 
chapter to give anything like an exhaustive account of H indu metaphysics. 
However, it is reasonably clear for practical purposes to say that the Atman  is 
equivalent to, and part of, the Divine force of which all life is imbued. All devotees 
work for a lifetime to disclose the Atman  in themselves through meditation and 
self-renunciation. Because it is neither male nor female, sexual relations can be 
regarded as an act that is not founded upon one's Divinity, thus it was not religious 
for Gandhi. Sexual relations necessarily involve an identification with maleness or 
femaleness. For Gandhi it had to cease because one cannot identify with one's 
maleness while also identifying with one's Atman, which has no gender. We can 
see the logical relationship within Gandhi's noetic structure which led him to 
believe that it was religiously necessary to cease any sexual relations. We can 
understand the reasonableness of Gandhi's decision to curb his sexuality, even 
though multitudes would not find that to be reasonable to adopt in their own 
noetic structures.
I insinuated earlier on that this kind of epistemological attitude tends to be 
referred to as weak foundationalism, which is differentiated from the strong 
foundationalism in its more orthodox or classical vein. I mentioned this because 
the classical foundationalist has very strict criteria of what are basic beliefs and 
what are not. Therefore, the domain of properly basic beliefs is quite small, and it 
takes painstaking analysis to accept a belief as basic from their view. However,
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with the reformists we get a relented sense of basicality which is not constrained by 
an inevitably arbitrary criterion of basicality. Their use of basicality is somewhat 
akin to a common sense notion. To know the basic beliefs in one's noetic structure 
one need only reflect on those beliefs that one cannot reason beyond. That is 
generally what we normally think "basicality", or "the foundation", is.
I w ant to pause for a moment and discuss an objection regarding how 
reformed epistemology has been characterized thus far. What the above amounts 
to is that we must accept a plurality of beliefs as basic because one can see the 
internal consistency of a given noetic structure regardless if one holds that belief as 
true. One perhaps may object that this generous epistemological tolerance is fine 
as a consequence of a defeated foundationalism, but w hat is left is a dramatically 
feeble notion of rational belief. Thinkers like Karl Marx may be able to see the 
internal consistency of a Christian's noetic structure, but for him the Christian has 
been dulled and enslaved by an opiate. To be a Christian, for Marx, is to be far 
from holding a rational belief. Logical consistency of religious belief, for Marx, 
does not mean that religious belief is rational. But, we ought to investigate what 
Marx means by rational. He does not appeal to necessary and sufficient conditions 
of truth, like the classical foundationalist. In this sense he does not use the concept 
of rational as that which is concerned with the pure logicality of belief. I think that 
w hat is meant here is that the truth of another's belief is not testified to. Marx sees 
Christianity as immensely shallow, and in certain respects, embodying pernicious 
attributes that have a negative effect for the human race. When he considers what 
he takes to be deep issues concerning human existence, against the backdrop and 
thrust of Christianity, he quickly observes that it does not speak to those problems, 
bu t perpetuates them. This Marxian attitude toward religious belief is an 
expression of conviction about a particular form of life. Marx views rational 
people as those who believe what he believes. What this involves is a very normal 
attitude of conviction that is intimately bound up with most transcontextual 
discourse. Rationality, in this way, can be synonymous with correct, or right. 
Etymologically, we can see that the word "rational" is connected to "ratiocination" 
("'right thinking"). Two people who think each other rational, take themselves to 
be thinking the same way.57
5T note that the term "rational" as well as "epistemic virtue" (which follows from being attentive to
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G. Religious belief is rational as it is: on epistemological description
Now that we have discussed some fine points about the reformed rejection 
cf classical foundationalism, and how the reformists wish to hold onto the 
foundationalist picture of knowledge and in what kind of way, I wish to turn  to 
another reformed philosopher and further consider his general view of rationality 
cf belief in God. I will consider some points made by the reformist George 
Mavrodes in his essay Jerusalem and Athens Revisited.58 In this essay he speaks for 
reformed epistemology, that belief in God, if held foundationally, can be viewed 
aad described as rational as it is by philosophers, thus in no need of 
logical/philosophical intervention to make it rational. Mavrodes uses the analogy 
of safe drinking water to illustrate how philosophers generally view the rationality 
o: religious belief. He invites us to consider a group of explorers that come upon 
water during their journey and ask if it is safe to have a drink. In the case of a pure 
mountain stream free of toxins, it is safe to drink just as it stands. But, what of a lake 
that contains noxious bacteria? With the knowledge of the bacteria, the explorers 
would know that they can boil it to make it safe. However, it must be recognized 
that it is unsafe to drink just as it stands; it needs a purifying treatment. He also has 
us consider a lagoon that contains bacteria which cannot be eliminated. Here, the 
water cannot be made safe and no amount of boiling will make it safer. Mavrodes 
takes note that some philosophers have thought that, vis-a-vis rationality, theistic 
belief is like the lagoon. That it is irrational and the irrationality of religious belief 
cannot be remedied. He says that some Christian philosophers have suggested that 
it is like the lake. In some circumstances theistic belief can be irrational, but it can 
be made to be rational. For instance, one may believe that faith is not based on any 
reason, it is just a hope or wishful thinking. If one accepted the cosmological
the rationality of one's beliefs) have two senses to them, one of which Marx follows and the other 
which Platinga (and most analytic epistemologists) accept. As described by Aristotle, one (the 
Marxian) sense of "rational" refers to the qualities of wisdom and good judgement which aid in a 
"correct" view  of reality. The other (in the Plantigarian sense) refers to qualities conducive to the 
discovery of truth and the avoidance of error, which is quite a different notion. The first sense of the 
term means that there is a particular view of reality that is apprehended by the wise person; other 
views of reality are not wise because they are not in accordance to good judgment. The latter sense 
refers to logical principles and methodology used in discovering what the conditions of truth are, 
regardless of what belief may be investigated and affirmed. See "Nichomachean Ethics" in The Basic 
Works of Aristotle, ed. R. M. McKoen (Random House, New York, 1941), Book IV.
^In Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds) Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief In God 
(University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983).
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argument, for example, as making sense of one's hope or wish that God exists, 
one's belief has been made rational. It was irrational; then, upon accepting the 
cosmological argument, it became logically grounded. Mavrodes and the reformed 
philosophers, however, consider religious belief to be like the m ountain stream: 
nothing can be done to make it rational because it is rational just as it stands.
Mavrodes says that for one to understand reformed epistemology it is best 
to look at John Calvin. He offers a quote from Calvin regarding rationality and 
belief in God.
Since for unbelieving men religion seems to stand by opinion alone, they, in order not to 
believe anything foolishly or lightly, both wish and demand rational proof that Moses and 
the prophets spoke divinely. But, I must reply the testimony of the spirit is more excellent 
than all reason.59
In speaking about reformed epistemology, Mavrodes writes:
Like Calvin they have no intention of providing unbelievers with reasons to believe or, 
for that matter, of providing believers with reasons to continue their faith.60
Thus, Plantinga and Mavrodes see theistic belief to be much like the mountain 
stream; for believers, belief in God can be viewed to be rational just as it stands. 
Therefore, they do not offer reasons for a theist to continue in his faith. Also, for 
the same reason, they do not offer the atheist reasons why she ought to have belief.
I think that this can be explicated by the last sentence from the quote above by 
Calvin: "...the testimony of the spirit is more excellent than all reason." We 
discussed Plantinga's view above that argument is not the source of confidence in 
God. Reason cannot deliver such confidence, but it emanates from such beliefs in 
God that are continuously reaffirmed, for instance, by Calvin's concept of the 
sensus divinitatis. Again, this position is supported by their view of the problem of 
basicality. Ultimately, the reformed philosophers see that no such criterion of 
basicality can be a deliverance of reason, it cannot be justified. Because argument 
for a kind of belief rests upon basic propositions - the thrust of classical 
foundationalism - to argue for or against the rationality of belief in God or any
59John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1960), p. 79.
60George Mavrodes, "Jerusalem and Athens Revisited", in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(eds) Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983), 
p. 195.
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other kind of belief, is folly. This reveals their weak foundationalism. It is weak 
because they find it problematic to convincingly argue for a belief in the absence of 
a universal criterion of basicality. On the other hand, classical foundationalists 
argue for and against all species of beliefs given how they stand under the 
inquisition of their criteria of basicality.
This is not to imply that reformed epistemology is engaged in an exercise of 
what has recently been branded "negative theology" or "negative epistemology"61.
By "negative theology" I am referring to a philosophical standpoint which 
promotes the view that positive statements about w hat the correct religious system 
of belief arguably is, is an impossible task. A negative epistemologist would, 
perhaps, assert that because there are no justified criteria of basicality that enforce 
arguments for a kind of belief to be rational, we are left to censure the work of 
philosophers who think otherwise. Therefore, their stake in philosophy is purely 
one of critique and denunciation, via negativa. To support that they are not engaged 
in this species of philosophy we need only look at w hat Mavrodes writes about the 
program of reformed philosophy: "...they hold, for the most part, that the
61The accusation of "negative theology" has, to my mind, recently been a lamentable source of 
unconstrained denunciation. I want to indicate here the sense that this accusation often takes. It 
centers around the concern for a growing epistemological nihilism. This nihilism is thought to have 
been bom out of an attack on the possibilities of enlightenment reason, finding that positive 
argument for universal meaningful truths is doomed to failure. However, critical analysis of what is 
truly at stake in the arguments of negative theologians or epistemologists (a rigorous engagement 
with their views) is shamefully a rare occurrence. What "debate" there is often gives voice to a 
strong philosophical prejudice and invective. I say prejudice because when one is called a "negative 
theologian", or an "epistemological nihilist" it is done on the level of name-calling, while 
denouncing the "non-serious" philosophers out of hand. The extreme irony of this situation is that 
the ones who use these pejorative labels with great abandon often never extend the intellectual 
courtesy of the requisite diligent engagement with their arguments. As an example, Jacques 
Derrida is still too often thought of as an epistemological nihilist. But, if anyone took the requisite 
time that his demanding work calls for by being intellectually rigorous (regardless if that person 
shares Derrida's views) one would see that his thirty years of philosophical output has been 
dedicated to arguing against any temptation to turn epistemologically nihilistic. For evidence of this 
see his "Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion" in Limited Inc. (Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston, 111.,1990), pp 111-160; "Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy", trans. 
John P. Leavey, Oxford Literary Review, Vol. VI, No. 2., 1984, pp. 3-37; and "The Principle of Reason: 
The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils", Diacritics, Vol. XIX, 1983, pp. 3-20. Some of the few lucid 
and deeply critical discussions of negative epistemology can be found in the work of Christopher 
Norris. See the section "The American Connection", in his book Deconstruction: Theory and Practice 
(Routledge, London, 1991), pp. 90-122. And his essay, "Right You Are (If You Think So): Stanley 
Fish and the Rhetoric of Assent", in What's Wrong With Postmodernism?: Critical Theory and the Ends of 
Philosophy (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1990), pp. 77-133.
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characteristic and preferred way to hold theistic beliefs is in this basic way."62 
According to Mavrodes, one who holds belief in God in this basic way can be 
characterized as "The mature and well-instructed believer..."63 He parenthetically 
claims this to be their position "for the most part", because in a "...curious article 
[Nicholas] Wolterstorff appears to deny it."64 If one is going to be a theist the way 
to make the claim of rationality of your belief is to hold it in this epistemologically 
reformed way.
At any rate, the mature believer, in their view, sees his belief in God as basic 
for him, and thus in no need of epistemological intervention for its rational 
justification. Those who recognize belief in God as the foundation of their belief 
system do so rationally, and those who do not would certainly be rational if they 
chose to recognize this eventually in their own noetic structure. However, the 
reformists maintain, this does not mean that atheists are irrational in their atheism, 
or that it would be irrational for believers to abandon their faith. To tell someone 
that it would be rational for him to believe in God does not amount to giving 
reasons for him  to do so, nor would it insinuate that his belief, whatever it may be, 
is irrational. There is no paradox, reformed epistemology claims, in a person 
agreeing that it m ight be rational to believe in God, yet persist in his atheism. An 
atheist can recognize the rationality of a theist placing a religious proposition in 
the foundations of his noetic structure without adhering to the same concepts.
What this means is that two people who hold incommensurable beliefs rationally 
in respective noetic structures, can see the logical consistency and intelligibility of 
each others belief. As we have seen, Plantinga et al. view rational believers as 
those who obey the epistemic duties of one's own foundational belief system. 
Because this is the case for them, one can recognize how it is possible for another, 
with differing beliefs, to be rational. Therefore, in the view of reformed 
epistemology, the atheist and theist alike can see the rationality of another's belief 
system regardless of w hat kind of proposition is in the foundations of his own 
noetic structure without fear of paradox. Again, this does not mean that the atheist 
must like w hat the theist believes. In fact, the atheist may not see how a hum an
62George Mavrodes, "Jerusalem and Athens Revisited", in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(eds) Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983), 
p. 195.
63Ibid.
MIbid.
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being could possibly believe in God for a single minute, but he may see the sense 
of the belief system as a whole. He may be able to see the intelligibility of a 
Christian belief system; how and why one may affirm such beliefs and attitudes. 
The plurality of noetic structures is based upon logical considerations and 
intelligibility, regardless of w hat the content of the beliefs in question may be.
Like Plantinga, Mavrodes claims that the reformed sense of rationality is, in 
a weak sense, that of epistemic permission, and not of an epistemological demand. 
The project of reformed epistemology is precisely to express how belief systems 
can be viewed to be, and held, logically. Because they see belief in God as basic, it 
is the case that others can come to the faith and have it rationally. But, one can be 
rational in one's atheism as long as it is held foundationally, and the believer is 
dutiful in respect to its epistemic demands. This is the character of their epistemic 
permissibility and their weak foundationalism. They show that belief in God is 
rational, but one does not have to have it to be rational.
IV. Concluding Remarks
I enthusiastically support reformed epistemology's analysis and rejection of 
classical foundationalism, for the most part. With that project there is an 
unjustifiable postulation of rational criteria by which all potentially foundational 
propositions m ust be evaluated. The reformist questions this narrow view of 
rationality and shows that, with the absence of criteria to fully justify that 
requirement, one may place the belief in God in one's noetic structure; although 
this is in a weaker sense than the classical foundationalist aims for. Thus, by a 
weaker sense of rational justification their enterprise is characterized by an 
epistemic permissibility. The salient feature of their analysis of rational belief is 
that the basic proposition m ust be permissible within a noetic structure.
I also appreciate reformed epistemology for focusing on the contingencies of 
existence, environment, conditions and so on, which are absolutely relevant with 
respect to holding beliefs and the formation of beliefs. We get very little of this 
w ith the classical foundationalist, thus one begins to wonder how applicable their 
reflections are to hum an existence. They have focused on the problem of the 
criterion in order to make the forceful arguments that they wish to pu t forward.
i l l
But, w ithout a justifiable criterion of basicality they m ust concede that there is no 
justifiable rationale to constrain the domain of basic beliefs as they have wanted to 
assert. Also, in this connection, I appreciate the expressed acceptance by reformed 
epistemologists of a plurality of rational beliefs. This way we get away from the 
popular conception of philosophy, as expressed in common parlance, as that which 
discloses the particular acceptable truth.65 Plantinga et al. rightly uphold a view of 
philosophy that is not part of any community of ideas, and that seeks to clarify the 
structure and function of logical systems.
For the rem ainder of this chapter I will indicate why I think that 
Wittgenstein's view better serves us in the analysis of rational belief. In light of 
reformed epistemology we will see Wittgenstein's later work in detail in the next 
chapter. I will argue that reformed epistemology has uncanny similarity with 
W ittgenstein's work concerning the rationality of belief. We will see the 
characterization of basic beliefs by the reformists to be a little different from 
Wittgenstein's, however. The reformist's imagery of a belief structure being like a 
pyramid (with the basic beliefs comprising its foundation) is different for 
Wittgenstein. He prefers to take a less tidy view of the structure of belief. In the 
next chapter, we will consider the ground of belief and its corresponding structure 
after a discussion of Wittgenstein's general method of investigation.
Basic beliefs are the nexus of a form of being. They are our central beliefs 
which we cannot do without. Wittgenstein calls them "hinge" propositions, 
because all other beliefs rotate around them. They function in a belief system like 
an axis of meaningfulness. Hinge propositions are also dependent upon contextual 
considerations. W hat is a hinge proposition in one context may not be in another. 
Wittgenstein gave the example of the hinge proposition, "I have two hands" (which 
can be taken just like Malcolm's basic proposition, "Here is an ink-bottle") 
however, it may not be such if a wounded soldier was asked if his hands have been 
shot off. We see that the reformed epistemologists are in complete agreement with
65Such expressions come in the form of "What is your philosophy of life?" or "My philosophy of 
marriage is..." These uses of "philosophy" make the discipline seem as if it is solely occupied with 
professing very particular interpretations of reality. Therefore, the reformed epistemologists would 
agree with me that the philosopher's work is greater than what is involved in a person seeking to 
merely refine opinions, because philosophy must be concerned with vast and deeper logical issues 
such as: How is any form of meaningfulness possible? Is philosophy autonomous? And if so, how is 
philosophy's autonomy conditioned?
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Wittgenstein in terms of the importance placed on context and circumstance of 
belief. For the reformists, basic beliefs are dependent on circumstances within a 
noetic structure, which is similar to the hinge propositions Wittgenstein discusses. 
However, W ittgenstein drops the foundationalist imagery of rational belief. We 
will see why Wittgenstein views basic beliefs to be implicit in our actions. They 
are rarely, if ever, brought to the level of cognizance. Because of what results from 
this W ittgensteinian view, I will argue that reformed epistemology has no reason 
to hold onto their residual foundationalistic concerns and foci.
Why is this? I think that Wittgenstein rids himself of the foundationalist 
picture of justified belief because basic propositions are the only ones that are 
focused upon for logicality. If a basic proposition is rational, then one can easily 
build a corresponding rational noetic structure on top of it. The claim of rationality 
always refers to the basic belief that is held by the subject for the foundationalist. 
Therefore, the primary and necessary focus is on basic beliefs. This is especially the 
case in the work of reformed epistemologists.
Another problem related to the above emerges. Reformed epistemology has 
such a relented sense of basicality one can think of any belief (held by an individual 
or a community) that could possibly be held foundationally in a noetic structure. 
The reformist focuses on describing a single basic belief which is held in one 
particular moment. We will consider the work of the Wittgensteinian D. Z. Phillips 
who shows that when one considers all of the basic beliefs a person holds, one may 
notice that some of their basic propositions clash w ith others. Philosophers ought 
not concern themselves with the crystalline purity of a single pyramid formation, 
but with all of our beliefs. He investigates various empirical propositions that 
clash with religious ones. Phillips reveals that not all beliefs can be held rationally 
because problems arise when a person holds conflicting basic beliefs. For the 
reformists to make this claim as well, they would need to abandon 
foundationalism. The reformists cannot argue this way because they are bound to 
analyzing a single basic religious proposition in relation to a single circumstance 
in which it is held. Their philosophical system and analysis is quite clean and 
crystalline as a result: it is easy to follow. But their tidiness comes at a price. By 
isolating an experience of holding a basic belief, one can no longer see the 
possibility that other beliefs (which a person may still hold while experiencing a
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religious proposition as basic) may cause conflict, confusion and unintelligibility 
:or a person. Because they aim to show that religious beliefs are rational, and 
exclusively in a foundationalist way, they m ust isolate and explain w hat makes a 
>ingle religious proposition basic. This can only be accomplished, in turn, by 
solating a moment of experience which would illustrate that a particular belief 
and it alone) is foundational. This inevitably involves the isolation of one noetic 
itructure a person may have (for instance, a religious one) from others (for 
nstance, empirical ones pertaining to cause and effect). This is the reason why 
Wittgenstein considers belief systems to be extraordinarily messy. It m ust be made 
explicit that noetic structures, or contexts of belief, overlap. Perhaps we have 
beliefs that we hold as basic, and that are considered and operative in all (or at least 
n  many) contexts of belief. When a kind of basic belief in God is held in a 
particular moment, we still hold other non-religious basic beliefs also, i.e. the 
lelief that one is bound to the earth by gravity, etc.
We heard Plantinga argue that believing in one's ability to flap one's arms 
end fly about the room is not basic because it is not up to the individual to discern 
vhat they would like their basic beliefs to be. We considered their view that what 
i« basic for a person is discerned by communal discourse. But, for Wittgenstein the 
nason that the belief that one can flap one's arms and fly is not basic is because it 
violates everything that we know about hum an physical capabilities. Most 
inportantly, if a person can flap his arms and fly, then I have no idea what it means 
to know anything. If I know anything at all, it is that people cannot flap their arms 
aid fly about a room. If I am wrong about that, then I am at a loss as how to even 
tegin investigating the very concept of knowledge. Knowledge would be imbued 
with such mystification that I would not know what grounds or foundations of such 
a tru th  could possibly be like. We must keep in m ind all of our basic beliefs that 
we hold when we consider issues of rationality, because some may clash with 
ohers in a particular circumstance. For Wittgenstein, we m ust be aware of a 
subject's "form of life" when considering issues concerning rational belief. This 
concept points towards a person's general sense of meaningfulness.
The hermeneuticist, Hans-Georg Gadamer, nicely expresses the problem 
surrounding the isolation of a single horizon of being (the foundation of one's
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reliefs about reality) while ignoring others. In his Truth and Method66 He writes:
...the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more an isolated
horizon of the present in itself than there are historical horizons which have to be acquired.
Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by themselves.67
It is this that I will insist upon: the analysis of the rationality of a religious 
belief cannot be carried out by only considering single instances of a belief being 
leld apart from other beliefs that a person holds. As Gadamer says, the very 
(oncept of understanding is at stake here. A consequence of this is, if we consider 
dl the basic beliefs that we hold, as we move through many circumstances and 
environments we may be compelled to abandon some and adopt others. This is 
vhat is involved in understanding oneself and the world. If a person faces 
conflicting beliefs she may abandon one or both which requires a greater 
mderstanding of them; not of what those propositions mean apart from each other, 
tut how they stand with respect to all of the beliefs that she holds. She understands 
tie totality of her beliefs, how and why one belief relates to another, and how and 
vhy one belief is incommensurable with another, by considering all of her beliefs. 
This is the wider picture of understanding one's beliefs, oneself, one's community 
aad all the world. This also makes possible understanding what is religious and 
vhat is not. We know the grammar of religion by contrasting it with a conflicting 
g-ammatical belief. This can only be done by looking at what all of our beliefs 
nean in relation to each other. We must consider all of the beliefs that we have, 
nore or less simultaneously, in order to understand the rationality of our beliefs 
axrnt being in the world.
To consider how a basic belief may clash with another, leads one to ask what 
tie role of superstition is in all of this. Philosophers often charge some believers 
with superstition, as do some religious believers of other religious believers. We 
hive seen that Plantinga wishes to not let the "gate to irrationalism and 
superstition" swing open. But, we have also seen that he cannot stop it from doing 
so. There are many beliefs which Plantinga could consider to be rational, yet 
countless others would characterize as superstitious. If I heard of a community 
whose members believed that they could flap their arms and fly, I would be
66Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Continuum, New York, 1993).
67bid., p. 306. Gadamer's emphasis.
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wiling to call their belief superstitious: this is a belief that cannot be rational 
bezause it violates common sense beliefs that everyone has. Common sense is 
bound to what is generally known about what the human body can and cannot do. 
TKs is not like a community having the belief that they are the fastest and 
strongest runners on earth, like the Tarahumara tribe in northern Mexico may 
claim. Everyone knows that humans can run and at various speeds and strengths. 
Wf know that there must be a community whose members do it the best. But, we 
can't imagine any hum an being taking flight by their own self-propulsion. This is 
a confusion because there is no sense to it that could be common to all. If one could 
flao their arms and fly, then we would ask if that person is hum an or not.
It is Wittgenstein's treatment of this issue that I feel results in a far better 
alternative to w hat the reformists offer. For him the sense of reasonableness is 
fom d within a context of belief that is organized in a much more ragged manner, 
than the sublimed or idealized structure of knowledge asserted by the 
foundationalist and reformists. Religious beliefs are not such things that we can 
map out and analyze as if they were blocks of stone that form a pyramid. The 
foundationalist structure of belief cannot be justifiably held as a normative 
conception which lies outside of all particular instances of belief. In this 
connection, we will see why Wittgenstein says that logical structures must be 
shown rather than said. It is only when we look at a context in which a particular 
belief is held, that we will be able to see the logicality of that belief. The 
foundationalist structure of belief m ust be given up, because it can be shown that it 
is not the logical standard for all rational beliefs. D. Z. Phillips notes:
In the growth of Reformed epistemology in America, we often find the assumption that 
any common inquiry into religious belief or unbelief m ust involve an appeal to a common 
rationality by which they are assessed. But, inquiry may show that no such standard 
exists.68
That inquiry is one that shows logicality rather than idealizing or stipulating
it.
Even though reformed epistemology rejects classical foundationalism for 
their arbitrary exclusion of religious propositions from those that are considered
“D. Z. Phillips, W ittgenstein and Religion (St. Martin's Press, London, 1993), p. xx. Phillips' 
emphasis.
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Dasic (which leads to their claim that a foundational belief does not require a 
:riterion of rationality) they still speak of rational belief as if it is this kind of 
general inquiry that Phillips discusses. The inquiry that Phillips has in m ind is of 
he sort that W ittgenstein suggests. This is an inquiry that seeks conceptual clarity 
)y describing the role beliefs have in a context, including concepts of rationality 
md the structure of belief systems. The reformists have the foundational view of 
inowledge governing all varieties of belief systems. All believers, from theist to 
itheist, must be analyzed by this view of rational belief. Wittgenstein argues that 
jational belief is not an idealized or sublimed notion of all rational belief 
jtructures. Instead of philosophically formulating "rational belief" and seeing all 
varieties by that formulation, we ought to take examples of contexts of belief and 
describe what is meant by "rational" for the believers within those contexts. Once 
ve describe all concepts in a belief system we may see problems arise, conflicting 
senses of belief, which would aid in staving off the anything goes criticism.
W ittgenstein's perspective provides illuminating clarity and simultaneously 
cispenses with the foundationalist picture of knowledge.
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CHAPTER THREE
Wittgenstein and the Grammar, "Ground", Logical Structure, 
and the Intelligibility of Religious Belief
Tantum homo habet de scientia, quantum operatur.1 
St. Francis of Assisi, "Mirror of Perfection"
I. Introduction
In this chapter I intend to explicate the later work of Wittgenstein in light of 
the reformists view. We will see that Wittgenstein and reformed epistemology 
share many ideas pertaining to the rationality of religious belief. Both the 
reformists and Wittgenstein view rational religious belief to be a matter of the 
relationship between propositions held within a particular context of belief or 
noetic structure. Rational belief is not as the classical foundationalist would have it. 
It is not an issue of discovering the criterion of basicalitv for rational religious 
propositions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. In the tirst section 1 
will describe Wittgenstein's general methodology of philosophical investigation. 
We will see the importance he places on the context of belief and problems that 
emerge when one philosophizes independently of contexts. For Wittgenstein there 
is no sense to a general form of investigation into religious belief. In comparing 
the differences between contexts of belief, there is no logical commonality that 
exists between them. There are no necessary and sufficient conditions of 
religiousness. The sense to the operative concepts of a religious belief are 
indispensably linked to the particularities of its context. As a result there is no 
sense to a general concept of religion, God, the Divine and so on. With this general
’"A man has only so much knowledge as he puts to work."
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introduction to Wittgenstein's method of inquiry we will see several key 
sinilarities with the reformist's position.
In the second section I will consider the structure of belief systems and its 
grmnds. I will describe how Wittgenstein's view of the structure of belief is 
diferent to the reformists in the sense that basic propositions do not comprise a 
fomdation where non-basic propositions are seemingly placed on top of them.
Thy are like a hinge on which non-basic propositions turn.2 By this difference of 
imigery we will see some slight differences of how belief structures are held 
together. For Wittgenstein a basic proposition gets its sense by the non-basic 
prepositions that hold it in place at the center of a context of belief. The 
preposition is implicit in our activity and not the focal point for a claim of 
ratonality. For the reformists a basic proposition is the focal point of rationality.
If a proposition can be described as basic in a noetic structure then the non-basic 
prepositions are understood in reference to that basic proposition. We will see that 
theWittgensteinian and reformist positions are similar but with fundamental 
differences.
Certain philosophers who are influenced by Wittgenstein have unfounded 
assimptions about reformed epistemology. I will consider an argument made by 
D. 1 Phillips who claims that the work of the reformed philosophers can be 
sunmed up as a Calvinist project with the sole interest of showing that that 
Cal/inist Christian belief is rational. By considering how a Wittgensteinian view 
coud elicit this argument, but how it is unfounded, we will achieve a better 
uncerstanding of the nature of reformed epistemology as well as Wittgenstein's 
phiosophical concerns.
The third section will take us to the starting point of my criticism of the 
reformist project. For Wittgenstein, what lies at the bottom of contexts of belief is 
different from what the reformists claim is there. He finds at the very bottom 
meaningful action and reaction to experiences in the world that cannot be described 
in terms of a single rational proposition of belief.3 Meaningful actions and 
reactions cannot be said to be rational or irrational, they are just there, as 
W itgenstein says, like our life. This is not to say that beliefs are non-rational.
2A dscussion of this central idea can be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty (Harper and 
Row, New York, 1972), §341-343.
3A discussion of this central idea can be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations 
(Basi Blackwell, Oxford, 1978), §479-484 and his On Certainty (Harper and Row, New York, 1972), 
§166, §204-211, and §259.
Rationality takes part in an established system of belief in terms of dictating the 
sense of the operative concepts in it.
Wittgenstein argues that logical propositions can be shown,4 but cannot be 
said to lie at the base of a noetic structure. For instance, a basic belief (the logic of 
basicality) is shown by the examples that the reformists offer of that kind of belief, 
e. g., "God is to be thanked and praised", and so on. But, reacting to the immediate 
attainment of a truth is prior to calling it logical. And we will see how some basic 
propositions of logic cannot be conceptually formulated. Wittgenstein asserts that 
logical structure cannot be described, but if we look at the practice of language we 
will see it.5 They cannot be said. We can only grasp what they amount to by being 
shown their application in a particular context. To a great extent reformed 
epistemology already has moved in this direction. They work also at showing 
basicality. By rejecting a criterion of basicality, they suggest that if a belief can be 
described as basic, then it is foundational. Nevertheless, they do consider basic 
beliefs as the locus of epistemological inquiry. In this sense they have some 
reliance on the foundational picture of knowledge as expressing rational belief.
The reformist does not see basic beliefs as that which are non-interrogated and 
precognitive for us like Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein this means that they are 
held at the center of a context of belief because all of the surrounding non-basic 
beliefs secure it in place.
For the reformist, at the base of a noetic structure is the inherently logical 
basic belief. The existence of basic beliefs are what establish rational noetic 
structures, i.e., the foundational picture of knowledge. A basic belief, for them, is 
where rationality is derived. Throughout this section we will see that Wittgenstein 
has an inclusive and comprehensive approach to rationality. The basic beliefs in a 
context are taken for granted; they make sense of the non-basic beliefs and put them 
to work. Basic beliefs are like general managers. Imagine a productive and well 
reputed business. We may not know who the head boss is, but we can be sure that 
whomever it is forms the foundation of the business. We could seek the boss out to 
verify our claim. But by seeing the practices of the business and their success, we 
can conclude that they are receiving solid and focused direction. Yet it is the 
employees who are doing all of the work and bringing repute to the boss. After all,
4A discussion of this central idea can be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty (Harper and 
Row, New York, 1972), §36-37 and his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Humanities Press International, 
Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1974), §4.021, §4.022, §5.5561, §5.557, and §5.61.
5Ludwig Wittgenstein On Certainty (Harper and Row, New York, 1972), §501.
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tie work and production is what is important. The boss could be viewed as very 
nuch behind the scenes. I think that for Wittgenstein, a context of belief, and the 
basic and non-basic beliefs within it, could be thought of in the same manner. To 
speak of the various aspects of the business is to speak of the boss as well. To speak 
cf non basic beliefs is to speak of basic beliefs as well.
The difference between Wittgenstein and reformed epistemology involves a 
cifference in epistemological focus. Wittgenstein investigates an entire context of 
belief by seeking the sense in the relationships between the non-basic beliefs. The 
reformists on the other hand, at least in some sense, have an exclusive view of 
iivestigating knowledge. When it comes to rational belief systems they observe 
tie basic beliefs and exclude the non-basic beliefs. They do not completely ignore 
ron-basic beliefs of course, but their focus is on the basic ones. If they secure the 
ntional standing of a basic belief, they seem to think that the non-basic ones will 
fill into place. It is this focus that expresses their residual interests in 
foundationalism. Given the results from the reformists form of investigation we 
will see that Wittgenstein has a much preferable position.
The last substantive issue that I will address is the greatest difficulty that 
remains for reformed epistemology; a problem that stems from their focus on basic 
beliefs. They cannot guard against the accusation that just any kind of belief can be 
teld rationally. Some will want to say that Wittgenstein must be committed to an 
"mything goes" epistemology as well. Any kind of belief system must be accepted 
as legitimate by this view, since logicality is internal to a belief system. Therefore, 
to make claims of rationality or irrationality, one m ust investigate the sense of 
propositions as they are held within a particular context of belief. This question 
stems from a classical epistemological perspective which maintains that the domain 
o: rational religious belief is much narrower than Wittgenstein shows it to be.
Traditional epistemologists assume that religiousness is linked by a single 
principle, so what counts as rational for them is equally as narrow. Given what 
will have been said about the need for a clear use of concepts in a context of belief 
ir order to make claims of rational and irrational beliefs (and that there is no 
intelligibility to a general conception of religion) this criticism loses force.
I will further argue that w ith Wittgenstein we can let reason come in at the 
rijht place, e.g. in the context of belief. In divergent belief systems, the concept of 
rationality, religion, God, prayer and so on, take very different and often 
ircommensurable forms.
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Thinking that any belief can be rational is untenable in the face of the 
particular aspects of Wittgenstein's view. We must seek a deeper understanding of 
the functionality between language-games and why some beliefs cannot be held 
Because of grammatical conflicts. Particularly, I will discuss the interrelatedness 
Between contexts of belief. By speaking of religious contexts of belief as having an 
internal logic, and not subject to a general logical form of propositions, some may 
cbject that I am presenting religious beliefs as coarsely isolated from all other 
forms of belief. If that were the case then what I accuse reformed epistemology of 
(:he inability to argue against the anything goes argument) applies to my view 
also. If religious language-games are logically isolated from other language- 
games, then just any belief can be justified merely by saying that it has a unique 
logic. We could not say that some beliefs are fantastic or superstitious. However, I 
will show that there are criteria of meaningfulness of non-religious beliefs already 
operational in the life of a believer which conflict with some forms of religious 
beliefs. Thus, we may show how to guard against irrationalism; and by utilizing a 
Wittgensteinian contemplative form of philosophy as a positive force, we may 
prevent religiousness from being confused by the fantastic. And this is the 
substantial point that the reformists cannot make.
II. Wittgenstein on the Possibility and Limits of a General Form of 
Propositions: the Indispensability of Particulars
A. Language-games and conceptual grammar: the problem w ith 
metaphysics
One main thrust of Wittgenstein's later work was to rid philosophers of the 
idea that logic is prior to all experience, or is the a priori order of the world. Logic, 
that which discerns sense from nonsense, is only found within language. The 
notion of sense and nonsense takes hold as one learns a language from childhood. 
One is raised to communicate with others and within communication is the ability 
to discern sense from nonsense. Wittgenstein shows that language-games a n  
bound by an internally related logic that orders the sense that is made within it, 
and not by a logic that orders and links all language-games from the outside
It simply will not do to say that the language-game of obeying orders, for 
instance, has a particular logic about it in as much as we think of it generally. It
122
would be superficial to describe the logic of that language-game as merely 
involving the enactment of what one is ordered to do. Even though it does indicate 
a kind of concept, it elucidates nothing of the very important differences in 
grammar between various modes of obedience. By "grammar" I mean the 
characteristics of a language-game that would reveal it as a unique kind of 
obedience. To comprehend the grammar of a concept is to grasp the sense of it. To 
understand what is involved in a particular case of obeying is to be clear about the 
context in which that concept has a role.
One needs to draw a distinction between what Wittgenstein calls "language- 
games" and "forms of life". The grammar of a language-game m ust be elucidated 
to become clear about the sense and nonsense of it. But how is this actually done? 
The description of a language-game itself does not do this. To be clear about the 
sense of a language-game one must take into consideration the form of life in 
which it occurs by elucidating its grammar. Take the example given above 
regarding the language-game of obedience. The two forms of obedience that come 
to my mind are that of obeying one's parents as a child, and obeying the state. The 
love and care of the parents is often central to the former, whereas it is not the case 
in the latter. But even so, there are sizeable differences in the grammar of obeying 
the state when considering the different forms of life that that concept can have a 
role. For instance, a person that obeys the state by paying taxes may do so within a 
form of life where she feels a civil duty, responsibility as a citizen, and joyful 
participation as a subject of a state. However, another person may obey the state in 
paying taxes, albeit grudgingly. That person may feel helpless because he cannot 
do otherwise, and thus feel a sense of being denigrated and deprecated by an 
authoritarian regime.
While following a common assumption above, I have taken a certain kind of 
love to be central to the obedience of one's parents and not to the obedience to the 
state. It can be recognized that this concept of love could be reversed as befitting 
the obedience to the state and not to one's parents. For instance, we often hear talk 
about "the fatherland" in reference to some countries where the subject feels an 
intimate father/child connection to the state. This person may feel a kind of love 
relationship to the state, and through it endeavor to fulfill his duties to it, which 
would involve obedience to its laws and policies. We can also imagine an 
adolescent sixteen year old, obeying his parents in a way that has nothing to do 
with intimate feelings or sentiments for them, but acting with the mere intention of
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not causing any personal friction in his life, thus obeying them and tolerating their 
orders. The language-game of obeying gets its sense by describing the grammar of 
the form of life in which it is embedded.
In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein considers "the great question" to 
be: is there "a general form of propositions" or a logical commonality between 
language-games? He challenges the idea that there is a rule, a common logicality, 
that runs through all language-games that can be discovered in order to disclose 
language's essence. This discovery would bring about the ideality of language or 
the metalanguage. Such a discovery has been thought to be the logical form that 
would be the basis for metaphysics -- the rule(s) that is (are) essential for 
everything. However, in Wittgenstein's introductory statements to Philosophical 
Investigations, prior to his argumentation against the idea of a unifying principle of 
language-games, he gives a distinct warning of how not to begin such an 
investigation. With the concept of games as his example, he claims that we ought 
to resist saying something like "There m ust be something common, or they would 
not be called 'games.'"6 He then states, and this is a crucial warning to which we 
must give close attention, that to resist this attitude we must commit ourselves to 
looking rather than thinking. By looking at the character of a particular language- 
game and describing its grammar we allow it to show itself. The point of his 
advice, that we must look rather than think, directs us to the proper method to 
reveal the differences in grammar. By looking and describing what conceptual 
differences exist in our ordinary language we can resist the temptation of 
discovering a general meaning of concepts. For traditional philosophy, declaring a 
general meaning of a concept involves discovering the essence of it through a 
rational investigation. By differentiating between the characteristics of what seem 
to be similar games we will see that there is no unifying principle running through 
or underlying all of them.
Wittgenstein still recognizes that concepts have some commonalties in 
general. But, as we have just said, strict clarity is grasped by a concept's use in a 
particular context. Generalities can only give us a modicum of conceptual clarity, 
because on some level they remain superficial. So, Wittgenstein suggests that we 
m ust not forget any general usage of, for instance, the concept of games. We still 
use a general form of the concept in certain circumstances; like on a rainy day we 
may say to another "Would you like to play a game? The weather is too awful to do
6Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978), §66.
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anything outside/' The concept of game here refers to one of many kinds of games 
that can be played indoors. This is an example of a set of concepts which are bound, 
as Wittgenstein says, by "family resemblances" because of some similarity between 
them. He writes:
...for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colours of 
eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross... —And I shall say: 'games' form a 
family.
And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call 
something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a - direct - relationship with several 
things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect 
relationship to other things we call the same name.
But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions - 
namely the disjunction of all their common properties." - I should reply: Now you are only 
playing with words.7
The reason that we can appeal to family resemblances is because it provides 
a purpose or use in ordinary discourse. "Family resemblances" is not meaningful 
because it expresses the essence of a group of concepts, it is meaningful because it 
shows how we ordinarily group concepts together.
So, family resemblances, then, are by no means essences. For Wittgenstein 
we m ust pay attention to the use of our ordinary language rather than 
philosophically constructing convoluted and abstract notions indicating essences 
because they cause confusion and unintelligibility. It is in our ordinary use of 
language where these differences are crucial, because they demand an 
understanding of a kind of sense, and therefore, resist an indication of an essential 
meaning. Wittgenstein writes:
When philosophers use a word - 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 'proposition', 'name' - 
and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever 
actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? What we do is to 
bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.8
For Wittgenstein, to "try to grasp the essence of the thing", involves the 
assumption that there is, in some sense, a postulated and essential logical nature of 
it which can be discovered in the metaphysical. The reason that W ittgenstein 
suggests that we must ask if the essence of a concept is actually used the same way 
in a language-game is because he wants to draw the distinction between idle and 
working concepts. Metaphysical propositions are idle because in ordinary 
discourse we never make use of philosophical abstractions. The role and meaning
7Ibid., §67.
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of an object is always contingent upon the context in which it is used. In an 
introductory philosophy course when discussing metaphysics, students might be 
asked to interrogate the essence of chair. They are asked to discover w hat is 
essential about a chair. What is logically necessary for a chair to be a chair. 
Responses like "all chairs m ust have four legs" are eliminated because some have 
three legs and bar stools can't really be said to have any legs at all. A response like 
"chairs are to be sat on" w on't hold either because a chair in a room which is used 
as a plant stand is still called a chair even though nobody ever sits in it. Students 
will be able to see that the concept of chair has many uses; and it is by the use of 
chairs in our life and ordinary talk that gives the concept its meaningfulness. But 
the question then is: what would we mean by an essence of chair?
Wittgenstein brings to our attention that metaphysical propositions are 
pseudo-explanatory and distort the phenomena that we investigate. Metaphysical 
propositions act as if they explain the meaning of something by referring to 
essential truths regardless of what a given proposition may mean in the context in 
which it is used. What is involved here is the thought that the meaning of our 
experiences is subordinate to some realm of context-independent ideality of 
meaningfulness. In some sense the essence of an experience awaits explanation by 
a metaphysical investigation. We may have thoughts about the meaning of some 
experiences, the metaphysician will assert, but it is up to metaphysics to show us 
what we really did experience, and what it really and necessarily means. In 
considering this issue Wittgenstein thinks about what is involved in the 
metaphysics of aesthetic judgements. In considering music, he writes that one may 
be inclined to ask:
"What is it like to know the tempo in which a piece of music should be played?" And the 
idea suggests itself that there must be a paradigm somewhere in our mind, and that we have 
adjusted the tempo to conform to that paradigm. But in most cases if someone asked me 
"How do you think this melody should be played?", I will, as an answer, just whistle it in a 
particular way, and nothing will have been present to my mind but the tune actually whistled  
(not an image of that).9
Wittgenstein questions the intelligibility of what an essential tempo would 
be for any melody. I am familiar with many different interpretations of the 
American national anthem. I have heard brass bands play it at a very slow, even 
melancholic, tempo; symphonic renditions that have in mind a particular tempo to
8Ibid., §116.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Harper and Row, New York, 1965), p. 166. 
Wittgenstein's emphases.
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jit a grand and stately occasion; as well it being sung by soul or gospel singers who 
have "played" with the tempo (speeding up and slowing down) which is a style of 
soul and gospel music. One point of Wittgenstein's is that to think that there is a 
paradigm of the American national anthem, an essence of it which explains how it 
ought to be played, is to be confused about that paradigm actually existing 
somewhere in the metaphysical realm. Also to think that there is an essence of the 
cnthem, a fixed way that it ought to be played, we can expect other performances 
contrary to that paradigm to be denounced or argued against. However, such an 
argument, as we have just seen, is based on a non-existent essence. All that we can 
say exists are the many different tempos at work in the many different 
interpretations of the anthem.10 To say to another that an ideal tempo of the 
American national anthem exists is to leave that person dumbfounded. How is that 
knowledge to be apprehended? What would knowing that be like? To think such 
an essence of the anthem exists is, therefore, confused. Furthermore, if one said that 
there is a definitive tempo of the anthem, and thereby critiqued all other divergent 
forms of the anthem in relation to that paradigm, those other forms would be 
distorted and violated by making the paradigm a necessary reference to it. That 
paradigm would act as an ideal representation of the anthem, thus a critique of a 
divergent form would involve trying to hear that paradigmatic representation in 
the divergent form. As Wittgenstein intimates, we ought to pay attention to the 
way that melodies are actually played. That way we can be clear about the tempo 
that is actually at work while not confusing it with any sort of ideality of the 
anthem.
There is however a popular aesthetic paradigm which is not to be taken as an 
essential paradigm of the piece. For most people the American national anthem 
cannot be played in just any tempo. This statement may lead one to object that then 
there is some kind of essential paradigm of the piece. This issue involves 
recognizing and understanding that there is an agreed upon sense of the piece.11 
People know the anthem because they have heard it before. By hearing all of the
10A composer once told me that his most psychologically challenging moment came when he 
instructed a quartet which was rehearsing one of his pieces, to play his music the "right" way. The 
musicians, along with many master teachers in the hall at the time, had to impress upon him the 
simple truth that there is nothing strictly essential in the sheet music that he wrote. There is only a 
very vague sense of his piece that remains for the musicians. Once a composer gives sheet music to 
a group of musicians, the music is strictly theirs. The composer must remain silent, because the 
musicians are the ones who will actually play it for an audience.
”1 also have in mind the experiments conducted by the jazz saxophonist, John Coltrane in the mid­
fifties. He noticed the obvious limitations of the instrument, that a player can only sound one note at
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variations of it through time, one knows a traditional version from other highly 
stylized ones. But, for example, we could imagine such a slow tempo, like that of 
an exaggerated dirge perhaps, where people would say, "That is not the national 
Anthem!" For many that tempo would be utterly unbefitting of the sense of the 
piece. Though there is a popular aesthetic, there certainly is not an essence, or ideal 
paradigm of tempo at which it m ust be played.
We must resist thinking that there are common rules, or necessary ideals, 
that run through all language-games, and once we turn our minds to the sense in 
ordinary language we will see this fact. It must be made explicit that when 
Wittgenstein insists on elucidating the sense in ordinary language, while resisting 
"the craving for generality", he is not pointing towards that logical space in which 
the true and false are to be found. The philosophical issue, concerning the use of 
metaphysical concepts versus particular ones which are contextually delimited, is 
cne of meaning and intelligibility.
B. Wittgenstein and the homogeneity of the religious
Analogously with religion, a necessary logical principle is thought to be 
running through or underlying all beliefs of religious traditions, and furthermore, 
the various beliefs within each tradition. This thinking is what seems to be 
orchestrating and motivating a philosopher to seek or discover justifications, 
foundations, presuppositions, and assessments of all belief; the motivation of the 
strong sense of a post-enlightenment philosophy. We saw in the first chapter a 
rather lengthy overview of that project. This project comes under scrutiny with 
Wittgenstein, and calls for the philosopher to bring his language back from the 
metaphysical to its ordinary use.
How does this relate to the project of the reformed epistemologists 
particularly? They rightly give up on trying to forge a hard and fast position (like
a time. So, he began playing what was called "sheets of sound". He concentrated on many notes at 
the same time, which resulted in sections of quick and sharp blurts of notes that seemingly made no 
music sense (the notes certainly did not sustain a melody or even a musical phrase). Critics at the 
time could make no sense of it. It was just aggravating noise for them. Then he began to explain 
and share what he was trying to do. The public, then, made sense of it; it was no longer confusing, 
but understandable. Many did not like it (which w as/is, of course, not required) but he did have 
reasons for playing like that. Now John Coltrane is considered one of the greatest jazz musicians of 
all time. What was his confusing experiment, by and large, is now considered standard. This 
example illustrates that the structure and sense of music in not based on metaphysical 
presuppositions, but a common and shared understanding of what is actually being played.
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strong foundationalism) which states what the religious belief must be. They give 
a lot of room for many divergent beliefs. So, thus far we can see that the reformists 
are in agreement with Wittgenstein in that a religious belief is indispensably 
contingent upon a unique context. They are both interested in investigating 
religious belief from the particular perspective of any given believer. They 
seemingly ignore such notions as what the essence of religion is. Both reformed 
epistemology and Wittgenstein would consider a H indu's beliefs from within the 
context of Hinduism, and not see Hinduism against the backdrop of w hat all 
religion amounts to, whatever that may mean. All of the operative concepts would 
have to come out of a Hindu culture. They would both recognize that for this 
believer all of his religious considerations are bound to that culture which gives a 
very particular sense to what it means to be religious for him.
There are differences however. The reformists m ust know the particulars 
surrounding one's belief in order to see how it is held basically because they 
believe that religious belief is held basically in many different ways and in relation 
to many different circumstances. The Wittgensteinian must know the particulars 
just to understand the sense of the concepts that one has in one's context of belief, 
while not assuming that one's beliefs must fit a general paradigm. Wittgenstein 
takes the importance of contextual considerations further in saying that the 
meaning of "knowledge", and the "rational" are also contingent upon context. 
There is a rem nant of the "craving for generality" problem in the work of the 
reformists. In some sense, they take rationality to be a contextually independent 
meaningful concept. Reformed epistemologists seemingly suggest that the rational 
is the foundational picture of knowledge, and the picture of knowledge expresses 
the essence of rationality for them. So, a certain kind of foundationalism is a 
meaningful picture of knowledge to be applied to all contexts of belief.
Wittgenstein has no picture of knowledge in mind at all when it comes to rational 
belief, primarily because any general picture of knowledge will prove to be 
superficial. He is concerned with the logic of ordinary language. He merely wants 
to show that the meaningfulness of religious belief is internal to a context and not 
grounded in the metaphysical. As this is the case with what religion amounts to, it 
also applies to concepts of rationality. The reformed use of the foundational picture 
of knowledge expresses an intuition about how they see propositions working in a 
believer's life: some propositions will form the grounds of a belief system and the 
others will not.
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But Wittgenstein still has more to say about the problem of a general form of 
propositions. If we take the concept of games it seems obvious enough that all the 
james that exist do not relate to one common essence of "gameness". Each 
particular game has rules and sense that are complete in and of itself w ithout any 
recessary reference to other games. Some may wish to say that there are striking 
similarities between games, however, and wish to give a unifying principle. For 
example, chess and checkers, it could be said, have great similarity; so much in fact 
hat there must be an essence linking them. But, the sense of chess and checkers can 
cnly be found in contemplating chess or checkers. The rules that govern both 
games cannot be fused into one another without great confusion and loss of 
identity of the meaning of either chess or checkers. We could say that they are both 
played on boards of alternating colored squares. But that certainly does not 
iluminate the sense of w hat is meant by either game; that is to say it is a superficial 
inderstanding of chess and checkers. The particular rules that govern each game 
(vhich yields its sense, particular characteristics, an understanding of how it is 
played in opposition to other games, or the objectives of it) are merely different or 
incommensurable to other games. We could say that a necessary characteristic of 
ttem is that they are both board games. But, again, even though this is true, it 
remains superficial and the identity of each particular game is not grasped by it.
Tie way a game is played, its rules and the sense of it, is internal to the game itself. 
Cne does not consult chess in order to comprehend checkers. One learns how to 
pay chess by being taught w hat its rules are.
In a similar fashion the beliefs in all religious traditions cannot be fused 
together in production of a universal essence of religiousness without distorting or 
ignoring the character of a particular tradition. All religious traditions cannot be 
identified as one homogeneous set ingrained in a common logic of belief. The 
giammar of a belief, or the description of the character of a particular tradition, 
brings about its clear understanding and identity. Only through its grammar can 
w? comprehend the meaning of a belief.
I would like to offer an example of a thinker who has tried to link all 
re’igious traditions by a common principle. Take the American "mythologist", 
Joseph Campbell. In his book, The Hero With a Thousand Faces12 he finds support in 
Jung's notion of the "collective unconscious", and a general attitude toward
12Jcseph Campbell, The Hero With a Thousand Faces (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1973).
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religion in Freud,13 to show that the heroes of religious traditions are linked in that 
their mythologies (narratives that disclose the tradition's teachings) revolve around 
an essential archetype of the "hero's journey". He shows how the Buddha, (in the 
oriental world) and Jesus, Moses, and Mohamed (in the occidental world) as well as 
Aeneas and Prometheus (in ancient Roman and Greek mythology respectively) - 
who represent only a few of the heroes that he focuses on in his book - all take part 
in a quest for truth in a manner that is structurally, or logically, the same.
I should comment on what he thinks he is doing in this project. In the 
preface of his book he quotes Sigmund Freud with approval, arguing that:
The truths contained in religious doctrines are after all so distorted and systematically 
disguised...that the mass of humanity cannot recognize them as truth.14
For Campbell, as for Freud, the meaning of religious doctrine is so 
symbolically cloaked that it remains obscure, cryptic, and muted. Therefore w hat is 
needed, in order to attain the real meaning of them, is a deeper investigative 
attention. For Campbell we m ust clear up the manifest impression that religious 
teaching makes upon us. We m ust intellectually intervene and discover what is 
really being expressed in religious doctrine, because the latent obscurities are only 
being perpetuated by leaving religious communities to teach what they always 
have about the meaning of their sacred tales. Religious communities have always 
taught their stories at face value, so to speak. But, we must apprehend that which 
will help us reveal its true meaning by removing the fog that a religious doctrine is 
engulfed in, and which sustains it as an orphic phenomenon. Campbell writes in 
the introduction to his book:
It is the purpose of the present book to uncover some of the truths disguised for us under the 
figures of religion and mythology by bringing together a multitude of not-too-difficult 
examples and letting the ancient meaning become apparent of itself...Once we have learned 
to read again their symbolic language, it requires no more than the talent of an anthologist 
to let their teaching be heard. But, first we must learn the grammar of the symbols, and as a 
key to this mystery I know of no better modern tool than psychoanalysis.15
13The general Freudian attitude to which I am referring is that religious traditions express their 
beliefs in highly convoluted symbolic language, and that religious meaning is cryptically embedded 
within a tradition's use of symbolism.
14Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. James Strachey (The Hogarth Press, London, 1961), 
p. 44.
15Joseph Campbell, The Hero W ith a Thousand Faces (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1973), p. 
vii.
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The logical structure of the hero's journey (the truth that is hidden in the 
quest for illumination of reality by religious heroes), according to Campbell, 
involves four stages. The first stage is of the hero's self-motivation or a push to 
journey for truth. The second is of a barrier, difficulty, or task that the hero must 
get beyond, or resolve, to show his worth in order to receive illumination of the 
truth. Stage three is the enlightenment or attainment of truth, which is followed by 
the fourth stage; a return to the community to give the knowledge attained to the 
masses.
A straightforward example that Campbell provides is that of the young 
Siddartha Gautama's "hero's journey" in which he received "The Great 
Enlightenment" in the Buddhist tradition. Siddartha, who lived in his father's 
castle, was forbidden to go beyond its walls so he would be kept safe and shielded 
from the disease, decay and death that was the life of the common people. He was 
to be groomed as a princely warrior and member of the court. However, he had 
interest in religious and philosophical reflection and found princely life dull. Thus, 
the first stage, according to Campbell, came in the form of self-motivation. The 
curiosity that Siddartha had for what was actually beyond the castle grounds 
complemented his desire to pursue a life of contemplation. So he sneaked out to 
venture into the streets of the commoners. There he wondered how one could get 
beyond the death and suffering of life. He met gurus who taught him meditation as 
well as the "great renunciation" of worldly possessions and began to learn from 
them and contemplate life's suffering. The second Campbellian stage came when, 
during meditation under a bo tree, he was confronted by the three forces that are at 
work in hum an suffering: fear, desire, and loathing. Yet, Siddartha remained 
uninfluenced and undistracted. Through meditation he became detached from the 
worldly forces. Fear, desire and loathing no longer had an influential hold on him, 
thus the forces retreated and respected his knowledge and mastery of the entire 
cosmos. He remained in the lotus position while nature bade homage to him. This 
episode, in the tale of the Buddha, is usually referred to as "the unmovable spot".16 
This marked the third stage for Campbell because the young Siddartha transgressed 
the barrier to enlightenment and finally became the Buddha: the one
16The most popular Buddhist statuettes depict this very moment. Normally, they depict the Buddha 
in the lotus position with his left hand open, palm out, and his arm rigidly extended in the air in a 
gesture of steadfast proclamation. His right arm is limply extended to the ground with the finger 
tips gently touching the earth. This cultural representation, truly in a sublime fashion, expresses a 
balance of principles that the Buddha is said to embody.
132
who possesses wisdom and truth. Thus, the fourth stage of his hero's journey was 
his venture with his five followers to preach his doctrine of enlightenment through 
the valley of the Ganges river.
It seems that trying to unify religious traditions in this abstracted, structural, 
or logical manner of the hero's journey is similar to pointing out that chess and 
checkers are structurally the same because they are played on boards of alternating 
colored squares. My disagreement with this methodology is the meaningfulness of 
the sublimation of the logical structure of the hero's journey as that which explains 
all religion. However, it is true that there is nothing necessarily logically negligent 
with universalizing religion by a single idea. The problem is in how far the 
meaning of a single idea can take us into the depth of being religious, given the 
multitude of its particular forms.
There are many concepts or ideas that we can concede as, more or less, 
blanketing religion. For instance, all religions profess beliefs that have a "saving" 
capacity for its devotees. This stands true in Christianity, for the Christian is saved 
from the sin of the world and death. Devotees of Hinduism, Buddhism, and to a 
certain extent, Jainism, are saved from earthly "flux" (the change of the world) or 
samsara, which recapitulates all life forms by virtue of the eternal life/death  cycle. 
The Zoroastrian, by serving Ahura Mazda (the God of goodness) and "battling" 
Spenta Mainyu (the God of evil), will be saved from eternity in Hell upon death 
and the ensuing judgment of the individual. The Muslim will be saved from 
eternity in Hell if he dedicates himself to good deeds and is worthy of Allah's 
mercy upon death. Other forms of "saving" can also be found in the religions of 
the Dogon of Mali, Judaism, Peyotism, Taoism, the Bahai faith, Shamanism 
(particularly in Siberia, Korea, and the Americas), the spiritual exercise of Subud, 
Shinto, Scientology, Rastafarianism and Pocomania, Santeria and Voodoo, as well 
as Wicca. We could also mention that a concept of "saving" would certainly be 
found in the ancient middle eastern religions of Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, Syria- 
Palestine, Persia and Egypt, as well as ancient Greece. Only a few of these religions 
that I will mention are of the Hittites, Phrygians, Canaans, the respective cults of 
devotion to Isis, Osiris and Horus, and the Dionysian Mystery cults.
Given this dizzying catalogue of saving religions we are faced with the 
problem of formulating one rigorous and deeply meaningful conception of what 
amounts to being saved by religion. If one has a sufficient grammatical 
understanding of the religions mentioned above one perhaps will think that the
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concept of "being saved" greatly fits Christianity, but does not really fit other 
religions such as Scientology or Taoism. The aim of Scientology, as I understand it, 
is to rid one's psyche of recurring unpleasant memories which haunts a person and 
forces one to stagnate in life while one "comes to terms" with them. These 
unpleasant memories affect one's ability to progress and develop effectively by the 
virtue of a fully functional mental capacity. In that sense one could say that a 
person is saved from poisonous, non-discharged cathexes ("engrams" to the 
Scientologist). But as some critics have said, there really is no distinction between 
the goal of Scientology and any other form of psychotherapy. So, perhaps one 
would like to say that there is not a sense of being saved by Scientology, it is an 
issue of psychologically adjusting well, or being better off mentally, which 
Scientologists characterize as a kind of psychological purity (which is called, "being 
clear" or "going clear"). We must recognize that "being saved" may fit the 
experience of one follower of Scientology and not another. If one considered his 
life to be atrocious because of an abundance of "engrams", and was unable to 
conduct his life in any stable manner whatever, and then, after becoming involved 
in Scientology, the quality of his life was completely turned around, that person 
may be willing to use the concept of being saved. Another Scientologist may think 
that he certainly could have gone on in life, but that the methods of Scientology 
have enhanced his existence, yet they did not completely transpose it. To say in this 
case that he has been saved by Scientology would be an exaggeration.
Conversely, for the most part in Christianity, there is the sense that one is 
lost and ill-fated without belief in Christ. The non-Christian is captured by 
sinfulness and is doomed to death. When one acquires belief in Christ, is baptized 
and becomes a child of God, one is saved from that lamentable, absolute and 
eternal fate. The "doomed or saved" dynamic is not really fitting, in an absolute 
sense, for Scientology. For the most part, the sense of being saved comes in degrees 
because one develops into a better and better person by its beliefs and practices.
The same could be said about Taoism in the sense that (as it is partly understood to 
be central to that belief) the flow or course of nature maintains the health of the 
world as well as one's "soul", if one relinquishes their will to it. The Tao, then, 
must not be hindered or obstructed by humans if things go horribly awry. For 
instance, if the hull of an oil tanker ruptures and spills its contents about a coastline
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somewhere, humans may be inclined to develop a chemical solution that would 
dissolve the oil in the water, on the beach and rocks, to assist in an easy and 
effective clean up. Imagine that after using the chemical it is discovered that it 
caused sickness in people using the beach as well as killing enormous populations 
of sea life. The Taoist would argue that we ought to stop trying to affect nature and 
its course because it will only cause more, and possibly greater, problems. We 
ought to stop acting and allow the Tao to make the world (in this case the beach, 
rocks, hum an and sea life) aright. We may argue that a person is not strictly saved 
by the Tao, but lives in a greater form of purity if one lives according to its force 
and purpose. It becomes a question of living better or worse and not, as Christians 
see it, a question of either living in accordance to the will of Satan and being 
doomed, or to the will of God and being saved. We can imagine though that there 
could be a Taoist who, in particular circumstances, claims that she was saved by the 
Tao in a similar way that the Scientologist was saved by Scientology.
The point of these examples is to illustrate that the sense of a concept within 
a religious tradition, like being saved by it, is indispensably linked to knowing the 
details of that tradition, as well as the details of a particular group or individual 
within a tradition. In terms of epistemological beliefs, when a particular religious 
devotee knows that he has been saved by his religion he is completely informed 
and clear about w hat that amounts to. What this suggests is that the reasonableness 
of a belief is internally related to the details of its religious tradition. But, to ask 
one generally if he knows what is meant by being saved by religion he would have 
to ask, "For whom? The Muslim, the Dogon...? Which Muslim or member of the 
Dogon tribe?"
As far as Campbell's theory goes, no grammatical work has been done. He 
claims that there is "the grammar" that is hidden in religious symbolism which 
serves as the structure or order of what it means to seek truth for all people. But 
through Wittgenstein we can see that there is no one grammar of anything, but 
many and various grammars all contingent upon a context of belief within a 
particular tradition. The reason that Wittgenstein seeks the grammar of a concept's 
use in context is because, by that investigation, the details and nuances of what a 
particular religion means by being saved provides a deep, meaningful, and distinct
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understanding of that concept. Campbell does not focus on a particular grammar 
internal to a belief in Buddhism. Instead, he focuses on the logical structure of the 
hero's journey as the metaphysical underpinning of all founders and devotees of 
religious traditions. His theory has nothing to do with believing anything while 
living w ithin any religious tradition. As it is actually intimated by Campbell 
above, we ought not seek a religious understanding by any teacher in accordance to 
any tradition, but ought to seek an anthologist, a comparative analyst. Then we 
might have the latent logical structure revealed to us, the universal essence of 
attaining any religious truth.
It is philosophically important to note that Campbell's view boarders on the 
nonsensical. I say nonsensical for the following reason: imagine that we discuss 
with a monk of Theravada Buddhism the manner in which Siddartha Gautama 
consistently followed the path of the hero's journey, thus fulfilled all of the 
universal stages set out before us by Campbell. Furthermore, we make it clear to 
the monk that the reason we have interest in discussing Siddartha with him is only 
because he serves as a good example, out of many, to illustrate that his religious 
quest for truth is structurally the same as all religious quests for truth. Most likely 
his response will be of disdain to our question because we basically do not want to 
talk about his Buddhist beliefs, but what underpins them and makes them the same 
with Christianity, Islam and the rest. More so, I imagine that our monk would be a 
little frustrated because in talking about his beliefs in the Campbellian way we do 
not take the Buddha's journey towards the kind of truth he attained seriously at all. 
For the monk, Siddartha was not following a universal logical course as Campbell 
sees it, but saving humanity from the despair of death in a distinct and particular 
way. Campbell is nonsensical in that, in focusing on explicating his theory of 
religion, he loses the sense of precisely what is meant by the journey of a particular 
hero for a whole particular religio-cultural tradition.
In his theory, Campbell ignores obviously fundamental and all im portant 
distinctions between Buddhism and Christianity. The concept of the soul as well as 
the Divine are very much at odds with each other. Because of this, certain spiritual 
issues arise in the life of the Buddhist, that do not (or they arise differently) in the 
life of the Christian. The Christian has a personal or unique relationship w ith God. 
God saves each of his children in a unique manner. God takes an active interest in 
the particularities of each of His children's life in order to guide him in sanctity to 
eternity in heaven. In Buddhism the devotee does not have a personal relationship
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vith one God. The Divine is the dispassionate creative energy that the universe is 
inbued with. The Buddhist strips his personality dow n to grasp that which is 
essential about him. He discovers through meditation that he can identify his 
essence with what is essential about all creation. God is not out in the heavens, as 
He is traditionally considered to be for Christians, but within each and every life 
form. The creative energy in one person is identical to that which is inside another 
person,17 plant or animal. If the devotee discloses the creative energy in himself 
and identifies it with all other living things, thus the source of the universe, then he 
is on the path to "salvation".
Furthermore, for the Buddhist the Divine is beyond the ordinary sets of 
conceptual opposition such as Good/evil, m oral/im m oral, male/female, and so on. 
In the Christian tradition one could identify the attributes of the Divine as fitting 
the first term of each of the above sets of conceptual oppositions. This is not the 
case in Buddhism. The Divine in this tradition "just is". One cannot call it a name, 
nor identify it as having particular attributes, because it is beyond any scheme of 
conceptual opposition. This is completely unlike the Christian tradition, which has 
a gender-marked Divinity, and which follows particular moral teachings and public 
denunciation of immoral acts and practices. Christianity has a long monastic 
tradition that involves contemplating the passion of Jesus. It is a tradition of 
believers who are moved to feel guilt by considering one's sinfulness and 
fcrgetfulness of the Divine. All of this is seemingly non-existent in the classical, or 
purest understanding of the Buddhist tradition.
I do recognize that there are exceptions to the above that could be found in 
some communities of Buddhists. Recognizing this involves being attentive to the 
different forms of beliefs and practices of the religion. The most obvious one 
would be a whole system of morals seemingly being religiously observed through 
the principle of compassion. Traditionally, the Divine in Buddhism takes no sides 
in moral debates, but some Buddhists seemingly do by their reverence for 
compassion. For some, rejection of the religious significance of moral actions over 
immoral ones would not be the case unconditionally. In Christianity morality is 
closely linked to the passions of being religious. Christians are moved to act 
morally. If a Christian loves his neighbor, we are told that God is with him in that 
action. Buddhists particularly aim to cease being moved to act in the world by our
17This belief gives rise to a uniform manner by which to greet another. The Buddhist places his 
hands together, as if to pray, while deeply genuflecting toward the other. This is meant to express
137
passions. We see this in the story of Siddartha when he reaches enlightenment and 
becomes detached from the concepts of fear, desire and loathing. Fear and loathing 
repel one away from that which is feared or loathed, and desire draws one toward 
lhat which is desired. The Buddha, nonetheless, remains in "the immovable spot". 
This is the reason why many westerners who spend time in Buddhist societies have 
ihe impression that they are extraordinarily stoic. Yet some Buddhist communities 
(the two Tibetan communities led by the Dahlia Lama and the Karmapa Lama could 
serve as examples) adhere very closely to the principle of compassion as a high 
moral standard which is congruent with their religious beliefs. They aim to show 
compassion to all life forms that are inevitably faced with confronting the fear and 
death of the world like all of the members of their community.
There are fundamental differences in language that m ust be made apparent. 
Instead of following Campbell's method we should focus on identifying different 
meanings in religious contexts so we do not lose sight of a concepts particular use. 
Campbell sees the profundity of religious traditions in acknowledging that they 
are all the same in an unconscious, Freudian or Jungian, way. For him, they are all 
equal manifestations of the universal and unconscious archetype of the hero. I am 
not concerned with discerning if he is correct or not, but simply wonder as a 
rhetorical question: how meaningful is it to all of the different forms religion 
takes?
Campbell writes about his theory:
We shall have only to follow, therefore, a multitude of heroic figures through the classic 
stages of the universal adventure in order to see again what has always been revealed. This 
will help us to understand not only the meaning of those images for contemporary life, but 
also the singleness of the human spirit in its aspirations, powers, vicissitudes, and wisdom.18
W hat is it exactly that has always been revealed by the "universal adventure"? 
Perhaps we concede that there is an uncanny similarity in the salvation stories of a 
lot of religions and mythologies that seemingly fit the dynamic of the hero's 
journey. It is true, as Campbell's second stage has it, that many founders of 
religions underw ent great tests of their worthiness to receive Divine knowledge in 
similar ways. Let us cite some examples: the Buddha's test under the bo tree; Jesus
respect for the Divinity within the other person.
18Joseph Campbell, The Hero With a Thousand Faces (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1973), p.
36.
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vas tested by the Devil in the desert; Moses had to conquer his fear in order to 
iscend the forbidding summit of Mount Sinai, face Yahweh, and receive the Torah; 
Aeneas (as recounted in epic detail by Virgil in The Aeneid,) had to find a way to 
gain entrance to the underworld of the dead which was guarded by the ferocious 
three-headed dog, Cerberus; and in the Bhagavad-Gita, Arjuna received Divine 
visdom  concerning social duty (Dharma) by the God Krishna, when with great 
trepidation he prepared for battle against his own family and friends. We can see 
that there are some similarities in the stories. Nevertheless, we m ust recognize that 
the similarities are superficial. It is not clear at all what the multitude of religious 
heroes, together and in unison, reveal. And quintessential differences found in the 
language of the tales are conveniently erased. The Buddha has revealed the way to 
escape from suffering and death through a particular form of meditation and ascetic 
practice. But, what that message amounts to, what it deeply involves and is 
inextricably bound to, is knowledge of a particular form of metaphysics (a 
particular grammar of the "Divine", "afterlife", "God" etc...) which is indispensably 
linked to its tradition and differentiates it from the Christian or Muslim forms of 
the concepts. What is meant by Buddhism cannot be grasped by saying that it is 
one out of many manifestations of the hero's journey, and what is being revealed 
by Siddartha, at the end of his heroic journey (with all of its richness and 
peculiarities), cannot be meaningfully extracted from the purely logical 
formulation of that journey. Gautama Buddha is not one of a kind; one "religious 
hero" out of a multitude of heroes. The same superficiality awaits us when 
attempting to explicate the "singleness of the hum an spirit in its aspirations, 
powers, vicissitudes and wisdom."
For precision, exactitude, depth of meaning and distinctions proper to 
philosophical investigations on concepts, Jacques Derrida nicely states w hat ought 
to be considered an undeniable intellectual platitude:
What philosopher ever since there were philosophers, what logician ever since there were 
logicians, what theoretician ever renounced this axiom: in the order of concepts (for we are 
speaking of concepts and not of the colours of clouds or the taste of certain chewing gums), 
when a distinction cannot be rigorous or precise, it is not a distinction at all.19
If it is not distinct, it is not a distinction. Campbell is entrenched in a 
difficulty when he tries to make the concept of religion general, dismissing the
19Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 111, 1990), pp. 123-124.
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precision and rigor that one must have to characterize religion as it is to its 
particular believers (or indeed, how it is). Here is one theoretician who renounces 
this axiom that Derrida rightly asserts as central to philosophy. Since it is clear that 
Campbell has abandoned the quest for distinction between the different grammars 
of religious belief, his views can offer very little to us except a box in which to file 
indistinct concepts. His thesis about the essence of religious belief is as superficial 
as asserting that religion saves. By seeking the grammar of beliefs we will evade 
the desire to sum up all religion, and inevitably produce its shallow results.
Apropos to Campbell's species of reflection on religion, Wittgenstein writes:
Philosophy puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything- since 
everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is 
of no interest to us. One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible before all 
new discoveries and inventions.20
Wittgenstein rightly claims that the sense or logic of a context of belief is 
already in order, and does not need foreign theoretical intervention. Contexts of 
belief lie open to view if we are dedicated to understanding what sense there is 
within any particular religious tradition. But we m ust cease with forging universal 
logical structures for them. All of the details to understand what a religious belief 
means is easily accessible to us. We must make it explicit that we can see in a 
religious tradition what concepts are there and operative within it. Can we say that 
the concept of the stages of the hero's journey is operative in each religion? 
Campbell intends to explain religion by making us see concepts that certainly may 
not be operative in the life of a particular religious believer.
However, we must note that there may be uniform structural features for the 
life of a group of religious devotees. The stages of life in Catholicism, for instance, 
are marked by five of the seven sacraments: baptism-birth, confirmation- 
adulthood, marriage and holy order-vocation, extreme unction-death. To say that 
there is an idealized structure (for the path of a religious life, or acquiring religious 
knowledge like the hero's journey) for all people the world over is nonsensical. 
Earlier I discussed the problem of metaphysical investigations into essences. 
Campbell, in a similar fashion, has tried to describe what the essence of 
religiousness is, e.g. what all seekers of truth will endure. The way one uses a 
concept, and the sense surrounding it, is particular to the manner in which it 
functions in a context. When we read the synoptic gospels of the Bible, the
20Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978), §126.
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Bhagavad-Gita, the Pentateuch, stories depicting the enlightenment of the Buddha, 
the Aeneid, the Koran and so on, we notice that w hat Campbell wants to make 
explicit may not have a serious baring on the sense of those texts. He has 
theoretically intervened in those texts, and many others, to explain what he thinks 
is hidden from us. But, as Wittgenstein says what is hidden from us is of no 
interest. Campbell's theory is not, in any way, necessary for the logic, or sense, of 
religious belief. In this connection we can recall the difference between the search 
for the ideal tempo of a melody and the way it is actually played by a musician.
The ideal tempo is not hidden inside each variation of a melody, all we have are the 
many forms that the melody takes when it is actually played. By focusing on what 
Campbell thinks his theory explains about the essence of religion we lose the 
intricacies of traditions, and their natural and original sense. The price to pay for 
homogenizing religion is a constrained sense of the religious, which blanches 
grammatical differences, offers shallow assertions, and ultimately, will 
mischaracterize some religious beliefs.
Thus far we have seen the general sense of Wittgenstein's criticism against 
the possibilities of a meaningful and unifying principle of all religious belief, thus 
the importance of keeping a keen eye on the particulars of a tradition. We can see 
for our purposes that reformed epistemology will not have m uch to disagree with 
regarding this view. They also expressly recognize a plurality of beliefs as possibly 
being rational, rather than of a single concept. For them, all religious believers 
will have belief in God in the foundations of their noetic structure. They are fond 
of Calvin's statement that "The testimony of the Spirit is more excellent than all 
reason", and so am I. So, for Wittgenstein and the reformed philosophers what 
one's soul professes, in concert with the tradition that surrounds it, is the rightful 
context wherein any investigation of rationality m ust take place. I imagine the 
foundationalist would also agree with reformed epistemology, in that if  a religious 
belief is rational it will have the belief in God in its foundations. However, the 
foundationalist's difficulty is in seeing how any religious belief could be properly 
basic and rationally held in the foundations of one's noetic structure. Nevertheless, 
both Wittgenstein and the reformed epistemologist concur that rationality can be 
found in many diverse religious contexts. Furthermore, they both reject the 
classical foundationalist's assertion that rational religious belief is a very narrow 
domain and unified by a single idea.
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In order to deeply compare and contrast the reformed and Wittgensteinian 
view we m ust look at Wittgenstein's understanding of the grounds of rational 
belief. We saw the reformists point to particular experiences that enact a basic 
belief in God. This basicality of a particular proposition is the foundation for one's 
religious belief, and thereby rational, and in no need of argum ent to promote that 
claim of reason. Wittgenstein, however, has a slightly different view of the basis of 
religious rationality. He views foundational beliefs to be held fast by the sense that 
they have in our lives. This, of course, is similar to the reformist view in that the 
sense of the basicality of a belief in God is contingent upon the environment in 
which it is enacted. However, there is no appeal to a formalized "noetic structure" 
for Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein does speak of contexts and the interconnectedness 
between concepts within them, but it is an over-simplification to say that he 
considers contexts of belief to be a clearly m apped out structure in the way that the 
reformists do. For Wittgenstein, contexts of belief are often very raggedly 
connected, and if one is not paying attention one could miss the connection 
between concepts. It is not explicit in the work of the reformists, at least not to my 
knowledge, that noetic structures are thought of as the pyramidal structure of 
rationality as the foundationalist has it. However, I get a sense that they do think 
of them as similar, if not synonymous. What I understand as foundationalistic 
about the reformists project is the view that rational beliefs do have grounds, and 
rational belief systems (noetic structures) are organized with non-basic beliefs 
resting on top of basic ones. Even though the reformists have rejected 
foundationalism, I think that they have held onto these two aspects of it which they 
hold as right about the rationality of belief. But, we will see later that for 
W ittgenstein the grounds of belief are not where an investigation into rationality 
ought to be focused. Also, the propositions in our belief systems are intricately 
interwoven in a very tattered manner (much like the individual strands that, woven 
together, form a strong rope) that is not as crystalline and pristine as the reformists 
suggest. Ultimately I intend to illustrate that Wittgenstein and the reformists share 
m any common ideas and assumptions regarding the character of foundational 
religious beliefs as well as the importance placed on the context of those beliefs. By 
showing how much they do share about the rationality of religious belief we will 
be able, later on, to clearly distinguish the substantial issues which differentiate 
them.
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III. The "Grounds/Foundations" of Religious Belief and the Ideal of
Philosophical Analysis
I will state at the outset that Wittgenstein's view of foundational 
propositions is loosely comparable to the reformists in that they are the grounds of 
a belief system for which we cannot argue, nor logically prove. Later on in this 
discussion we will see why I say that it is loosely comparable. For now we can say 
that they do share certain assumptions about the nature of rationality and 
knowledge. We cannot argue for a particular rational belief with W ittgenstein 
primarily because foundational or basic beliefs are the basis from which we reason 
about the world. Therefore any argument given about X will stem from basic 
beliefs; and, since we cannot reason beyond them, we cannot provide reasons for 
them. Basic beliefs do not rest upon reasons nor evidence. We saw with the 
reformists that there are certain circumstances that evoke an instantaneous belief in 
God by virtue of an experience at a particular moment. In this sense, the belief in 
God in those circumstances is a basic one. In somewhat of a similar fashion, 
Wittgenstein sees ground-level or basic beliefs as those propositions that one 
cannot doubt, and yet for which one cannot give argument. We saw in the first 
chapter the arguments by Norman Malcolm (a student of Wittgenstein's) which 
stated that we cannot discover in our minds whether we merely believe something 
or know it. This is because he learned from Wittgenstein to focus on the ordinary 
use of "know" and "believe". This focus revealed that the distinction partly rests 
upon one's attitude toward the beliefs one can doubt, and the beliefs one cannot.
The distinction does not rest upon logical discovery. We know something when we 
cannot imagine what could possibly count against it rather than it being a case of 
discovering and distinguishing knowledge from mere belief by one's mental 
processes. The grounds for belief work in a closely related way. They are 
comprised of the propositions that we know in the strong sense. Wittgenstein 
writes:
What would it be like to doubt now whether I have two hands? Why can't I imagine it at 
all? What would I believe if I didn't believe that? So far I have no system at all within 
which this doubt might exist.21
I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions. And one might also say that these 
foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.22
21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Harper and Row, New York, 1972), §247.
^Ibid., §248.
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The first paragraph reveals an important idea. When it comes to basic beliefs 
(as "I have two hands"), the concept of doubting (that which accompanies reasons 
for not believing a proposition) is non-existent. There are no reasons to doubt, it is 
senseless in this context. Indeed he states that he has no existing system of beliefs 
in which such a doubt might exist, and this is the very bottom of his convictions. 
Wittgenstein continues by implying that his convictions are carried in a structure or 
system of beliefs. The last sentence of the last paragraph implies another important 
idea. The basis of his convictions do not rest upon foundations. Analogously, it is 
the entire structure of a house which shows the importance and stability of its 
foundations. W hat can be draw n from this is that it is not a single basic 
proposition, in isolation, which we can hold with certainty and trust that it will 
support or buttress our belief systems. Conversely, our belief system gives the 
sense of certainty to our basic propositions.
A. "God exists" as a properly basic belief
W hat a basic belief actually is, and how one functions in a belief system, is 
viewed differently by the classical foundationalist, the reformed epistemologist, 
and Wittgenstein. For classical foundationalism, a basic belief is rational because of 
its particular internal rational attributes: it is self-evident, incorrigible, or evident 
to the senses regardless of the context in which it is held. From propositions 
endowed with one of those three characteristics, so goes the argument, we can build 
a rational belief system. The reformed epistemologist can accept a vast plurality of 
rational beliefs because he sees the basicality of a particular belief as inseparable 
from the context in which it comes to the mind. A basic belief need only be 
descriptively basic.
We saw in the last chapter that "God exists" is not a properly basic 
proposition for the reformist. Basic propositions are ones like, "God is to be 
thanked and praised" in moments of contentment. It seems undeniable that the 
proposition, "God is to be thanked and praised", logically entails that "God exists". 
So, "God exists" is fundamental for the belief that "God is to be thanked and 
praised". "God exists" is really the basic belief. However, the reformists still speak 
of "God is to be thanked and praised" as properly basic even though they recognize 
that "God exists" is more fundamental. Any particular proposition that is 
characterized in terms of holy reverence, or devotion to God, logically entails that
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that person firstly, and necessarily believes that God exists. Reformed 
epistemology's starting point for arguing for a rational religious belief is their 
focus upon analyzing a particular experience of holding beliefs in a way that is 
descriptively basic. A proposition of this sort will rarely be "God exists". If "God 
is to be thanked and praised" is truly basic, then no other belief can be more 
fundamental. It cannot rest on another proposition. It think that it is incongruous 
to see that belief as the grounds for one to believe in God in the first place. If one 
does not firstly believe in God's existence, then one cannot believe that He could be 
an object of praise. "God exists" must be the primordial proposition: it m ust come 
first. This issue in my view creates a substantial source of ambiguity in their work. 
There must be a way that even when a person holds "God is to be thanked and 
praised" in experience, the proposition "God exists" is, in at least some implicit 
sense, its basis. Wittgenstein shows that basic beliefs are implicitly informing our 
belief systems and rarely (but they certainly can be) formulated on the level of 
consciousness. Therefore, the proposition that "God is to be thanked and praised" 
logically entails the basic belief that "God exists". To understand the details of 
Witttgenstein's view, we m ust take a closer look at how a basic belief functions in a 
belief system.
B. A basic belief and its belief system
For Wittgenstein, as I understand his remarks, a basic belief and a belief 
system are established in cooperation with each other. Another way of putting it is 
that a belief system, together with its basic beliefs, come into being simultaneously. 
A belief system and its basic beliefs are inseparable. If you have one you have the 
other. Instead of focusing on a basic proposition for rationality in the style of 
classical foundationalism, we ought to focus on the system in which that basic 
belief takes part, and how it moves or operates around it.
The above is nicely illustrated by Wittgenstein when he writes:
I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them 
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense 
that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.23
To begin we need to discuss what he means by saying that he does not 
explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for him. It is with this idea that
^Ibid., §152. W ittgenstein's em phasis.
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Wittgenstein focuses on concept formation. For Wittgenstein our beliefs 
spontaneously come upon us by virtue of our behavior in the world: often by 
meaningful communal practices or rituals. For instance, Wittgenstein notes that we 
never explicitly learn the proposition that chairs exist in the world. As a young 
child, perhaps our father asks us to stand on a chair to retrieve an object off of a 
high shelf; that we ought to bring the chair in from the other room for him; that, as 
a child, we ought to sit still in the chair and stop annoying others with our frantic 
movement and so on. I suppose, given these examples, that it could be said that we 
implicitly learn that chairs exist. But the point is that the abstract proposition, 
"chairs exist", never (or rarely if ever) occurs to us as an object of our knowledge 
which we are explicitly taught. It is fundamental to being in the world. It is nearly 
as absurd as being taught that I am alive. I know that I am alive, I must be in order 
to write this thesis! In the same way I know that chairs exist; they m ust exist 
because I sit on them when I write this thesis. It is not something that requires 
instruction. What the above implies is that basic beliefs say very little to us when 
they are isolated in the same manner than a logician who isolates, then analyzes, 
propositions of logic. Furthermore, if basic beliefs say very little to us when they 
are isolated, they cannot offer us much if we focus on them in epistemology.
If I doubted basic beliefs like "chairs exist", or "I exist", I would 
intellectually collapse and be submerged in such a chaotic state from which I could 
never rise again. However, that is not a pragmatic statement! I do not mean to say 
that it is extremely prudent of me to accept that chairs and I exist, or else I would 
not be able to psychologically contravene the strain of the ensuing confusion. I 
mean to say that if I could not accept that chairs and I exist I would not know what 
it means to know anything. If I ought not accept that chairs exist, what proposition 
of knowledge ought I accept as true? The notion of truth and knowledge vanishes if 
these propositions can be doubted. This understanding of basic propositions, how 
they are axial in our behavior, inscribes the dawning of the very concepts of truth 
and knowledge.
On knowledge being grounded in a context rather than on a particular kind 
of proposition of logic Wittgenstein says that:
The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to those beliefs. Bit
by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand
146
unshakably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not
because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.24
I would like to further illustrate this point, that a basic belief implicitly 
functions like an axis of meaningfulness, and also that it seems idle or trivial for an 
epistemologist to isolated one for analysis. I will consider the proposition that 
"the earth is older that I am", and show that it is grounded in my actions and daily 
practice. During my visit to the War Rooms Museum in London I saw the bunker­
like facilities in which the British government, headed by Churchill, convened to 
discuss national and allied strategy during the Second World War. I saw the 
consultation room of the cabinet ministers and military officers. Within it were the 
original chairs, decor and so on. In the "Maps Room" were aged maps and 
documents from the early forties with faded, blotched ink. All of it was left as it 
was after the war and before my existence. What sense is there for me to abandon 
my grandfather's stories of the war, my history courses on this period, etc. to think 
that the War Rooms Museum is just a clever hoax and my grandfather and history 
professors to be in collaboration, maliciously deceiving me, laughing at my 
expense? The War Rooms Museum has sense and is logically connected to what I 
had been taught by my Grandfather and history professors as I grew older and 
learned more about historical developments and my current generation. All of this 
logically entails that the earth has existed longer than I have. I do not know what it 
would mean to think otherwise. The very notion of investigating this proposition 
for its rational merits in general comes into conflict with any notion of sense. What 
would those merits or demerits be like? Everything around me (parents, 
grandparents, the conceptual use of "heredity" in all of its forms, history and 
geology books, technological developments, evolutionary theory, graveyards, 
paleontology, archeology, documentaries on past art movements, museums 
virtually of all kinds, and so on) indicate that this proposition is true. Furthermore, 
those parenthetical examples above require that I accept that the earth is older than 
I am or else I would not understand them. This proposition is part of knowing 
what those examples entail, indeed, what they amount to.
In order to bring the reformists into the discussion on the role, nature, and 
sense of basic propositions, we can consider Plantinga's seemingly contradictory 
remark:
24Ibid., §144.
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I know the propositions in the foundations of my noetic structure, but not by virtue of 
knowing other propositions; for these are the ones I start with.25
Plantinga is correct in terms of being consistent with foundationalism. He is also 
correct, for the most part, when we look at his examples of basic beliefs. If we take 
his example of holding that "God disapproves of w hat I have done" in a moment of 
guilt, we see that that experience requires that proposition to be the primary one 
which is recalled to the mind. In other words, that proposition is basic in that 
moment concerning one's feelings. But, we can see logically, concerning this 
person's form of life (she presumably being a Christian) that her basic belief is that 
"God exists". If God did not exist in the first place, she would have no reason to 
feel guilt. At least, to be precise, she has no reason to feel guilt before God if she 
does not think that a God is there to care about her offensive behavior. The 
reformist asks us to see the basicality of a proposition like "God disapproves of 
what I have done" when it is the basis of a person's circumstantial feelings. 
Logically, or epistemologically, we have seen that it is not really her basic belief. 
Imagine that I see a woman who is overwhelmed by guilt because God disapproves 
of what she has done. Imagine that I ask her to tell me what the ground of her grief 
is, and she tells me that "God exists". I would be very confused indeed. Logically it 
is her basic belief. It is the ground of her Christian form of life regardless of what 
experiences she may have or how she may express it. But, in her circumstance of 
feeling guilty before God the proposition, "God disapproves of what I have done", 
is the belief that she starts with. It is descriptively basic for her.
I think that we ought not focus on momentary experiences of holding beliefs. 
We should follow Wittgenstein and refer to our form of life when considering 
issues of rationality. This way we may focus on all of the propositions of belief we 
hold. A form of life impels one to think, believe and behave, in a particular way 
throughout all of that person's experiences. The truly basic propositions in a form 
of life are second nature to that person and rarely questioned. They act implicitly, 
thus we, normally, do not start with beliefs that are truly basic for us in experience. 
By focusing on all of our beliefs which hang together and make sense of our world, 
and seeing what is foundationally implicit for those beliefs, we can evade this
25Alvin Plantinga, "Is Belief In God Rational?", in C. F. Delaney (ed) Rationality of Religious Belief 
(University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1979), p. 13.
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difficulty that the reformists face concerning the ambiguity of what is and w hat is 
not truly a basic belief.
With regard to what has been said thus far let us consider the following 
remark by the Wittgensteinian D.Z. Phillips where he has the proposition "God 
exists" in mind as being properly basic for the reformed philosophers:
Unlike the Reformed philosophers, Wittgenstein would not say that one could start with 
[basic] propositions, because the propositions have their sense, are held fast, by all that 
surrounds them. So before we can be sure of the ways in which we think and behave, we 
do not have to start from these propositions. How could we since the propositions have their 
life in the ways we think and behave... On the contrary, they are taken for granted, rarely 
formulated, and taken out of the traffic of discourse as far as any doubt, conjecture or proof in 
relation to them is concerned.26
We can see that Phillips draws the distinction between what a basic 
proposition is for the reformists (how it is the focus of their investigations) and 
how a basic belief is implicit for Wittgenstein (how it ought not be an 
epistemological focus). We do not logically start w ith what are truly basic 
propositions. The reformists start their investigation by considering how we act 
and behave, i.e. particular circumstances of believing. We have seen that those 
beliefs are rarely the fundamental ones. We can also see that since basic beliefs are 
held fast by all that surrounds them, we ought to consider the entire system when 
making a claim of rationality while nearly ignoring what are our truly basic 
beliefs.
C. Reformed epistemology is not a Calvinist philosophy: the 
Wittgensteinian and reformist philosophical ideal
While devoting this section to the explication of Wittgenstein in the light of 
reformed epistemology, it is important to dispel a common Wittgensteinian 
assumption about their project. Wittgensteinian philosophers are interested in a 
mode of inquiry that is not theoretical in nature. Theoretical philosophers 
normally argue for the acceptance of a system of particular ideas. Nothing is 
further from Wittgenstein's mind than logically supporting a particular system of 
belief. Wittgenstein says of his philosophical goal:
My ideal is a certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without 
meddling with them.27
26D. Z. Phillips, Faith After Foundationalism (Westview Press, London, 1995), pp. 40-41.
27Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984), p. 2.
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Philosophy must not intervene in the meaningfulness in hum an lives. The 
task is to provide a logical mode of inquiry that will allow for the natural voicing 
of different passions, as they are bound up in various grammars of belief. This way 
they can be investigated in a manner that is conceptually nonviolent. The necessity 
for this is obvious. Wittgenstein was interested in showing the variety of 
conceptual grammars in use to illustrate that logic is internal to a context of belief. 
This, furthermore, gives rise to a particular attendant concept of knowledge. 
Ultimately we must not begin our inquiry in applying a theory of w hat the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of religious belief m ust be, nor in applying a 
theory which has incorporated essential conditions of knowledge into it.
The context of our beliefs is where we use the concept of knowledge 
pertaining to God, righ t/ wrong, ethics, rationality and so on. If the traditional 
philosopher claims that S is essential to belief P, we can show that that may not be 
the case for others in differing contexts. This is comparable to Campbell's work.
We saw that his quest for an essence of all religious belief distorts the sense of 
many divergent grammars of religiousness. We lose the particular sense of the 
divergent and often incommensurable forms of religious belief. His theory is 
intolerant to some differing grammatical expressions, while being ultimately false 
in other contexts.
Some Wittgensteinian philosophers see the work of reformed epistemology 
by the same light as I see the work of Campbell. Campbell, who is aided by the 
theories of Freud and Jung, argues that religion is unified by a few particular ideas. 
Since all religion can be distilled to a few fundamental concepts for him, it is 
theoretical. We saw that some devotees of a religion may conform to his theory 
while others may not. I concluded the discussion of his work by showing that there 
is no epistemological obligation for a devotee to comply to his theory.
Is there a theoretical force in the work of the reformists? Do they argue for a 
very particular form of religious belief? Some philosophers maintain that 
reformed epistemology emphasizes the work of John Calvin, and his like-minded 
theological commentators, to such an extent that their philosophical thrust ought to 
be characterized as Calvinistic. Thus, all forms of belief must be measured in 
relation to Calvinism. It has been thought that the notion of the Calvinistic God so 
permeates their work that it characterizes everything they discuss, including 
reason. They are Protestant Christian philosophers who are interested in showing 
that their belief can be held rationally. Their epistemology is theoretical in nature
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because it surrounds a particular view which expresses the one and true hum an 
:reality for them. D. Z. Phillips is one philosopher who affirms this view in writing:
What is being proposed is an epistemology, a mode of inquiry, which is itself religious in 
character. Since epistemologies are regarded as theories or hypotheses about the nature of 
reality, which are either true or false, reformed philosophers cannot tolerate a plurality of 
noetic structures. There is an issue of correctness or incorrectness involved. There can be 
only one true theory of knowledge. It seems that, according to the reformed 
philosophers...they trust that the only true theory of knowledge is not only religious, but 
Christian; not only Christian, but Protestant; not only Protestant, but Calvinistic.28
I think that Phillips' remark misrepresents the whole tone of their 
reflections. It is true that the reformists have a particular view of rational belief. 
Their view is conceptually tied to the foundationalist model. They argue that it is 
the logical structure by which all kinds of beliefs must be analyzed. I concur that 
this is an issue that deserves critiquing. But, I think that Phillips' view is wrong 
because he attaches Calvinism to their position about rational belief. One problem 
with the reformists point of view surrounds the sublimation of the foundationalist 
picture of knowledge, and I think that leads them in a bad direction when seeking 
the rationality of belief. However, the crux of reformed epistemology can be 
grasped with or w ithout consideration given to the Calvinist religious perspective. 
Is it true that the reformists cannot tolerate a plurality of noetic structures because 
they are Calvinistic? The reformists do have one idea of what a rational belief 
entails. We clearly saw in the last chapter that they can "tolerate" a vast plurality of 
noetic structures. In fact they must accept an enormous domain of religious beliefs, 
a domain that apparently has no limits. In my mind, any kind of belief could be 
conceived as rational by them. Their concerns, nonetheless, are strictly logical and 
not actually religious in nature at all. They have claimed that they are not 
interested in making an atheist convert to any religious view. An atheist is rational 
as long as his noetic structure conforms to their understanding of the 
foundationalist model.
In the same essay that the above quotation can be found, Phillips defends 
himself from the criticism of a critic who lumps him with Plantinga, claiming that 
their work ought to be characterized, exclusively, as Christian philosophy. Phillips 
writes of his own work:
28D. Z. Phillips, Faith A fter Foundationalism  (W estview  Press, London, 1995), p. 97.
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...I do not conceive of it as the work of a Christian philosopher or a Christian scholar. 
Hopefully, it is the work of a philosopher endeavoring to become clear about a cluster of 
beliefs which have been and are extremely important in the lives of men and women. The 
aim is not to persuade people to believe, but to understand the character of their beliefs. The 
aim is not to persuade them that there is a God, but to see what it may mean to be so 
persuaded. ...Plantinga's concerns are the concerns of a Christian philosopher asking 
whether Christians have a right to believe what they say they believe.29
His clarification of what he is engaged in, as opposed to the project offered 
by the reformed philosophers, spawns an irony. What Phillips says about his own 
work is epigrammatic of the intentions of the reformist's work. His 
characterization of the reformist's work is, as we have seen, not entirely accurate. 
Plantinga's concerns are not about persuasion. Plantinga's aim is not to persuade 
another to believe in God. He seeks to understand the character of beliefs, which 
are important in the lives of women and men. The reformists do admit that they 
can show how one may hold the Christian belief rationally. However, they can 
show how one may hold an atheist belief rationally also. But, even if a philosopher 
asks if Christians have a right to believe what they do, and seeks to give an answer, 
does that necessarily mean that the philosopher must be a Christian philosopher? I 
must admit that I am not completely clear on what is bound up with a philosopher 
having "Christian concerns." Is it the concern to promote the faith to all humanity? 
The promotion of the logical acceptance of the faith in some academic circles? Or a 
desire to produce a theology rather than the results of a disinterested philosophical 
investigation? Regardless of what that label may indicate about their work, we 
have seen that the reformists are interested in the rationality of atheism as well. 
Most people in the academic world seek a rational understanding of religious belief 
rather than atheism. Can we seriously allege that the philosophical concerns of the 
reformed epistemologists are Christian? Many of their examples are draw n from 
Protestant Christianity, but their epistemology is not.
We ought to resist mischaracterizations by paying close attention to the 
character of the philosophical presentation. The reformists are not interested in 
isolating basic propositions of an abstract nature, regardless of the context in which 
they may have a role. Also, they cannot be characterized as Christian philosophers 
who are seeking to persuade another that their own religious perspective is the 
correct one. There are great similarities in the work of Wittgenstein and reformists, 
especially in considering the importance of contexts of belief and their
29Ibid., pp. 95-96.
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particularities in their respective work. But we cannot be lulled into thinking that 
reformed epistemology is really an American version of Wittgensteinian thought. 
It must be clear that the interests of reformed epistemology concern the logical 
status of basic beliefs. They intend to accurately express that status as the starting 
point of all rational structures of belief.
If there is to be any criticism of their work from my view, it would be 
connected to their assertions and presuppositions surrounding their foundational 
focus.
IV. Showing Contra Saying Logical Structure
There are few continuities in Wittgenstein's thought throughout all of his 
philosophical output. But, there is one notion that seems to have stayed with him 
from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to On Certainty. This idea concerns the 
expressibility of logical form. He questions the possibility that propositions which 
express logical principles can be meaningful. These are propositions such as "there 
is an external world", which expresses a basic logical principle. For instance, that 
the earth has existed long before my death, is meaningful when it is logically 
connected to activities in my life, such as learning history, geology and so on. As a 
proposition of logic, the question of its truth, isolated from my behavior in the 
world, cannot be determined because it expresses nothing. Wittgenstein wanted to 
free philosophers from the idea that there is an Archimedean criterion of 
rationality to which we can appeal as a context-independent, yet meaningful, 
concept. Perhaps it can be stated that where reformed philosophers do share 
similar ideas about the importance of context with Wittgenstein, a substantial 
difference is that the reformists hold onto the foundationalist's focus on basic 
beliefs as a key to explain all rational systems of belief. Wittgenstein does 
maintain that there are "basic" beliefs, but they ought not interest us 
epistemologically. I sit in a chair which shows that I believe in the existence of an 
external world. Basic beliefs are not grounded in a metaphysical, static, rational 
structure, but they are tacit and implicit in my activity.
With such metaphysical structures of rationality in mind as that which is the 
ground for belief, Wittgenstein says "The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness
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of our believing."30 His remark is elliptical in the sense that he does talk of the 
grounds of belief, but at the end of his analysis we must toss aside any assertion of 
a logical structure that can be identified as being paradigmatic of the rational m an's 
belief. Perhaps the "ground of belief" for Wittgenstein is like some concepts 
formulated by Jacques Derrida31 that m ust be used "under erasure". That is, we use 
the idea to get a clear understanding of our ordinary use, or the sense, of concepts, 
but "grounds of belief", and all other concepts that surround and aid in 
Wittgensteinian analysis, ought not be understood as necessary postulates for 
rational belief systems, as if they served as metaphysical entities. Such 
philosophical concepts merely aid us in becoming clear about where our beliefs, 
and their justification, come to an end. When philosophizing we may discuss what 
the grounds are for another person's belief P, meaning from what proposition does 
the conviction in belief P come. To be strict, when Wittgenstein speaks of the 
ground of belief he means to refer to that which we believe in unwaveringly, that 
which makes sense of our actions. Basic propositions ought to serve us 
philosophically as reminders about the limits of sense. They explicitly clarify from 
where the sense of the logic of our beliefs come, which is not normally considered 
at the level of consciousness.
The following quotation from Wittgenstein is of particular interest to us 
because it shows a shift in focus from that which is central to the reformists project. 
He writes:
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not 
certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part: 
it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.32
The reformists advocate seeing a rational belief in terms of a single 
proposition which is immediately recalled to the mind in a permissible 
circumstance; it is immediately apprehended as true. For Wittgenstein, we must 
only seek the clarity of the logic of our language, e.g. making sense of the concepts 
that we use. Basic propositions ought not be the locus for investigating rationality,
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Harper and Row, London, 1972), §166.
31Some of Derrida's philosophical concepts, such as "Differance", "Supplement", "Pharmakon", and 
"Hymen", are notoriously frustrating for many because they function in this way. Nonetheless, they 
must not be thought of as part of an essential metaphysical structure of reality; that is, in the fashion 
of G. W. Leibniz's "Monads" or A. N. Whitehead's "Actual Entities". These concepts used by 
Derrida and Wittgenstein only aid one to conduct certain analytical strategies for considering logical 
issues about reality. They are used to provide clarity and precision about the beliefs that we already 
have about reality.
32Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Harper and Row, London, 1972), §204.
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what ought to be is the sense in forms of life. This is because, as we have just seen, 
ihe ground of belief (which provides the limitations of sense in a context of belief) 
is the activity in a language-game. I think the reformists would agree w ith this 
point because their concern is with ordinary circumstances in which a belief can be 
held basically. However, we do not need foundationalist imagery and 
netaphorical structures of belief, but detailed descriptions of the sense in forms of 
lie. For Wittgenstein the structurality of a form of life could look like anything 
and whatever it looked like would be inconsequential.
The foundationalistic attitude that remains in the reformist's work surrounds 
their focus on the inherent rationality of holding basic beliefs. Once the basicality 
of a belief is apprehended we can insure that the corresponding non-basic beliefs 
will form a rational noetic structure. As we have seen, for Wittgenstein it is quite 
different. When we look to the non-basic beliefs which we acquire we see that they 
show what is logically basic for them. We cannot be said to consciously apprehend, 
arid then hold, "God exists". One may experience a moment of wanting to praise 
and thank God and think that "God is to be thanked and praised", but the truly 
basic belief, which is implicit, primordial, and yet has its sense by these kinds of 
experiences, is "God exists". The proposition is the hinge on which turn other 
beliefs such as "God is to be thanked and praised". True basic beliefs cannot be 
explicitly interrogated like propositions of logic (they cannot be said), because they 
are implicit in the meaningfulness of our actions. Imagine a man who is playing a 
violin says that one of his basic beliefs is that "there are physical objects". This 
proposition would ordinarily strike one as idle. An ordinary response could be 
that this proposition is painfully obvious and perhaps not worth saying. Therefore, 
we may rhetorically ask, what does it say? Concerning the idleness of logically 
analyzing basic propositions W ittgenstein says:
We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the
conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk:
so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!33
The rough ground is the language we use in our ordinary activity. It is 
where basic propositions are seemingly unnoticed because they are implicit hinges 
of meaningfulness. They are only of interest to us epistemologically in as much as 
they can be described as serving in this capacity. To focus on basic beliefs creates
33Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978), §107. 
Wittgenstein's emphasis.
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problems because there is very little we can do with them. If a basic belief is made 
explicit, when it is used implicitly as a hinge of meaning in a context, it can say 
nothing. Implicit logic can only be described. Wittgenstein writes about the 
grounds of a belief not having an explicitly rational proposition:
You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I 
mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).
It is there -  like our life.34
Generally speaking, we m ust accept this notion that belief systems, in the 
end, are not based upon rational grounds at all. One's belief system may be similar 
to another, yet foreign to others. There are many similarities with the Christian 
and the Jew. However, the Christian and the Peruvian Shaman have virtually no 
similarities. A particular belief may be incomprehensible for one person to hold in 
his life, yet another finds the same belief to be central to his own existence. One can 
only say that a belief which is personally impossible to hold is simply there in the 
life of the other. As an example of the extreme conceptual gulf that often exists 
between two people, we can look at the work of the American poet, Albert 
Goldbarth, who nicely expresses this reality concerning his impression of Jewish 
worship. He writes that orthodox Jews:
...softly rock their prayer as if each slowdanced in place 
with an angle, and listening as their opaque wall of Hebrew, 
uttered brick by brick, rose out of the room to somewhere 
I could never believe and they could never not.35
Or again, in considering Judaism and Moses' revelation at the burning bush, he 
writes:
Elijah this.
The Children of Israel that.
And Moses. Moses in the Bulrushes, Moses 
blahblahblah...
...every night I'd read another chapter
in those actionful schlock-epic books by Edgar Rice Burroughs, 
the ones where Mars (Barsoom, the natives called it) is 
adventured across by stalwart Terran John Carter, Jeddak 
(warrior-king) and husband of the gauzy-saronged and 
dusk-eyed Dejah Thoris, Princess of all those red-duned climes.
It made more sense to me 
than God in a great bush of fire.36
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Harper and Row, London, 1972), §559.
35Albert Goldbarth, "The Dynamics of Huh", in Heaven and Earth: A  Cosmology (The University of
Georgia Press, Athens, GA, 1991), p. 9.
^Ibid., "The Nile", p. 15.
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There are differing belief systems that are equally rational, and the 
reformists would not object to this notion. The structure of rationality does not 
start with basic beliefs, but an a-rational action and reaction 
which elicit particular forms of behavior. Because of this the structurality of a 
rational belief system is quite untidy. The propositions of a belief system are all 
bound together by many intricate logical connections. Taken separately, each 
proposition performs some particular logical function in a language-game. 
Meaningfulness is achieved by assessing logical connections.
Am I asserting that there are no rational grounds for our beliefs because 
rationality in general cannot be accounted for? To say that would be to 
misunderstand the nature of meaning that I am trying to show. Of course there is 
rationality. But what amounts to rationality, like w hat amounts to God, is 
determined by the use of the concept in a particular context. Wittgenstein questions 
a standard philosophical assertion, an intellectual assumption that has been around 
for ages. We hear post-enlightenment philosophers wanting to affirm the 
rationality, for instance, of a basic belief like "There is an external world", as if the 
proposition fulfilled necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. If 
rationality can be affirmed then it can serve as rational grounds for empirical 
beliefs. The ethos of this kind of project requires us to ask how we can really be 
sure of the rationality of a belief. The problem of this kind of question is that it 
tries to say that which can only be shown. In On Certainty Wittgenstein focuses on 
the logical proposition, "I know that that is a tree". This is a proposition equivalent 
to "There is an external world". As it is external to any activity in a particular 
language-game, w hat can one make of it? Because we cannot make anything of it, 
how would we analyze its logicality? We must show its logicality. Once we think 
of ordinary contextual uses for such statements, says Wittgenstein, its logic 
becomes clear and precise. Therefore, we m ust show the logic of those propositions 
by describing the particular role that they play in a language-game.
Let's look at w hat role the proposition, "I know that that is a tree", may have 
in a language game. Imagine that I am walking w ith my brother at night around 
the city center of Rouen, France. Upon reaching the cathedral he notices w hat he 
gathers is a bizarrely placed, ornate pillar-like structure protruding out from the
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cathedral's western wall. When he questions me about it I say, "That's a tree. It is 
caught in the shadows of the street lamps and seems as if it is part of the building, 
but it is a tree." He then says, "Are you sure? It looks like part of the structure to 
me." Then I finally reply, "I know that that is a tree. I have lived in Rouen for over 
a year now and have walked next to the cathedral a hundred times while noticing 
that tree." We can clearly comprehend the logic, or sense, of "I know that that is a 
tree" as it is expressed in this particular performative utterance. One cannot 
comprehend what that proposition means, the logic of it, apart from a particular 
context in which it is used.
Wittgenstein called propositions of logic which are abstract and dislocated 
from any contextual use "pseudo-propositions". They look like meaningful 
propositions for the logician, but when they are analyzed by Wittgensteinian eyes, 
we notice that there is very little that we can do with them as propositions of logic. 
We saw earlier that concepts about religion, God, salvation and so on, have no 
essence. These propositions can only be understood by comprehending their role 
in a particular context. We m ust investigate a context of belief in order to see what 
really amounts to propositions of logical form.
Concerning this issue Wittgenstein writes:
'A is a physical object' is a piece of instruction which we give only to someone who doesn't 
yet understand either what 'A' means, or what 'physical objects' means. Thus it is 
instruction about the use of words, and 'physical objects' is a logical concept (like colour, 
quantity...). And that is why no such proposition as: 'there are physical objects' can be 
formulated.
Yet we encounter unsuccessful shots at every turn.37
Wittgenstein shows that "A is a physical object" is used in the language- 
game of instruction. It informs a person that A is equivalent to physical objects. A 
is connected to physical objects by the logic of equivalence. By that connection we 
can comprehend the sense, or logic of this piece of instruction: A is equivalent to 
physical objects. It instructs one how to use the concept of physical objects. But, 
"there are physical objects" has no logical connection to anything, it is nonsense as 
a proposition that is isolated from any context of its use. It has no role, nor does it 
make a move in a language-game. Its logic is indeterminate.
Wittgenstein argues that the logic of a basic belief is not the ordinary 
concern or focus for the believer, therefore, it ought not be for philosophers. We
37L udw ig W ittgenstein, On C ertain ty  (Harper and Row, London, 1972), §36.
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see through Wittgenstein, that no reasons remain for the reformed epistemologist 
to consider the foundationalist picture of knowledge to be tenable as that which 
expresses the rational ground of belief. Given that the ground of logicality can be 
shown to be uniquely circumscribed in a context, they ought to give up their 
attachment to the spirit of foundationalism. The rationality of belief systems does 
not originate from any one proposition as the foundationalists and reformists 
assume. If we look at the activity in a language-game we may comprehend how it 
is logical. For this reason Wittgenstein writes:
Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You 
must look at the practice of language, then you will see it.38
The logic that one will see in the practice of language is not grounded in a 
single proposition. We cannot describe what may be the logical grounds for belief, 
because there are no logical grounds. Wittgenstein also writes that, "Logic m ust 
take care of itself."39 We cannot formulate what a rational belief m ust be like. We 
must look to the internal logic of a language-game and see it.
V. On Conceptual Intelligibility and the Limits of Rational Belief
A. Standing at the gates of irrationalism: the case against Wittgenstein 
and the reformed epistemologist
The criticism of not being able to argue against superstitious beliefs stands as 
an insurmountable obstacle for the reformists, while it can be dispelled with 
Wittgenstein and other philosophers influenced by him.
The argum ent persists that the grounds of religious belief (and by 
implication, beliefs in general) are not rational nor non-rational, but are subject to a 
contextually circumscribed form of rationality. Some would say that this 
presupposes a kind of laissez-faire anti-epistemology, and that anyone who holds 
the statement would have to accept all forms of belief systems as philosophically 
legitimate, including those which incorporate obscure superstitious propositions.
If we merely look at the sense of beliefs in a context, we can call it rational 
regardless of what superstitious beliefs may be held within it. They would argue,
^Ibid., §501.
39Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks - 1914-1916 (Basil Blackwell, London, 1961), §2.
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any belief can be held rationally if we can appeal to the internal logic of the 
particular language-game in which it has a role.
Reformed epistemology faces a similar accusation. As I see their project, any 
belief can be called basic if one can describe how it is the base of a belief system in 
an experience which calls it to the mind. If we can do that, we can claim that we 
hold the basic belief rationally.
Others may object to the Wittgensteinian view that religious beliefs are a- 
rational and subject to contextually circumscribed forms of rationality by claiming 
that it is merely concerned with the everyday distinction between sense and 
nonsense. Though this may clarify and elucidate already held beliefs, its dominant 
characteristics for some traditional philosophers are that of barrenness, impotence, 
and inadequacy in light of the "first philosophy" espoused by Descartes. For many 
it seems to be a kind of an "I'm  OK, you're OK" anti-intellectualist fiddling while 
Rome burns. The critic impatiently demands, "I w ant the truth of religious belief! 
Does God exist, or not!?"
It is commonly thought that for Wittgenstein the philosopher m ust 
completely cease arguing for the rationality of particular beliefs and against others. 
Henry Staten writes that some critics of W ittgenstein's work - who concentrate on 
his unorthodox dedication to the description of language-games - see it "...as 
though the price of describing were that we have to give up saying anything 
interesting."40 John Ellis, concurs that this view of Wittgenstein's work conjures up 
a moribund, ho-hum, intellectual world, where:
...no one would be able to argue the case for a specific viewpoint with well-formulated 
argument and relevant evidence...because all viewpoints and "pictures" would have been 
declared in advance to be equal, with none, however compelling, to be judged superior, and 
none, however absurd, to be dismissed.41
B. Is any belief potentially rational for Wittgenstein?
The criticism that Wittgenstein advocates a laissez-faire epistemology, and 
that his view is powerless and unproductive because he is only concerned with the 
sense and nonsense of a language-game, m ust be dispelled.
We gain more from describing the practice of language than merely an 
understanding of the particular logic of a language-game. Attention to language
40Henry Staten, "Wittgenstein and the Intricate Evasions of 'Is'", New Literary History (Vol. 18: 281- 
300, 1988), p. 285.
41John M. Ellis, "Playing Games With Wittgenstein", New Literary History (Vol. 18: 301-308,1988), p. 
304.
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also reveals that some beliefs make use of concepts in unclear and puzzling ways. 
When this is evident the philosopher cannot offer a believer a different belief as a 
better alternative to cure the confusion. The philosopher can call attention to the 
confused belief and question the reasons that the believer has for holding it. This 
will prevent just any belief from being held, and possibly motivate a person to 
investigate the depth, coherence, and sincerity of his form of life.
W hat does the existence of superstition show us philosophically? Consider 
the well known superstition that if I break a mirror I will endure seven years of bad 
luck. What is puzzling about this belief is the assumption that there is a causal 
connection between breaking the mirror and the seven years of bad luck. The 
concept of causation in this belief is the root of the confusion. It is senseless to 
think that a physical action can cause a seven year period of bad luck. What can be 
said about superstitious beliefs is that they express a shallow conceptual grammar. 
If a person announced in a crowded room that the mirror which I just broke caused 
me seven years of bad luck, I should expect to hear some laughter and joking. This 
is a common reaction to superstitions because most people do not take them 
seriously. If a person is serious in saying that I will have seven years of bad luck 
because I broke a mirror, most people would wonder if the person really 
understands the idea of cause and effect.
Everyone learns the concept of cause and effect by the important role it plays 
in our ordinary experiences. We see effects from corresponding causes a thousand 
times a day. We see cause and effect in the sun rising, water boiling, flags waving 
in the wind, etc. We know that a frozen lake is slippery, and if a person walks on 
one he can easily lose traction and fall. It is difficult to think of an ordinary 
experience which would introduce a person to the belief that breaking a mirror 
causes one seven years of bad luck. Presumably most people have broken a mirror 
at least one time in their life, and nobody is known to have suffered such a fate as a 
result. We can imagine that this superstition perhaps began because mirrors are 
valuable, and parents told their children that if they broke one they would have 
seven years of bad luck. This involves trying to prevent the destruction of one's 
valuables by careless children who tend to play recklessly around them. People 
joke about the superstition, but if someone actually believed it I imagine that 
questions concerning his seriousness, or even sanity, would arise.
That one accuses another of believing a superstition has no greater currency 
than in religion. Some philosophers call some religious believers superstitious, as
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some religious believers call other religious believers. My task is to show that 
Wittgenstein can distinguish between religious belief and superstition, and that 
superstitious beliefs ought to be dismissed. Can Wittgenstein accept any religious 
belief as sensible by appeal to the internal logic of the language-game in which it 
has a role? The method of analysis that Wittgenstein prescribes involves being 
clear on the relationship between contexts of belief. What logical ground is there 
between them? Do language-games overlap? What will be revealed by a 
grammatical clash between two different language-games which share a common 
context? For instance, do empirical or historical truths (which are determined by an 
investigation in search of facts) conflict with some religious beliefs? If there is such 
a conflict in a context, will it reveal that a belief is fantastic, unintelligible, or 
superstitious? If a conflict occurs between two language-games that overlap, will 
consequences pertaining to the meaningfulness of the language-games be apparent?
In the beginning of the essay Religious Belief and Language-Games42, D. Z. 
Phillips notes some misgivings that he has had about the way that he has discussed 
religious language-games in the past. His misgivings arise from speaking of 
religious language-games as if they were completely cut off from other forms of 
social life and propositions of knowledge that are not marked by a religious 
grammar. I do fear the same characterization of language-games by what I have 
said in this chapter. This characterization of language-games begins to take form 
when a philosopher so concerns himself, at times exclusively, with challenging a 
general form of propositions. By introducing the concept of language-games to 
perform this task, they readily seem as if they were esoteric, arcane, and cryptic for 
those who are not within the language-game. So, religious language-games look as 
if they conceptually encapsulate and shelter those in it; that the people within them 
seemingly are not a part (nor privy to the sense) of non-religious language-games. 
Thus, the picture of society that we are left with is one where every person, or 
particular community, is detached from all meaning except that which rests in their 
own impervious sphere of religious understanding.
When the Christian and atheist eat ice cream on a hot summer day don 't they 
both believe for the same reasons that, if not eaten quickly enough, the ice cream 
will eventually melt? This commonplace experience illustrates that there are some 
propositions of belief which are shared in a common context. This context is one 
where all people know what happens to ice cream in the sun regardless of what
42In D. Z. Phillips, W ittgenstein  and Religion  (M acmillan, London, 1993), pp. 56-78.
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religious beliefs they hold. It is difficult indeed to imagine a person who does not 
have this belief about ice cream. But, this kind of discussion must be done with 
great care, because the risk of diminishing what particular criteria of 
meaningfulness there is in a context of religious belief by overemphasizing various 
criteria of non-religious contexts of belief is considerable.
For Wittgenstein the concept of God cannot be reasoned about by a 
transcontextual criterion of meaningfulness. There is not one grammatical form of 
belief which is the common denominator for all forms of belief. Therefore, we can 
question the breadth of meaningfulness in Professor Steven Hawking's 
proclamation that God does not exist. His research in theoretical physics show that 
the universe has been imploding and exploding eternally. From this he concludes 
that there is no God. But his concept of what God m ust be is far too narrow. To be 
strict, for Hawking, we can only conclude that there is no God that began to 
construct the world on such and such a date in the universe. Objecting to the 
breadth of meaningfulness of his belief involves distinguishing the grammar of 
God from the grammar of physical research. However, imagine a Christian who 
believes that the world was literally created by God at a particular time within 
seven days. If Hawking is correct about the fact that the earth was never literally 
created by God, then the Christian's belief is wrong. This is because two language- 
games (physics and Christianity) are logically related to one another in one context. 
The Christian and Steven Hawking have beliefs about the physical origins of the 
universe. Both of them cannot be correct. Hawking's belief about the physical 
origins of the universe contradicts the Christian's belief. We must seek to 
understand who has the grammar of belief which is congruent with the logic of 
determining the physical origins of the universe. It is Hawking's belief which 
makes intelligible moves in the language-game of physics.
However, there would be no contradiction between the Christian and 
Hawking if the Christian believed that the creation of the universe is, for instance, 
an expression that the universe is imbued with Divine purpose. If that were the 
case the meaning of their respective beliefs would be incommensurable. While 
working within the field of theoretical physics Hawking is, of course, not equipped 
with methods of investigation that could determine w hat that Divine purpose is, or 
that there is no Divine purpose at all. Hawking's belief is properly empirical, and 
the Christian's belief is properly devotional. Hawking's belief properly has the
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grammar of physics, and the Christian's belief properly has the grammar of 
religious worship.
The concept of God does not have the identical grammar as physical 
concepts. Why is it that the Christian and atheist both believe their ice cream will 
melt if they leave it in the sun, yet they do not have the same beliefs regarding holy 
reverence? Knowing the ontological status of objects in the physical world 
(facticity) involves a different grammar than knowing God. For instance, I may not 
know where my keys are, but I can find them in a way that will not help me find 
God. To know the physical world involves an investigation into physical realities. 
But the key term is the grammar of "realities". When a religious believer speaks of 
Divine reality, it cannot amount to the same thing as physical reality. The ancient 
harbor of Alexandria in Egypt - which was only speculated about by references to it 
in the fourth book of the Odyssey by Homer - was recently investigated and found, 
and its reality confirmed. This kind of investigation is nonsense in confirming the 
reality of God. Hawking's belief assumes that God is like a theoretical physical 
object which awaits discovery. God, however, is not a theoretical physical object to 
be discovered along with black holes, superfluidity, absolute zero, or blackbody.
I also agree with Phillips' dictum that "religion m ust take the world 
seriously."43 A religious believer cannot encounter events in his life and have 
fantastic beliefs about them. I am not presupposing a transcontextual concept of 
what amounts to fantastic and acceptable beliefs. The acceptability of beliefs, in 
certain contexts, are uniform and already agreed upon. There are structures of 
intelligibility which are already in place and function in ordinary discourse. There 
is a difference between one not accepting the Christian faith and one not accepting 
the fact that ice cream melts when it is exposed to the sun. Only people who have a 
particular disposition to Christianity are moved by it and accept it, but that ice 
cream melts is an empirical fact and is not a matter of personal disposition towards 
the proposition. All people who have eaten ice cream on a hot summer day know 
that it melts in the sun. What if the language-game of religious expression and 
empirical fact overlap? Problems arise if one expresses religious belief P and it 
contradicts his own, and everyone else's, non-religious beliefs. To paraphrase 
Phillips, he would distort and violate what everyone already knows. A religious 
belief which contradicts empirical propositions that we all share and which are 
expressed in our actions is a violation of what we know.
43Ibid„ p. 70.
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I want to consider a fine example that Phillips offers about religious 
believers confusing what we already know and not taking the world seriously. 
Imagine a religious believer who speaks of death as if it were a sleep of long 
duration. This is problematic talk because we know w hat sleeping is. Normally it 
is a daily occurrence to rest one's body in order to be invigorated for another day. 
We all know that we can say "see you in the morning" literally. We all know that 
sleep is a temporary resting of the body, and the temporality of it is essential to 
everyone's understanding of the concept. Likewise, we all know that death is that 
which is caused by the permanent ceasing of physical operations and not resting 
them for further use. We all know that for the dead there will not be another day, 
and we will not interact with the dead when they "wake up". We all know that 
there is no temporality to the concept of death, it is forever. All of this is obvious 
to everyone. If anyone contradicted me on these statements above, and argued the 
opposite, I would not consider that person as merely having a different grammar of 
belief, but I would seriously wonder if he is hum an at all. A religious believer 
cannot be serious if he holds that death is sleep of long duration. Some would say 
that this belief is a superstition because his belief contradicts what everyone knows 
is true.
I must use another example of a religious belief that reveals conceptual 
confusion. Certain literal readings of scripture seem to clash with established 
historical truths. I have in mind the view that the book of the apocalypse (The 
Revelation to John) depicts a future event, moment by moment, that will come to 
pass. This view holds that in a particular time in the future Jesus will be in the 
physical form of a wounded lamb, with seven eyes and seven horns, amidst the 
throne of heaven where God will sit. The lamb will clasp a scroll which has seven 
seals on it, and begin to break them in succession. W hen the first four seals are 
broken the horsemen of the apocalypse will be called to ride into the world and 
usher in the last days. The souls of the martyred will cry out with impatience when 
the fifth seal is broken, as they remain fettered under the altar of heaven. When the 
sixth seal will be broken the earth will literally endure the havoc of a great 
earthquake. Stars will literally fall from the sky and then the sky itself will split in 
two "like a torn scroll."44 The moon will turn black and the sun will become like 
blood, while the rich and powerful run for the caverns in the hills. The breaking of 
the seventh seal will prom pt seven angels to blow trumpets in succession which
“ 6: 14.
165
will cause various things such as " something like a large burning m ountain"45 
literally being hurled into the sea. A third of the seas will turn into blood, and then 
a large star named "Wormwood" will fall into the sea making a third of the water 
bitter, and so on until the final end of the ages.
A fact that makes this belief unintelligible is that we know the reasons and 
intentions for the composition of Revelation. The book is not an oracle which 
depicts future historical affairs. Neither is it the only book of its kind. It was not 
written down during a prophet's communion with God. We all know, or can study 
the research of eschatologists and biblical historians to find out, that apocalyptic 
literature (which seemingly always involves surreal images and events) was 
extremely popular in Jewish and early Christian communities, between 200 B. C. 
and 200 A. D., the time frame in which Revelation was written. Apocalypses were 
composed to serve a people as resistance literature to meet a crisis.46 Revelation, 
itself, suggests that its origins stem from such an historical crisis. Chapter 17; verse 
9 clearly indicates that the historical crisis involved the persecution of the early 
church by Roman authorities. The "harlot Babylon" symbolizes pagan Rome, "the 
city on seven hills." Chantal Reynier writes that, "The author, John, who finds 
himself in exile on the island of Patmos (Ap 1; 9), invites his reader to contemplate, 
in faith, the victory of the Lamb."47 Reynier elucidates the sense of Revelation by 
making it explicit that the document comes from a member of a struggling and 
suffering Christian community.48 The book is meant to support those suffering for 
their faith. Again he writes, "In this situation [of Christianity being a threatened 
minority religion], the Church, however persecuted and wounded she may be, can
458: 8.
46A detailed historical explanation of the sense and purpose of apocalyptic literature is included in 
the introduction to "The Revelation to John" in the New American Bible (Catholic Bible Press, Atlanta, 
1987), pp. 1426-1427. Also included in the above volume is a very helpful and sober general 
introduction to historical truths in the Bible; it offers scholarly discussions of what, in the Bible, are 
facts and what are articles of faith, devotion and worship. This introduction, for the most part, sheds 
a lot of light on the meaning that one can justifiably have about apocalyptic literature. The 
introduction is comprised of the following four essays: "The Purpose of The Bible", by Eugene H. 
Maly, pp. vii-xiii; "The Bible and History", by Paul Jurkowitz, pp. xiv-xx; "How the Bible Came 
About", by Jerome Kodell O. S. B., pp. xxi-xxvii; and "How to Study the Bible", by Orlando R. 
Barone, pp. xxviii-xxxii.
47Chantal Reynier, Le Christ au Cceur de L'Histoire, (Bayard Editions/Centurion, Paris, 1999), p. 164. 
My translation. The original French is: L'auteur, Jean, qui se trouve en exit dans Vile de Patmos (Ap 1, 
9), amene son lecteur a contempler, dans la foi, la victoire de VAgneau.
48I recognize that there is some debate about who the actual author of the book was. Some claim that 
it was John, while others point to evidence which suggests that it may have been written by his 
followers. Even if John's followers were the authors, thus it can be proven that John did not actually 
write it while living in exile on the island of Patmos, I contend that the meaning and point of the text 
remains unchanged.
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say: "Amen, come Lord Jesus!' (Ap; 22, 20)."49 Revelation is worship of the 
meaningfulness of Jesus' ministry. This is expressed by a suffering exile who has a 
faith which tells him that the truth of Jesus' teachings could never be eradicated by 
powerful earthly regimes. One may have to hide in exile from persecution, but 
Revelation teaches that the kingdom of God will one day be trium phant over the 
entire world. All of the above historical facts about Revelation comprises relevant 
evidence for one to dismiss their belief that the book is intended to foretell a future 
event.
There are other apocalyptic books in the Apocrypha or the Pseudepigrapha50. 
What would be the evidence for us to believe that the book of Revelation will reveal 
historical accuracy while the others will not? What would comprise this evidence? 
Because we are speaking of belief in a future factual event, it is relevant to ask what 
evidence there is to suggest that it will come to pass. The sense of the images and 
events expressed in Revelation are conceptually bound to the synoptic Gospels and 
John. Revelation also shares certain attitudes about martyrdom, and the faith of the 
persecuted, with some of the letters of the New Testament. This particular 
apocalyptic book is theologically harmonious with the whole of the New 
Testament. This text was chosen, I imagine, for this reason. Revelation is a
49Chantal Reynier, Le Christ au Cceur de L'Histoire, (Bayard Editions/Centurion, Paris, 1999), p. 164. 
My translation. The original French is: Dans cette situation, VEglise, si menacee et blessee qu'elle soit, 
peut dire: "Amen, viens, Seigneur Jesus! (Ap 22, 20)."
^"The Apocrypha" and "the Pseudepigrapha" ( being Catholic and Protestant terms respectively) 
are roughly synonymous. Here I wish to clarify their use generally and explain how I am using 
them. The writings that belong in this domain are not agreed upon by Catholics and Protestants.
For the most part these writings are from the late Jewish and early Christian period (200 B. C. - 100 
A. D.), thus intertestamental and extracanonical. Some of these writings were modeled on canonical 
books that were (for the most part) not preserved in their original Hebrew or Aramaic, or books that 
express forms of belief that are considered outside of orthodoxy. The Roman Catholic Church follows 
the Septuagint (the Greek translation of the Old Testament) which includes more extracanonical 
books than the Hebrew version. After some Protestant scholars and leaders (namely Martin Luther) 
realized that the Vulgate (the Latin version of the Old Testament) was not as close to the original 
texts as could be (the Vulgate reached a point in the 16th century of being translated from transliterate 
translations of the Septuagint), they began translating it directly from the Hebrew in an effort to 
comprise an Old Testament that was closer to the original. What resulted is that, for example, Sirach 
(Ecclesiasticus) and The Book of Wisdom remained canonical books for Catholics, yet were placed in the 
Pseudepigrapha by Protestants because they were part of the Septuagint. Furthermore, books like 
the Gnostic gospels of Mary, Thomas, and the attending apocalypses of Gnosticism, belong to the 
Apocrypha for Catholics as well as Protestants because they express forms of belief that both consider 
to be outside of orthodoxy. So, I am using both terms (Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha) in a 
confined sense to serve my particular purpose. I wish to use them to connote books that are not 
collected in the Catholic or Protestant Bibles. These are books that are not central to any particular 
standard form of contemporary Christian communal life. The following are some non-canonical 
apocalypses of the New testament: The Apocalypse of Paul, The Revelation to Stephen, the first and 
second book of Esdras, and The Revelation to Peter. The following are some non-canonical Apocalypses 
of the Old Testament: Chapters 14 and 15 of the first book of Enoch, the fourth book of Ezra, and the 
second book of Baruch.
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devotional expression concerning God as the final judge, creator and sustainer of all 
life on earth. The text teaches that regardless of the persecution that one may suffer 
at the hand of authorities and powerful adversaries, God's kingdom will reign 
victoriously in the end. It expresses devotion to God, in that a Christian's life 
begins and ends with Him, regardless of what may be suffered. The meaning of 
Revelation is sensible within the language-game of religious devotion, and not the 
language-game of determining future historical events.
This sense of apocalyptic literature is also bound to another historical fact 
about the beliefs of some of the first generation of Christians. It is known that in 
early Christian communities (from the resurrection to 30-40 A. D.) there was no 
documentation about the life and teachings of Jesus.51 Jerome Kodell tells us why:
In the first years after the resurrection there was little thought given to writing down a 
Christian library. Some of this was undoubtedly due to the example of the Lord himself 
who, like the rabbis of the time, taught by the spoken word, which in turn was remembered 
and discussed by disciples. There was no need for writing while the apostles were still alive 
to clarify or verify anything uncertain. Because his followers expected Jesus to return soon, 
any permanent writing of his teachings seemed unnecessary, and perhaps even faithless.52
I want to focus on the content of the last sentence as a reason why there was a 
delay in the documentation of Jesus' life and teaching. Some first generation 
Christians, then, believed that since Jesus was to come soon there was no need to 
write anything down because the end of salvation history would arrive, roughly, 
within their own (or their children's) lifetimes. Anyone who reads the New 
Testament will see that Jesus often taught that the end of the world was imminent 
by his second coming. At the time of his second coming, judgment would ensue, 
and the children of God (those who professed Christ) would be separated from 
those who did not. Those who did not profess Christ would suffer greatly for 
eternity, and those who did would join the Father in Heaven. In this sense these 
people interpreted Jesus' words as a prediction for a future historical inevitability. 
However, the second coming never did arrive; therefore, there m ust have been, 
presumably, a dramatic conceptual shift for these particular Christians. The 
meaning of what the second coming amounts to, what beware "the thief will come
51There is evidence that some communities in the first decades documented hymns, psalms, and
prayers, but no narratives about the life and teachings of Jesus. In 30-40 A. D. some sayings of Jesus 
were documented which were eventually written to form a chain of episodes. These writings are 
called "Q" (from the German Quelle, "source") and can be traced in the Gospels of Mathew  and Luke 
(both written around 80 A. D. and intended for Christian communities of divergent cultural bases). 
“Jerome Kodell, "How the Bible Came About" in New American Bible (Catholic Bible Press, Atlanta, 
1987), p. xxv.
168
in the night"53 means, and so on, had to take on a different sense for them, because 
Christ's second coming could no longer be understood as an historical event that 
would take place within 80 years of his resurrection. Another meaning of Jesus' 
words developed because of this historical fact: that, generally, as Christians, we 
must always live as i f  it were the last days, and we were to meet God face to face. 
2,000 years after there is no sense in thinking that the apocalypse will take place 
shortly. The Christian m ust beware that the thief will come when he least expects 
it. This no longer means that we must always be faithful to God because the world 
is to end soon, bringing Divine judgment to all, but the exact time is not known. 
This expresses a hum an reality that we often are forgetful of God, we are fallible in 
this way. To be faithful we must always try to keep the knowledge of God at the 
forefront of our lives in order to prevent the appearance of the thief. The thief, 
then, represents the forgetfulness of serving God and his kingdom, which can be 
exemplified in serving our self-interests in the world, e. g. various actions that 
evoke vanity, arrogance, gluttony, lust and so on. Vanity, arrogance etc., often 
represents the path to death, destruction, and not eternal life, in the New Testament. 
For many, to serve our self-interests in the world amounts to serving the will of 
Satan, and not the will of God. Therefore, to be certain about the truth of some 
religious beliefs while rejecting others is rooted in the clarification of what 
everyday experiences can mean.
The Anglican theologian, John A. T. Robinson, well canvasses the above 
concerning the service to the kingdom of God and eschatological expressions, by 
writing:
What the Christian faith provides is not a blue-print for the future of man...Its assurance rests 
in the fact that the whole of life is response, that the initiative - whether in the Beginning or 
the End - does not lie with us. It speaks of an evocation, a trust, an endurance, by which, in 
freedom, men find themselves impelled and drawn on. It points to those whose whole way 
of life betokens a "beyond" that will not let them rest...54
Religious beliefs arise from our actions and reactions to life's experiences 
and events. That over 2,000 years ago a person named Jesus of Nazareth lived, 
taught, caused reactions from the society in which He lived, and was executed by 
the government, is not in question. Richard P. McBrien writes that:
53The thief is often represented as the second coming of Christ in the Gospels. This means that the 
end of the ages will come when one is inattentive and least expects it.
^John A. T. Robinson, In the End God (Harper and Row, New York, 1968), p. 139. Robinson's 
emphasis.
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...he is called Jesus Christ and not simply Jesus of Nazareth because a certain meaning or 
interpretation was given to otherwise bare historical facts of his existence some two thousand 
years ago. It is clear, in fact, that a special value was placed on the life and death of Jesus of 
Nazareth even during the first century of Christianity, immediately after his death by 
crucifixion at the hands of the local Roman government and at the instigation of the local 
religious establishment.55
The people who surrounded Jesus from the days during his ministry to his 
death had an enthusiastic reaction to Him. A Christian today finds himself in the 
position of Pontius Pilate when he asks Jesus, "Are you the king of the Jews?", and 
Jesus says, "You say so." A Christian says that he is, and this elicits a particular 
form of behavior, and it evokes certain views about the course and attitude one 
ought to have in life. How one responds to the question m ust be grounded in 
earthly existence or ordinary experiences. The belief that the book of Revelation 
predicts historical events is not grounded in the common historical facts which 
describe and clarify the actual intentions of the book's author. Learning historical 
facts of this sort is an ordinary experience, it is relevant, and it ought to be taken 
seriously by those who want to hold an intelligible belief about Revelation. A belief 
which is confused, because it is comprised of two overlapping and contradictory 
language-games, often reveals that it is not grounded in an ordinary experience. 
Superstitions often appear to be fantastic for this reason.
When showing that religious belief is grounded in ordinary experiences we 
m ust be careful not to present it in a reductionist fashion either. Believing in God 
does not necessarily mean affirming a code of ethics that is appreciated because it is 
expressed in the poetic language of scripture. This would suggest that religious 
belief is strictly an earthly affair, and that Christianity is seemingly a kind of 
aesthetic lifestyle. Believing in God normally involves holding beliefs in the center 
of one's existence which tell one what it means to be most human. The Christian 
worship of the Divine most often expresses attitudes about what to hope for, what 
to trust in, what truth is, how all the world would be made aright if everyone loved 
their neighbor, etc. Being religious is not the mere appreciation of an aesthetic way 
of life that may be abandoned without much difficulty. For some devoted 
Christian believers the difference between living with faith in Christ and not 
having faith in Christ, is equivalent to knowing w hat is real and what is an illusion.
55 Richard P. McBrien, Catholicism (HarperCollins, New York, 1981), p. 391.
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Since being religious is rooted in everyday experiences we can call attention 
to religious beliefs that contradict what everyone knows. When we investigate the 
beliefs of a person who affirms a factual reading of the book of Revelation, for 
example, we ought to raise questions about the depth of his affirmation or the 
sincerity of his beliefs. We ought to raise questions about the breadth of meaning 
of a theoretical physicist's belief that there is proof that God does not exist because 
the world was never actually created. The Christian who holds that God did 
empirically create the universe can also be asked how his belief logically connects 
w ith his ordinary life as a Christian. Does his belief that God created the world 
have the same grammar as the common belief that watchmakers create watches? If 
so, w hat would he mean by believing that God created the world? All of these 
questions come from investigating grammatical conflicts between overlapping 
language-games. They all show that a concept is being used in an obscure fashion. 
A devotional religious belief is made to function like an empirical, or historical, 
belief; and vice versa. If one has a belief which is historical in character, for 
example, his reasoning about that belief must play the rules of the language-game 
of historical facts. These grammatical conflicts can be found on the rough ground of 
ordinary discourse along with the criteria which discerns if a belief is unintelligible 
or riot.
This issue is complicated and requires delicate consideration. A careless 
investigator could easily misrepresent religiousness, or the beliefs of the religious. 
He either risks representing religion in a reductionist fashion, or as if it were 
esoteric. Of course, I do not claim to be the exemplary investigator. I have tried, 
and I hope that to some extent I have succeeded, to preserve the natural voice of 
religious beliefs and religiousness throughout my critique. My essential goal, 
nevertheless, was to elucidate a domain in which we can philosophically critique 
religious beliefs, and dismiss those which are superstitious and confused.
VI. Conclusion
In this comparative study we have seen that even though the focus upon 
foundations may seem epistemologically tempting for securing a rational base for 
a belief system, problems arise from it, notably a confused notion about what a 
basic belief actually is. Wittgenstein and the classical foundationlist agree on what
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a basic religious belief is. However, they have opposing views about its 
epistemological importance. They agree that "God exists" is a basic belief for a 
religious believer. Where that belief m ust be the epistemological focus for the 
foundationalist, Wittgenstein shows that it ought to be ignored because it expresses 
nothing and only acts implicitly in our belief system.
Philosophically speaking the reformist occupies a place in between the 
foundationalist and Wittgenstein. The reformist holds that we can describe some 
basic beliefs as acting like the foundations of a belief system in a momentary 
circumstance. It is nearly Wittgensteinian in that the reformist seeks to describe the 
logic of basicality in ordinary circumstances. However, the reformist's focus upon 
basic propositions is a feature of foundationalism. The reformed epistemologist 
departs company with Wittgenstein and the foundationalist when he suggests that 
"God is to be thanked and praised" is properly basic for a religious believer. With 
Wittgenstein we responded that even when one apprehends "God is to be thanked 
and praised" in a conducive experience, the truly basic belief is "God exists". The 
latter is logically prior to the former. Yet, "God exists" is an axial proposition and 
meaningless in its isolation, thus it gets its sense from a Christian knowing that 
"God is to be thanked and praised". This suggests that truly basic beliefs ought not 
be focused upon for rationality. If they are isolated from any use in a context, they 
have no logical function in hum an discourse, hence no logical or rational role.
We also saw that if we follow the reformist's neo-foundationalist views 
much of what is nonsensical in ordinary discourse can be justified by them. By 
focusing on the sense in ordinary discourse, and the conflicts in overlapping 
language-games that often arise, we may effectively guard against irrationalism, 
and by extension, superstitious beliefs.
We can imagine a person (individually, or instructed and urged by a 
community) who reads the book of Revelation and is overwhelmed by a sense that 
all which is portrayed in it, will literally occur. This belief is descriptively basic 
and can support non-basic beliefs in a rational noetic structure. The reformists must 
concede that it is justifiable within their view of the rationality of religious belief.
It could be imagined as a permissible belief within a religious community. But 
Wittgenstein leads us to the rough ground of ordinary discourse where we are 
confronted with other information, such as historical facts about the composition of 
the books in the Bible. When looking at historic facts that surround the 
composition of Revelation the clear sense of what a literal reading of the book
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amounts to, dissipates. To say that book was written to depict future events is 
simply not true.
W ittgenstein's primary concern is how do we make sense of our world. His 
concern is with the clarity of using all of our concepts together. Once we have 
clarity about our operative concepts, we can understand our world. Understanding 
our world amounts to knowing the grammar of history, physics, mathematics, 
commerce, art movements, as well as religious belief. History, physics and other 
subjects, are grammatically distinct from one another, yet there are important 
relationships between them which we notice in seeing them being used in 
disjunction to one another. Clearly distinguishing between what is factual from 
what is devotional by focusing on the logic of our language does not have a central 
place in the work of the reformists. If the reformists would follow Wittgenstein in 
this direction, then they too would be able to distinguish superstitious beliefs from 
intelligible ones and not allow just any belief to be deemed rational.
By traveling down the main avenues in traditional epistemology, and then 
investigating the crux of reformed epistemology, we have seen that the best 
responses to the issues surrounding reason and religious belief culminate in the 
later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. With the aid of Norman Malcolm I showed 
that the Wittgensteinian view is much more preferable than the views of traditional 
epistemology. It is Wittgenstein's work that also shows why the reformists ought 
to give up their remaining foundationalistic views. Even though the reformists are 
on the border of investigating the rationality of religious belief along with 
Wittgenstein and share many ideas with him, the distinction between their projects 
leads to results that are qualitatively different. Reformed epistemology cannot 
keep the gates of irrationalism and obscurantism from swinging open. It is with 
Wittgenstein that we notice that not just anything can be believed intelligibly. The 
very idea of philosophy being intimately bound to the passions, concerns, and 
seriousness of the lives of men and women is at stake in the reformist's work. The 
theist and atheist alike must take the understanding of the world that they inhabit 
seriously. A good point of departure can be found with Wittgenstein.
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